Working paper

Dominant currency pricing in international trade of services

Retrieved on: 
Donnerstag, April 25, 2024

Abstract

Key Points: 
    • Abstract
      We analyze, for the first time, how firms choose the currency in which they price transactions
      in international trade of services and investigate, using direct evidence, whether the US dollar
      (USD) plays a dominant role in services trade.
    • JEL: F14, F31, F41
      Keywords: dominant currency paradigm, international trade, services.
    • Related research has
      shown that the US dollar (USD) exchange rate is a major source of swings in
      global trade in goods?a ?dominant currency pricing? (DCP) phenomenon?since
      most goods traded internationally are invoiced and sticky in USD.
    • Yet it is also key to look at dominant currency pricing in international trade
      in services for several reasons.
    • First, global trade in services is big?accounting for
      about a quarter of global gross trade flows and for around 40% in terms of valueadded trade.
    • Third, and relatedly, the
      future of globalisation might be in trade in intermediate services?as progress with
      digitech lowers technological barriers to such trade across borders.
    • But perhaps the main reason is that trade in services is conceptually different
      from trade in goods.
    • Our paper is the first, to our best knowledge, that analyzes how firms choose
      the currency in which they price transactions in international trade of services and
      that examines whether dominant currency pricing differs between trade in goods
      and services using direct evidence? hitherto unavailable?on patterns of currency
      choices in international transactions in services compared to goods.
    • Work on dominant currency pricing has
      almost exclusively focused on trade in goods.
    • One reason is that data on patterns
      in invoicing currency for trade in services are ?virtually nonexistent? (Adler et al.
    • Yet it is important to look at dominant currency pricing in international trade
      in services for several reasons.
    • Using the exporter?s (or producer) currency in exports is known in the literature as producer
      currency pricing (PCP), while using the importer?s currency is known as local currency pricing (LCP)
      and using a third currency is known as vehicle currency pricing (VCP).
    • Our paper is the first, to our best knowledge, that analyzes how firms choose the
      currency in which they price transactions in international trade of services and that
      examines whether dominant currency pricing differs between international trade in
      goods and services using direct evidence ? hitherto unavailable ? on patterns of
      currency choices in international transactions in services compared to goods.
    • First,
      we rule out compositional effects, that is that differences in the use of currencies
      reflect differences in trade partners in services vs. goods trade.
    • Both in extra-EU and intra-EU trade, the EUR is the
      most widely used currency, be it on the export or import side.
    • Based
      on the framework, we stress which factors should determine currency choices in
      international trade, and to what extent one should expect differences between
      services trade and goods trade.
    • Second, it can price in the importer?s currency
      (local currency pricing, LCP).4 Third, it can use a third currency, say currency
      v (vehicle currency pricing, VCP).
    • That is,
      the currency choice problem is equivalent to determining the currency in which the
      desired price is least volatile.
    • (2022)
      provide systematic empirical evidence ? firm size and exposure to foreign currencies
      in imported inputs ? should also shape currency choices in services trade.
    • Dominant currency pricing in USD ? services vs. goods trade
      Having established that currency choice in international trade of services is an
      active firm-level decision as well as the determinants of this decision, we now

      8.

    • Services and goods exports: prevalence of different pricing strategies (percent)
      Notes: The table shows the shares (in value terms) of different pricing strategies: producer currency
      pricing (PCP), local currency pricing (LCP) and vehicle currency pricing (VCP).
    • To make comparisons with goods trade, we rely on Eurostat?s
      macro data on international trade in goods by invoivcing currency.
    • If intra-EU trade is more important in services than
      in goods trade, this could hence be an explanation for the lower prevalence of the
      USD in services trade.
    • We showed
      that while the USD is also extensively used as a vehicle currency in services trade, its
      prevalence is systematically lower than in goods trade.
    • Hence for all travel services exports
      the invoicing currency is the EUR; for travel imports it is the currency of the
      destination of travel (i.e.
    • Also for these

      ECB Working Paper Series No 2932

      33

      services it seems plausible that trade does not take place vis-?-vis all counterparts
      in each currency.

    • Figure B.2: Share of international trade in services in global GDP broken down by type (%)
      Notes: Authors? calculations using World Bank and World Trade Organization data.
    • An earlier version of this paper circulated under the title ?Currency choices and the role of the
      U.S. dollar in international services trade?.

