Bank of Canada

ISC Reports Solid Start to 2024

Retrieved on: 
수요일, 5월 8, 2024

Refer to “Caution Regarding Forward-Looking Information” in Management’s Discussion & Analysis for the three months ended March 31, 2024.

Key Points: 
  • Refer to “Caution Regarding Forward-Looking Information” in Management’s Discussion & Analysis for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
  • However, the robustness and diversity of our business means we are well‐positioned to deliver on our expectations for 2024 and beyond.
  • The Registry Operations segment is anticipated to remain as a strong free cash flow and adjusted EBITDA contributor in 2024.
  • This news release provides a general summary of ISC’s results for the quarters ended March 31, 2024, and 2023.

Connect with the best thinkers, leaders and innovators in payments at The SUMMIT

Retrieved on: 
수요일, 5월 8, 2024

With over 200 speakers and 1,800 in-person attendees, The SUMMIT will be a dynamic and thought-provoking gathering of Canadian and international leaders from across the payment ecosystem.

Key Points: 
  • With over 200 speakers and 1,800 in-person attendees, The SUMMIT will be a dynamic and thought-provoking gathering of Canadian and international leaders from across the payment ecosystem.
  • This year, The SUMMIT will explore a wide range of topics central to the future of payments in Canada and around the world, including artificial intelligence, cyber security and faster payments.
  • Ron Morrow, Executive Director, Payments, Supervision and Oversight, Bank of Canada discussing the evolution of the Canadian payments ecosystem and upcoming changes to retail payments supervision.
  • The SUMMIT provides a unique opportunity to connect with peers, learn about the latest trends and innovations, while shaping the future of payments in Canada.

BMO Survey: 72% of Aspiring Homeowners are Waiting for Rate Cuts Before Buying

Retrieved on: 
월요일, 4월 29, 2024

62% believe owning a home is still one of life's biggest aspirations, but 56% of aspiring homeowners feel owning a home is unattainable.

Key Points: 
  • 62% believe owning a home is still one of life's biggest aspirations, but 56% of aspiring homeowners feel owning a home is unattainable.
  • The Bank of Canada left interest rates unchanged in April, but left the possibility open for a rate cut by June or July 2024.
  • "Demographic forces have allowed some pent-up demand to build, and market psychology is such that many are expecting rate cuts in the second half of the year," said Robert Kavcic, Senior Economist, BMO Capital Markets.
  • BMO SmartProgress : Customers can learn more about homeownership, budgeting, and other personal finance topics from BMO SmartProgress.

Northern Trust Pension Universe Data: Canadian Pension Plan Returns Concluded the First Quarter With an Upbeat Tone Buoyed by Rising Stock Markets

Retrieved on: 
수요일, 5월 1, 2024

The first quarter of 2024 was dominated by macro-economic data flows, with particular focus on inflation and its salient components.

Key Points: 
  • The first quarter of 2024 was dominated by macro-economic data flows, with particular focus on inflation and its salient components.
  • The first quarter of 2024 witnessed some bumpy days in the financial markets driven by uncertainty surrounding the timing of monetary easing.
  • Emerging markets witnessed positive returns for the quarter, but lagged results observed by developed markets.
  • The Canadian Fixed Income market, as measured by the FTSE Canada Universe Bond Index, declined -1.2% for the quarter.

Decomposing systemic risk: the roles of contagion and common exposures

Retrieved on: 
화요일, 4월 23, 2024
Tao, CIBC, Tax, RWA, Risk, European Systemic Risk Board, Research Papers in Economics, Contagion, RT, The Big Six, NBC, International, Shock, Observation, Bank of Canada, HTC, European Economic Association, The Washington Post, Great, JPMorgan Chase, Paper, GM, Environment, Political economy, Journal of Financial Economics, COVID-19, Perception, BNS, Website, Silicon, IAT, Cifuentes, Probability, Balance sheet, RAN, Medical classification, Algorithm, Information technology, Quarterly Journal of Economics, LN, Nature, European Journal, Royal Bank of Canada, Technical report, Journal of Political Economy, Equitable Bank, Bankruptcy, RAI, PDF, Private, ECB, Policy, CHS, Supercapacitor, Social science, Journal of Financial Stability, Intelligence (journal), Elsevier, Home, Cambridge University Press, Journal, Springer Science+Business Media, Research, Classification, Regulation, News, EQB, Credit, Literature, AIK, European Central Bank, COVID, SVAR, Section 5, Management science, DRA, M4, VL, National bank, Government, ISSN, BMO, Panel, International Financial Reporting Standards, BIS, FIS, Basel III, Commerce, Scotiabank, C32, Econometric Society, Interbank, Fraud, Section 4, Bank, Schedule, VAR, Section 3, The Journal of Finance, RBC, Volcanic explosivity index, Fire, Wassily Leontief, Financial economics, Metric, Section 2, L14, Central bank, Superintendent, Bank of Montreal, Kronecker, BOC, Lithium, BCBS, Sale, Macroeconomic Dynamics, Christophe, CWB, LBC, NHA, Imperial Bank, Private equity, Quarterly Journal, National Bank of Canada, C51, Canadian Western Bank, Currency crisis, JEL classification codes, Victor Drai, L.1, MFC, Silicon Valley Bank, EB, Laurentian Bank of Canada, Federal, RA1, Series, W0, FEVD, Journal of Econometrics, Aggregate, University, FRB, MB, Financial institution, Element, Health, Book, Angels & Airwaves, Common, OSFI, GFC, Reproduction, K L, Systematic, Housing, G21, Home Capital Group, Communications satellite

