International Economics Bulletin

Update on euro area fiscal policy responses to the energy crisis and high inflation

Retrieved on: 
星期四, 三月 30, 2023

This box provides updated estimates on the fiscal support provided by euro area governments in response to the energy crisis and high inflation, reflecting the March 2023 ECB staff macroeconomic projections.

Key Points: 
  • This box provides updated estimates on the fiscal support provided by euro area governments in response to the energy crisis and high inflation, reflecting the March 2023 ECB staff macroeconomic projections.
  • It also provides more granular information on the design and timing of these fiscal policy support measures.
  • [3] According to the March 2023 ECB staff macroeconomic projections, the discretionary fiscal support enacted by euro area governments in response to the energy crisis and high inflation remains sizeable in 2023 (Chart A).
  • This fiscal support is estimated to amount to around 1.8% of euro area GDP in 2023 (down from 1.9% in 2022) and to drop steeply to 0.5% of GDP in 2024.
  • Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, euro area energy support was relatively limited and confined to a few countries.
  • However, following the surge in energy prices in 2022, energy support measures were adopted by all euro area countries, although the size of the measures differed considerably across member states.
  • Notes: In Panel a), the size of the bars denotes the fiscal support with impact on the budget balance in gross terms.
  • The category “Mixed price-income support measures” refers to fiscal policy support measures that cannot be clearly distinguished as either income or price support.
  • The reason for the observed stickiness in the budgeted fiscal cost of energy measures is that only about 43% of such fiscal support in 2023 is linked directly to energy prices via energy price caps.
  • Overall, targeted support to low-income households and energy-intensive firms remains limited in the euro area, although with significant heterogeneity across countries.

How people want to work – preferences for remote work after the pandemic

Retrieved on: 
星期一, 二月 20, 2023

Work from home (WFH) patterns have changed substantially following the onset of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic and point to a persistently higher preference for remote work.

Key Points: 
  • Work from home (WFH) patterns have changed substantially following the onset of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic and point to a persistently higher preference for remote work.
  • This box documents the changes in WFH during the pandemic and the main drivers behind them as well as future expectations for work preferences.
  • Changes in WFH patterns and preferences potentially have important consequences for economic and social developments, including in the labour market and housing choices.
  • [4] According to CES data more than 60% of workers had never worked from home before the pandemic.
  • [6] Number of WFH days before and during the COVID-19 pandemic and preferences for after
    (percentage of respondents)

    Source: ECB (CES, May 2022).

  • *On average, workers see their preferences for WFH as broadly aligned with the preferences they perceive their employers to have.
  • Notes: The chart shows workers’ preferred number of WFH days per week and their perception of their employers’ preferences.
  • If a worker’s WFH preferences exceed what their current employer offers, this can lead to an increased willingness to change jobs.
  • [8] WFH preferences and worker retainment
    (percentage of respondents)

    Source: ECB (CES, July 2021, August 2021 and following waves until May 2022).

  • After controlling for job-specific characteristics, commute time is shown to be the most important person-specific driver of WFH preferences.