Central bank asset purchases and auction cycles revisited: new evidence from the euro area

Retrieved on: 
Freitag, April 19, 2024

Working Paper Series

Key Points: 
    • Working Paper Series
      Federico Maria Ferrara

      Central bank asset purchases
      and auction cycles revisited:
      new evidence from the euro area

      No 2927

      Disclaimer: This paper should not be reported as representing the views of the European Central Bank
      (ECB).

    • Abstract
      This study provides new evidence on the relationship between unconventional monetary
      policy and auction cycles in the euro area.
    • The findings indicate that Eurosystem?s asset purchase flows mitigate
      yield cycles during auction periods and counteract the amplification impact of market volatility.
    • The dampening effect of central bank asset purchases on auction cycles is more sizeable and
      precisely estimated for purchases of securities with medium-term maturities and in jurisdictions
      with relatively lower credit ratings.
    • On the other hand, central banks may influence price dynamics in these markets, most notably
      through their asset purchase programmes.
    • If so, do central bank asset purchases
      affect bond yield movements around auction dates?
    • Auction cycles are present when secondary market yields rise in
      anticipation of a debt auction and fall thereafter, generating an inverted V-shaped pattern around auction
      dates.
    • ECB Working Paper Series No 2927

      3

      1

      Introduction

      The impact of central bank asset purchases on government bond markets is a focal point of economic and
      financial research.

    • If so,
      do central bank asset purchases shape yield sensitivity around auction dates?
    • The paper provides new evidence on the effects of Eurosystem?s asset purchases on secondary market
      yields around public debt auction dates.
    • The analysis builds on previous research based on aggregate data
      on central bank asset purchases and a shorter analysis period (van Spronsen and Beetsma 2022).
    • Using
      granular data on Eurosystem?s asset purchases offers an opportunity to shed light on the mechanisms linking
      unconventional monetary policy and auction cycles.
    • Given this legal constraint, the study
      hypothesises that the effect of asset purchases on 10-year auction cycles is mostly indirect, and goes via price
      spillovers generated by purchases of securities outside the 10-year maturity space.
    • Taken together, these results provide new evidence about auction cycles in Europe and contribute to a
      larger literature on the flow effects of central bank asset purchases on bond markets.
    • Section 4 offers descriptive evidence about auction cycles in the euro area.
    • Auction cycles are defined by the presence of an inverted V-shaped pattern in secondary market yields
      around primary auctions.
    • That is, government bond yields rise in the run-up to the date of the auction and
      fall back to their original level after the auction.
    • Their limited risk-bearing capacities and inventory management operations are
      seen as key mechanisms driving auction cycles (Beetsma et al.
    • ECB Working Paper Series No 2927

      7

      Second, central bank asset purchases can alleviate the cycle by (partly) absorbing the additional supply
      of substitutable instruments in the secondary market (van Spronsen and Beetsma 2022).

    • This expectation is
      supported by several analyses on the price effects of central bank bond purchases (D?Amico and King 2013;
      Arrata and Nguyen 2017; De Santis and Holm-Hadulla 2020).
    • Empirically, previous research has provided evidence of auction cycles taking place across different jurisdictions.
    • (2016) detect auction cycles for government debt in Italy, but not in Germany, during the European
      sovereign debt crisis.
    • Research on the impact of central bank asset purchases on yield cycles around auctions is still limited.
    • Their paper provides evidence
      that Eurosystem?s asset purchases reduce the presence of auction cycles for euro area government debt.
    • Nonetheless, several questions remain open about auction cycles and unconventional monetary policy
      in the euro area.
    • Therefore, they
      provide only a partial picture of auction cycles and central bank asset purchases in Europe.
    • The use of granular data on central bank asset purchases is especially important in light of the modalities
      of monetary policy implementation of the Eurosystem.
    • Altogether, these elements motivate further investigation of the relationship between central bank asset
      purchases and auction cycles in the euro area.
    • Taken together, these results confirm that Eurosystem?s asset purchases mitigate yield cycles during auction periods and counteract the amplification impact of market volatility.
    • The findings confirm that the flow
      effects of central bank purchases on yield movements around auction dates are driven by lower-rated countries.
    • Additional analyses provide evidence for an indirect effect of purchases on auction cycles and highlight
      the presence of substantial heterogeneity across jurisdictions and purchase programmes.
    • Flow Effects of Central Bank Asset Purchases on Sovereign Bond
      Prices: Evidence from a Natural Experiment.
    • Federico Maria Ferrara
      European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, Germany; email: [email protected]

      ? European Central Bank, 2024
      Postal address 60640 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
      Telephone
      +49 69 1344 0
      Website
      www.ecb.europa.eu
      All rights reserved.