Abstract

Key Points: 
    • Abstract
      We evaluate the effects of contagion and common exposure on banks? capital through
      a regression design inspired by the structural VAR literature and derived from the balance
      sheet identity.
    • Contagion can occur through direct exposures, fire sales, and market-based
      sentiment, while common exposures result from portfolio overlaps.
    • First, we document that contagion varies in time, with the highest levels
      around the Great Financial Crisis and lowest levels during the pandemic.
    • Our new framework complements
      traditional stress-tests focused on single institutions by providing a holistic view of systemic risk.
    • While existing literature presents various contagion narratives, empirical findings on
      distress propagation - a precursor to defaults - remain scarce.
    • We decompose systemic risk into three elements: contagion, common exposures, and idiosyncratic risk, all derived from banks? balance sheet identities.
    • The contagion factor encompasses both sentiment- and contractual-based elements, common exposures consider systemic
      aspects, while idiosyncratic risk encapsulates unique bank-specific risk sources.
    • Our empirical analysis of the Canadian banking system reveals the dynamic nature of contagion, with elevated levels observed during the Global Financial Crisis.
    • In conclusion, our model offers a comprehensive lens for policy intervention analysis and
      scenario evaluations on contagion and systemic risk in banking.
    • This
      notion of systemic risk implies two key components: first, systematic risks (e.g., risks related
      to common exposures) and second, contagion (i.e., an initially idiosyncratic problem becoming
      more widespread throughout the financial system) (see Caruana, 2010).
    • In this paper, we decompose systemic risk into three components: contagion, common exposures, and idiosyncratic risk.
    • First, we include contagion in three forms: sentiment-based contagion, contractual-based
      contagion, and price-mediated contagion.
    • In this context,
      portfolio overlaps create common exposures, implying that bigger overlaps make systematic
      shocks more systemic.
    • With the COVID-19 pandemic starting
      in 2020, contagion drops to all time lows, potentially related to strong fiscal and monetary
      supports.
    • That is, our
      structural model provides a framework for analyzing the impact of policy interventions and
      scenarios on different levels of contagion and systemic risk in the banking system.
    • This provides a complementary approach to
      seminal papers that took a structural approach to contagion, such as DebtRank Battiston et al.
    • More generally, the literature on networks and systemic risk started with Allen and Gale
      (2001) and Eisenberg and Noe (2001).
    • The matrix is structured as follows:
      1

      In our model, we do not distinguish between interbank liabilities and other types of liabilities.

    • In other words, we can and aim to estimate different degrees
      of contagion per asset class, i.e., potentially distinct parameters ?Ga .
    • For that, we build three major
      metrics to check: average contagion, average common exposure, and average idiosyncratic risk.
    • N i j

      et ,
      Further, we define the (N ?K) common exposure matrix as Commt = [A

      (20)

      et ]diag (?C
      ?L

      such that average common exposure reads,
      average common exposure =

      1 XX
      Commik,t .

    • N i j

      (22)

      20

      ? c ),

      The three metrics?average contagion, average common exposure, and average idiosyncratic risk?provide a comprehensive framework for understanding banking dynamics.

    • Figure 4 depicts the average level of risks per systemic risk channel: contagion risk, common exposure, and idiosyncratic risk.
    • Figure 4: Average levels of contagion (Equation (20)), common exposure (Equation (21)), and idiosyncratic risk
      (Equation (22)).
    • The market-based contagion is the contagion due to
      investors? sentiment, and the network is an estimate FEVD on volatility data.
    • For most of
      the sample, we find that contagion had a bigger impact on the variance than common exposures.