Monetary asmmetries without (and with) price stickiness

Retrieved on: 
Freitag, April 19, 2024
Online, University, Public Security Section 9, Employment, Calibration, Small, Equity, Volume Ten, Research Papers in Economics, Policy, A.4, Communication, Crisis, Mass, Silvana Tenreyro, Business, Shock, Intuition, Business cycle, TFP, Volume, European Economic Review, Marginal value, SME, NBER, Forecasting, Depression, 3rd millennium, European Economic Association, Conceptual model, Journal of Monetary Economics, Insurance, Harmonization, Great Depression, CES, Economic Inquiry, Paper, Environment, Political economy, Journal of Financial Economics, MIT, University of York, COVID-19, Behavior, Review of Economic Dynamics, Rigid transformation, Website, Access to finance, Accounting, Working paper, Probability, Total, Appendix, Section 8, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Zero lower bound, Curve, Chapter, Cost, Nominal, Journal of Political Economy, Euro, PDF, ECB, Unemployment, Hoarding, STAT, Economic Policy (journal), Household, Canadian International Council, Social science, Government, Federal Reserve Bank, JEL, Journal, Textbook, Missing, Food, Private sector, A.5, Asymmetric, The Journal of Finance, Credit, Speech, Princeton University Press, Literature, NK, European Central Bank, Growth, Labour, Monetary economics, Loss aversion, Financial intermediary, Injection, Elasticity, Inventory, Subprime lending, Ben Bernanke, Finance, BIS, Phillips curve, International Economic Review, Money, London School of Economics, Marginal product of labor, Pruning, Marginal product, The Economic Journal, Rate, Aswath Damodaran, Risk, OECD, Competition (economics), Section 4, MIT Press, Consumption, Bond, Section 3, Yield curve, Loanable funds, Habit, Cobb–Douglas production function, Economy, Aarhus University, Financial economics, Section 2, Conference, Central bank, Chapter Two, Monetary policy, Capital, Hartman–Grobman theorem, CEPR, Framework, American Economic Review, Capital Markets Union, ZLB, Exercise, Liquidity, Interest, Intensive word form, Workshop, European Commission, Macroeconomic Dynamics, Population growth, B1, Response, Quarterly Journal, Community business development corporation, GDP, E31, Control, Journal of Economic Theory, Christian Social Union (UK), T2M, Hamper, Data, American Economic Journal, Aggregate, Konstantinidis, B.1, A.9, A.6, Remuneration, Civil service commission, EUR, Uncertainty, Motivation, A.7, Bank, GFC, Section 13, Motion, Reproduction, IMF, Staggers Rail Act, Abstract, Tale, Handbook, Asymmetry, Stanford University, Communications satellite

Key Points: 

    A new measure of firm-level competition: an application to euro area banks

    Retrieved on: 
    Donnerstag, April 18, 2024

    Abstract

    Key Points: 
      • Abstract
        This paper extends Boone (2008) by introducing a competition measure at the individual
        firm level rather than for an entire market segment.
      • We apply this extended Boone indicator to individual bank-level competition
        in the loan market in the four largest euro area countries and Austria.
      • Our new measure of firm-level competition enriches and complements
        other competition measures and provides a promising starting point for future market
        power analyses.
      • The only measure among non-structural measures that is based on the
        concept of competition as a process of rivalry is the Boone (2008) indicator.
      • We introduce
        a new performance measure of competition by extending the Boone indicator to the
        individual firm level.
      • Introduction
        The ability to reliably measure competition is valuable to researchers, analysts, and
        policymakers, especially antitrust authorities, financial supervisors, and central banks.
      • One broad
        category of indicators often used to measure competition are structural competition
        measures, such as static concentration measures, and dynamic measures, e.g., entry and
        exit rates.
      • Out of these measures, the only measure based on the
        concept of competition as a process of rivalry is the Boone indicator.
      • This study introduces a new performance measure of competition by extending the
        Boone indicator to the individual firm level.
      • It thus measures the
        increase in profits in percent of one percentage point increase in efficiency, with marginal
        costs as measure of efficiency.
      • We extend the theoretical
        underpinning of the measurement of competition for the entire market of Boone (2008) by
        a new measure of individual firm-level competition.
      • A concern of the literature is the gap
        between the practical application and the theoretical framework of Boone (2008).
      • We introduce within the same theoretical
        framework a new measure of competition on firm level, the MRP.
      • Our new
        measure significantly augments the antitrust evaluative framework by shedding light on
        whether a merger results in a less competitive market.
      • Our novel indicator focuses on
        firms? incentives to enhance their relative efficiency, as manifested in the elasticity
        between relative profits and efficiency.
      • However, an inefficient firm that is foreclosed could be more
        competitive than the larger efficient firm that relies on its scale economies.
      • Our new metric of competition unveils
        banks? ability to influence their profitability in the short term by cutting costs relative to
        their peers.
      • The new MRP indicator provides the ability to assess the impact
        of individual banks? competitiveness on their interest rate-setting behaviour in loan
        markets.
      • Incorporating this information promises a more refined understanding of the impact and
        timing of monetary policy rates changes on the real economy.
      • Section 3 introduces within the Boone
        (2008) theoretical framework our new measure of individual firm-level competition,
        including the interpretation of the MRP.
      • Section 4 provides an application of our new
        ECB Working Paper Series No 2925

        6

        individual firm-level competition measure to the loan market.

      • The StructureConduct-Performance paradigm (SCP) provides a traditional framework in the field of
        industrial organization for analysing competition behaviour in markets.
      • Concentrated
        markets ease the possibilities to collude implicitly or explicitly and therefore concentrated
        markets result in higher prices and profits.
      • For example, a tougher competition
        setup may lead to a reallocation of market shares, potentially forcing some firms to exit
        the market.
      • This approach gives firms? strategic behaviour
        central stage and focuses on the strategic interaction on prices and quantities, known as
        conjectural variation.
      • Another measure from
        this strand of literature is the H-statistic developed by Panzar and Rosse (1987).
      • The only competition measure from this performance literature where competition is the
        outcome from a process of rivalry is the Boone indicator.
      • A continuous and monotonically increasing relationship exists between
        RPD and the level of competition if firms are ranked by decreasing efficiency.
      • (2013) compare the Boone indicator with the price-cost margin
        and conclude that the profit elasticity is a more reliable measure of competition.
      • The high
        elasticity of profits to efficiency unequivocally indicates that the high market shares and
        therefore high profits are due to high efficiency.
      • A firm that quickly passes changes to the input prices is seen as a price
        taker with little market power.
      • Indicators of competition tend to measure different phenomenon and may provide
        conflicting messages, as reported for European banking by Carbo et al.
      • Application 2: Test the ?quiet life? and related market structure hypotheses using the
        MRP as competition or market structure measure.
      • Data
        Our application to individual bank-level competition in the euro area loan market uses
        balance sheet and income statement data from the Moody?s Analytics BankFocus for the
        calendar years 2013-2020.
      • As such, most publications
        on competition in the euro area includes the largest four member states.
      • Due to these restrictions the database was reduced to an unbalanced panel of up to 1862
        banks (depending on the year) from five euro area countries.
      • Application 1: Measure bank competition using MRP
        Looking at the distribution of the MRP for individual banks (Fig.
      • A similar finding for the four largest euro area countries as a group is
        reported in Carbo et al.
      • Application 2: Test of market structure hypotheses using MRP
        Our new measure of individual-bank competition can be used to test market structure
        theories.
      • Euro area banks? market power,
        lending channel and stability: the effects of negative policy rates, European Central Bank
        Working Paper, 2790 (February).
      • A
        new approach to measuring competition in the loan markets of the euro area, Applied
        Economics, 43 (23), 3155?3167.
      • Impact of bank competition on the interest rate pass-through in the euro area, Applied
        Economics, 45 (11), 1359?1380.