A new measure of firm-level competition: an application to euro area banks

Retrieved on: 
목요일, 4월 18, 2024

Abstract

Key Points: 
    • Abstract
      This paper extends Boone (2008) by introducing a competition measure at the individual
      firm level rather than for an entire market segment.
    • We apply this extended Boone indicator to individual bank-level competition
      in the loan market in the four largest euro area countries and Austria.
    • Our new measure of firm-level competition enriches and complements
      other competition measures and provides a promising starting point for future market
      power analyses.
    • The only measure among non-structural measures that is based on the
      concept of competition as a process of rivalry is the Boone (2008) indicator.
    • We introduce
      a new performance measure of competition by extending the Boone indicator to the
      individual firm level.
    • Introduction
      The ability to reliably measure competition is valuable to researchers, analysts, and
      policymakers, especially antitrust authorities, financial supervisors, and central banks.
    • One broad
      category of indicators often used to measure competition are structural competition
      measures, such as static concentration measures, and dynamic measures, e.g., entry and
      exit rates.
    • Out of these measures, the only measure based on the
      concept of competition as a process of rivalry is the Boone indicator.
    • This study introduces a new performance measure of competition by extending the
      Boone indicator to the individual firm level.
    • It thus measures the
      increase in profits in percent of one percentage point increase in efficiency, with marginal
      costs as measure of efficiency.
    • We extend the theoretical
      underpinning of the measurement of competition for the entire market of Boone (2008) by
      a new measure of individual firm-level competition.
    • A concern of the literature is the gap
      between the practical application and the theoretical framework of Boone (2008).
    • We introduce within the same theoretical
      framework a new measure of competition on firm level, the MRP.
    • Our new
      measure significantly augments the antitrust evaluative framework by shedding light on
      whether a merger results in a less competitive market.
    • Our novel indicator focuses on
      firms? incentives to enhance their relative efficiency, as manifested in the elasticity
      between relative profits and efficiency.
    • However, an inefficient firm that is foreclosed could be more
      competitive than the larger efficient firm that relies on its scale economies.
    • Our new metric of competition unveils
      banks? ability to influence their profitability in the short term by cutting costs relative to
      their peers.
    • The new MRP indicator provides the ability to assess the impact
      of individual banks? competitiveness on their interest rate-setting behaviour in loan
      markets.
    • Incorporating this information promises a more refined understanding of the impact and
      timing of monetary policy rates changes on the real economy.
    • Section 3 introduces within the Boone
      (2008) theoretical framework our new measure of individual firm-level competition,
      including the interpretation of the MRP.
    • Section 4 provides an application of our new
      ECB Working Paper Series No 2925

      6

      individual firm-level competition measure to the loan market.

    • The StructureConduct-Performance paradigm (SCP) provides a traditional framework in the field of
      industrial organization for analysing competition behaviour in markets.
    • Concentrated
      markets ease the possibilities to collude implicitly or explicitly and therefore concentrated
      markets result in higher prices and profits.
    • For example, a tougher competition
      setup may lead to a reallocation of market shares, potentially forcing some firms to exit
      the market.
    • This approach gives firms? strategic behaviour
      central stage and focuses on the strategic interaction on prices and quantities, known as
      conjectural variation.
    • Another measure from
      this strand of literature is the H-statistic developed by Panzar and Rosse (1987).
    • The only competition measure from this performance literature where competition is the
      outcome from a process of rivalry is the Boone indicator.
    • A continuous and monotonically increasing relationship exists between
      RPD and the level of competition if firms are ranked by decreasing efficiency.
    • (2013) compare the Boone indicator with the price-cost margin
      and conclude that the profit elasticity is a more reliable measure of competition.
    • The high
      elasticity of profits to efficiency unequivocally indicates that the high market shares and
      therefore high profits are due to high efficiency.
    • A firm that quickly passes changes to the input prices is seen as a price
      taker with little market power.
    • Indicators of competition tend to measure different phenomenon and may provide
      conflicting messages, as reported for European banking by Carbo et al.
    • Application 2: Test the ?quiet life? and related market structure hypotheses using the
      MRP as competition or market structure measure.
    • Data
      Our application to individual bank-level competition in the euro area loan market uses
      balance sheet and income statement data from the Moody?s Analytics BankFocus for the
      calendar years 2013-2020.
    • As such, most publications
      on competition in the euro area includes the largest four member states.
    • Due to these restrictions the database was reduced to an unbalanced panel of up to 1862
      banks (depending on the year) from five euro area countries.
    • Application 1: Measure bank competition using MRP
      Looking at the distribution of the MRP for individual banks (Fig.
    • A similar finding for the four largest euro area countries as a group is
      reported in Carbo et al.
    • Application 2: Test of market structure hypotheses using MRP
      Our new measure of individual-bank competition can be used to test market structure
      theories.
    • Euro area banks? market power,
      lending channel and stability: the effects of negative policy rates, European Central Bank
      Working Paper, 2790 (February).
    • A
      new approach to measuring competition in the loan markets of the euro area, Applied
      Economics, 43 (23), 3155?3167.
    • Impact of bank competition on the interest rate pass-through in the euro area, Applied
      Economics, 45 (11), 1359?1380.