    Transactional demand for central bank digital currency

    Retrieved on: 
    Donnerstag, April 18, 2024

    Key Points: 

      Isabel Schnabel: R(ising) star?

      Retrieved on: 
      Mittwoch, April 3, 2024

      This box investigates how households have responded to the 2021-23 inflationary episode using evidence from the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey.

      Key Points: 
      • This box investigates how households have responded to the 2021-23 inflationary episode using evidence from the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey.
      • The findings suggest that households have primarily adjusted their consumption spending to cope with higher inflation.

      The impact of regulatory changes on rating behaviour

      Retrieved on: 
      Dienstag, April 2, 2024
      Długosz, Disagreement, Pi bond, Direct lending, Key, Research Papers in Economics, Finance Secretary (India), University of Oxford, STS, Journal of Economic Perspectives, International, American Economic Review, Life, Columbia Business School, British Academy of Management, Risk assessment, ABS, Rating, EBA, Development, Reputational damage, OBS, CRA, Bond credit rating, Cras, Journal of Monetary Economics, CDO, Becker, Paper, 2007–2008 financial crisis, Raja, University, Environment, Journal of Financial Economics, Perception, H3, Website, Securitization, Working paper, Market, Collection, Total, European Banking Authority, Quarterly Journal of Economics, BBB, Whetten, Column, ESMA, European Journal, Issuer, Asset quality, Information revolution, Federal Reserve Bank, OLS, Statistics, PDF, Private, ECB, Surety, Weighted-average life, CCC, European Commission, Social science, Journal of Financial Stability, JEL, Real, Bias, Journal, Research, Classification, Certification, Commission, Credit, The Journal of Finance, Literature, Karel Škréta, European Central Bank, AA, Finance Research Letters, Origination (telephony), Monetary economics, Section 5, Xia, Kraft Foods, Government, AAA, Mukherjee, Finance, Deku, DOI, White, Risk, IOSCO, MBS, OECD, Wang, Section 4, University Challenge 2013–14, Section 3, Ashcraft, Financial management, Accounting, Financial economics, Fannie Mae, Conference, Pressure, Central bank, Griffin, University of Michigan, Systematic review, EPRS, Freddie Mac, Loan, BCBS, Palgrave Macmillan, R2, Microeconomics, Quarterly Journal, Financial statement analysis, The Japanese Economic Review, Christian Social Union (UK), Green, University of Huddersfield, PSM, Management, Security (finance), Security, Civil service commission, Private placement, American Economic Journal, GFC, Reproduction, IMF, Small business, Trustee, Data

      Abstract

      Key Points: 
        • Abstract
          We examine rating behaviour after the introduction of new regulations regarding Credit Rating
          Agencies (CRAs) in the European securitisation market.
        • There is empirical evidence of rating catering in the securitisation market in the pre-GFC period (He et al.,
          2012; Efing and Hau, 2015).
        • Competition among
          CRAs could diminish ratings quality (Golan, Parlour, and Rajan, 2011) and promotes rating shopping by
          issuers resulting in rating inflation (Bolton et al., 2012).
        • This paper investigates the impact of the post-GFC regulatory changes in the European
          securitisation market.
        • In 2011, in addition to the creation of
          European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), a regulatory and supervisory body for CRAs was
          introduced.
        • We examine how rating behaviours have changed in the European securitisation market after the
          introduction of these new regulations.
        • We utilise the existence of multiple ratings and rating agreements between
          CRAs to identify the existence of rating shopping and rating catering, respectively (Griffin et al., 2013; He
          et al., 2012; 2016).
        • We find that the regulatory changes have been effective in tackling conflicts of interest between issuers
          and CRAs in the structured finance market.
        • Rating catering, which is a direct consequence of issuer and
          CRA collusion, seems to have disappeared after the introduction of these regulations.
        • There is empirical evidence of rating catering in the securitisation market in
          the pre-GFC period (He et al., 2012; Efing and Hau, 2015).
        • Competition among CRAs could diminish ratings quality (Golan, Parlour,
          and Rajan, 2011) and promotes rating shopping by issuers resulting in rating inflation (Bolton et
          al., 2012).
        • This paper investigates the impact of the post-GFC regulatory changes in the European
          securitisation market.
        • In 2011, in addition
          to the creation of European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), a regulatory and
          supervisory body for CRAs was introduced.
        • We find that the regulatory changes have been effective in tackling conflicts of interest
          between issuers and CRAs in the structured finance market.
        • Rating catering, which is a direct
          consequence of issuer and CRA collusion, seems to have disappeared after the introduction of
          these regulations.
        • Investors who previously demanded higher spreads for rating agreements for a
          multiple rated tranche, did not consider the effect of rating harmony as a risk in the post-GFC
          period.
        • Regarding rating shopping, we find that the effectiveness of the changes has been limited,
          potentially for two reasons.
        • Additionally, we also find that rating over-reliance might still be an issue, especially
          Rating catering is a broad term and it can involve rating shopping.
        • They re-examine the rating shopping and rating
          catering phenomena in the US market by looking at the post-crisis period between 2009 and 2013.
        • Using 622 CDO tranches, they also observe the existence of rating shopping and the diminishing
          of the rating catering.
        • Firstly, our main focus is the EU?s CRA Regulation and its effectiveness in reducing
          rating inflation and rating over-reliance.
        • To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to
          examine the effectiveness of the EU?s CRA regulatory changes on the investors? perception of
          rating inflation in the European ABS market.
        • Hence, the coverage and quality of our dataset constitutes significant addition
          to the literature and allows us to test the rating shopping and rating catering more authoritatively.
        • The following section reviews the literature
          on securitisation concerning CRAs and conflicts of interest, and outlines the regulatory changes
          introduced in the post-GFC period.
        • Firstly, ratings became ever more important as the Securities and
          Exchange Commission (SEC) 5 began heavily relying on CRA assessments for regulatory purposes
          (i.e.
        • the investment mandates that highlight rating agencies as the main benchmark for investment
          eligibility) (SEC, 2008; Kisgen and Strahan, 2010; Bolton et al., 2012).
        • issuers) as one of the main explanations for the rating inflation (He et al., 2011; 2012; Bolton
          et al., 2012; Efing and Hau, 2015).
        • Bolton et al., (2012) demonstrate that competition
          promotes rating shopping by issuers, leading to rating inflation.
        • The last phase, CRA III, was implemented in mid-2013 and involves an additional
          set of measures on reducing transparency and rating over-reliance.
        • As mentioned above, rating inflation can be caused by rating shopping
          In order to be eligible to use the STS classification, main parties (i.e.
        • The higher the difference in the number of ratings for a
          given ABS tranche, the greater the risk of rating shopping.
        • Alternatively, the impact of the new
          regulations could be limited when it comes to reducing rating shopping.
        • This is because, firstly,
          the conflict of interest between securitisation parties is not necessarily the sole cause for the
          occurrence of rating shopping.
        • L is a set of variables (Multiple ratings, CRA reported, Rating agreement) that
          we utilise interchangeably to capture the rating shopping and rating catering behaviour.
        • Hence, issuers are incentivised to report the highest possible rating and
          ensure each additional rating matches the desired level.
        • All in all, our results suggest that
          the new stricter regulatory measures have been effective in tackling conflicts of interest and
          reducing rating inflation caused by rating catering.
        • Self-selection might be a concern in analysing the impact of the
          new measures and investors? response with regard to the rating inflation.
        • This
          result is in line with the earlier findings suggesting that regulatory changes have reduced investors?
          suspicion of rating inflation and increased trust of CRAs.
        • Conclusion
          Several regulatory changes were introduced in Europe following the GFC aimed at tackling
          conflicts of interest between issuers and CRAs in the ABS market.
        • Utilising a sample of 12,469
          ABS issued between 1998 and 2018 in the European market, this paper examined whether these
          changes have had any impact on rating inflations caused by rating shopping and rating catering
          phenomena.
        • We find that the
          effectiveness of the changes has been more limited on rating shopping potentially for two reasons.
        • Tranche Credit Rating is the rating reported for a tranche at launch.