Central bank digital currency and monetary policy implementation

Retrieved on: 
목요일, 4월 18, 2024

Key Points: 

    Transactional demand for central bank digital currency

    Retrieved on: 
    목요일, 4월 18, 2024

    Key Points: 

      Digital euro safeguards – protecting financial stability and liquidity in the banking sector

      Retrieved on: 
      목요일, 4월 18, 2024

      A digital euro would offer a wide range of

      Key Points: 
        • A digital euro would offer a wide range of
          financial stability benefits, including safeguarding the role of public money and
          strengthening the strategic autonomy and monetary sovereignty of the euro area in
          the digital era.
        • Keywords: CBDC, digital euro, bank intermediation, financial stability risks.
        • A digital euro has the potential to offer a wide range of financial stability
          benefits for the digital era.
        • A digital euro would
          stimulate financial innovation among private sector entities and enhance the
          efficiency and resilience of the financial system by supporting competition and
          diversity within it.3 In addition, a digital euro would strengthen the strategic autonomy
          and monetary sovereignty of the euro area.
        • A digital euro would be designed to minimise risks to the financial system.
        • 2

          The preparation phase will pave the way for a future decision on whether or not to issue a digital euro.

        • When gauging the implications for the euro area banking sector of introducing a
          digital euro, take-up would be key, as it would determine the level of deposit
          outflows.
        • In the latter case, the
          issuance of a digital euro would not affect banks? balance sheets, since banks would return euro
          banknotes to the Eurosystem in exchange for digital euro.
        • Banknotes and digital euro are two different
          types of central bank liability, so a swap between banknotes and digital euro would only affect the
          composition and not the size of the Eurosystem?s balance sheet.
        • In our analysis, we model only the
          substitution of commercial bank deposits with a possible future digital euro.
        • 8

          The legislative proposal on a digital euro provides for the inclusion of such safeguards and establishes
          specific criteria for the limits, aiming to contain the use of a digital euro as a store of value.

        • ECB Occasional Paper Series No 346

          4

          2

          The added value of digital euro
          safeguards such as holding limits
          To understand the benefits of digital euro safeguards, such as holding limits, it
          is useful to first consider the implications of introducing a CBDC without
          adequate safeguards.

        • (2022), ?Central bank digital currency and bank intermediation: Exploring different
          approaches for assessing the effects of a digital euro on euro area banks?, Occasional Papers, No 293,
          European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, May.
        • deciding to adopt the digital euro, and (ii) the average amount of digital euro in a
          wallet.
        • At the same time, as discussed in this paper, the design of a digital euro would
          include effective safeguards, such as individual holding limits, to mitigate
          potential financial stability risks.
        • ECB Occasional Paper Series No 346

          15

          an upper bound on the amount of digital euro in circulation, thereby addressing and
          limiting financial stability concerns associated with the introduction of a digital euro.

        • (2023), ?A digital euro: gauging the
          financial stability implications?, Financial Stability Review, ECB, November.

      BC Check-Up: Investment climate shows strength in housing construction, but challenges in economic growth and major projects

      Retrieved on: 
      화요일, 4월 9, 2024

      "Despite these challenges, residential building investment remained strong, particularly in high density units."

      Key Points: 
      • "Despite these challenges, residential building investment remained strong, particularly in high density units."
      • Non-residential building investment reached $7.9 billion, up 6.5 per cent from 2022, with a notable increase in investment in institutional and governmental projects, particularly healthcare facilities.
      • However, B.C.’s major project inventory was valued at $373.0 billion in Q3 2023, down 4.2 per cent compared to Q3 2022.
      • Prioritizing a clear strategy towards a balanced budget is essential to maintaining the province’s ability to address future challenges.”