      Consumer participation in the credit market during the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond

      Retrieved on: 
      Dienstag, April 2, 2024
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      We find that credit demand is highest when

      Key Points: 
        • We find that credit demand is highest when
          the first lockdown ends and it drops when supportive monetary compensation schemes are implemented.
        • Credit is more likely to be
          accepted under favourable borrowing conditions and after the approval of national recovery plans.
        • We also find
          that demographic, economic factors, perceptions and expectations are associated with the demand for credit and
          the credit grant.
        • First, it adds to a rapidly growing literature on household
          borrowing behaviour during the COVID-19 pandemic; see, for example, Ho et al.
        • We provide evidence that credit applications and credit acceptances display a different pattern over
          time.
        • Credit is more likely to be accepted under favourable borrowing conditions and after the
          approval of national recovery plans.
        • In almost all countries
          households are significantly less likely to apply and to get their credit approved than in Germany.
        • In line with literature, we show that
          demographic and economic factors affect the probability for credit applications and credit approval.
        • In addition,
          the paper shows that consumer perceptions and expectations matter when they decide to apply for credit.
        • Introduction

          The participation of households in the credit market receives wide attention in the consumer finance literature
          because consumer credit enters the monetary policy transmission mechanism through the so-called ?credit
          channel?: changes in credit demand and supply have an effect on consumers' spending and investment, which in
          turn affect economic growth.

        • We use microdata from the ECB?s Consumer Expectations Survey (hereinafter CES), a survey that
          measures consumer expectations and behaviour in the euro area.
        • Its panel dimension allows for an assessment of
          how consumer behaviour changes over time and how consumers respond to critical economic shocks.
        • This way we can gauge how credit applications and credit acceptances change under different, almost
          opposite, borrowing conditions.
        • We also distinguish between the demand for long-term secured loans (mortgages) and for short-term
          uncollateralized loans (consumer loans).
        • ECB Working Paper Series No 2922

          3

          We use probit models to estimate the probability of the consumer to apply for credit and the credit being granted.

        • The rate peaks in 2020Q3 which reflects the rebound in the demand for loans when the first lockdown ended.
        • In almost all countries households are significantly less likely
          to apply and to get their credit approved than in Germany.
        • However,
          when it comes to credit acceptance, we observe that the two groups of households are more similar.
        • Finally, we find some heterogeneity with respect to the type of credit, particularly between secured and unsecured
          debt.
        • The demand for
          consumer credit is insignificant for liquid households and decreases significantly for constrained households in
          the last two quarters of our timespan.
        • The first consists of a recently growing literature which
          explores consumer behaviour in the credit market during the COVID-19 pandemic, mostly in the United States.
        • Sandler and Ricks (2020) show that consumers did not use credit card debt for financial liquidity in the early stage
          of the COVID-19 pandemic.
        • (2020) report that credit card applications and new mortgage loans
          declined during the first months of the pandemic in regions with more unemployment insurance claims.
        • Lu and
          Van der Klaauw (2021) show that there was a sharp drop in consumer credit demand, especially for credit cards.
        • (2022) document that there was a substantial decrease in the usage of credit cards and home equity lines
          of credit by Canadian consumers.
        • Our paper is also consonant with studies on the association between financial and demographic factors and
          consumers? participation in the credit market as well as on the demand for specific types of credit.
        • January 2020 ? October 2020 - The two main events are the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the
          consequential lockdowns in the euro area.
        • 4 If the
          respondent has applied for more than one type of credit, she is asked to refer to the most recent credit application.
        • Between 2021Q3 and 2022Q3 the acceptance
          rate stays above the average values, mirroring the easing of credit standards for consumer credit and other lending
          to households during this period.
        • Second, we can investigate the presence of nonlinearities in how liquidity and the credit type interact in explaining credit applications.
        • (2023) ? who show that in the United States the local pandemic severity had a strong
          negative effect on credit card spending early in the pandemic, which diminished over time.
        • First, we select mortgages and consumer credit as the two mostly reported categories for secured and

          13

          The full estimation results are reported in Table 3.

        • The right-hand side panel of Figure 6 shows that the demand for consumer credit is insignificant for both liquid
          and illiquid households.
        • It also shows that
          subjective perceptions of credit access, financial concerns and expectations on interest rates matter for the demand
          for credit.
        • In Bertola, G., Disney
          R., and Grant, C. (eds) The Economics of Consumer Credit, Cambridge MA, MIT Press.
        • Horvath, A., Kay, B. and Wix, C. (2023) The COVID-19 shock and consumer credit: Evidence from credit card
          data.
        • Magri, S. (2007) Italian households? debt: The participation to the debt market and the size of the loan.