Islam

Why has it been so difficult to create smoke-free areas in Indonesia? The answer lies in the way laws are made

Retrieved on: 
Tuesday, February 13, 2024

As of 2018 only 345 out of 514 districts in Indonesia had issued laws on smoke-free areas in 2018.

Key Points: 
  • As of 2018 only 345 out of 514 districts in Indonesia had issued laws on smoke-free areas in 2018.
  • In June 2023, more than ten years after the regulation was issued nationally, 13% of districts were still yet to create local smoke-free area laws.
  • Our recent study shows the challenges local governments face translating national laws into local laws as well as the role of local politics.

Smoke-free area challenges in three provinces

  • Breaking this rule can result in various punishments, including fines or imprisonment, depending on the local regulations.
  • We analysed smoke-free area regulations in three provinces: Aceh, Malang, East Java and Bandung, West Java, to understand how local contexts influence the trajectory of law-making.
  • Aceh has one of the highest smoking rates in Indonesia and smoking plays an important social role.

Local differences

  • Each local government must go through the formal law-making process, which requires time, money and resources to research and draft the law.
  • We found the main reason for the delay was a lack of local legislative support.
  • Local governments are also required to discuss the proposed laws with relevant stakeholders to ensure the local community’s needs are met.
  • While some local leaders ardently championed the cause, their ability to influence local parliaments* is limited.

Political dynamics and patchwork laws

  • Our study also showed how making local laws is intertwined with local political dynamics.
  • The 2014 national elections shifted the narrative in Malang with the rise of political parties more supportive of smoke-free areas.
  • In Aceh, a medical doctor, the head of the smoke-free area task force, was pivotal in pushing for the required smoke-free area laws.

What’s next?

  • Our study highlights the cumbersome process of law creation.
  • Giving local politicians responsibility for creating local laws based on pre-existing national regulations creates multiple issues, especially if they do not see it as a priority.


Elisabeth Kramer receives funding from Sydney Southeast Asia Centre (SSEAC) at University of Sydney for conducting this research. Anastasia Maria Sri Redjeki, Eni Maryani, Lestari Nurhajati, Masduki, dan Rizanna Rosemary tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.

‘America is the mother of terrorism’: why the Houthis’ new slogan is important for understanding the Middle East

Retrieved on: 
Monday, February 12, 2024

As their attacks have intensified, the group’s slogan (or sarkha, meaning “scream”) has also gained notoriety.

Key Points: 
  • As their attacks have intensified, the group’s slogan (or sarkha, meaning “scream”) has also gained notoriety.
  • Banners bearing the sarkha dot the streets in areas of Yemen under Houthi control and are brandished by supporters at their rallies.
  • Read more:
    Why US strikes will only embolden the Houthis, not stop their attacks on ships in the Red Sea

Terror groups as a tool of the state

  • Some experts argue this may create more “terrorists” than it kills.
  • However, there are other layers to these slogans that are less intuitively understood by a Western audience.
  • For many in the region, groups like al-Qaeda and Islamic State function, in part, as “tools” that Western-backed authoritarian leaders use to maintain their power.


releasedal-Qaeda prisoners so they could regroup
facilitated al-Qaeda attacks against local and foreign targets
misdirected US strikes to kill political opponents rather than al-Qaeda leaders.

  • As a result, many Yemenis wouldn’t view al-Qaeda or Islamic State as being completely separate from those in charge of the country.
  • In the West, these groups are framed as rebels seeking to overturn the state.
  • But across the region, many believe these relationships defy simple categories like “state versus insurgent” or “friend versus enemy” because terror groups can be both at once.

Why the West’s policies are backfiring

  • When I asked residents about the this, they appeared to see the statement as a banal declaration of fact.
  • (Like the banners bearing the sarkha, the murals used a red barbed-wire font for the word “America”.)
  • Of course, the violence the Houthis use to sustain their own power is an irony that should not be lost.
  • Even so, their messaging taps into widespread views about the drivers of regional violence that some Western observers have long dismissed.


Sarah G. Phillips receives funding from the Australian Research Council (FT200100539). She is a Non-Resident Fellow with the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies (Yemen).

Press release - Human rights breaches in Belarus, Iran and Nigeria

Retrieved on: 
Friday, February 9, 2024

On Thursday, the European Parliament adopted three resolutions on human rights issues in Belarus, Iran and Nigeria.Subcommittee on Human Rights Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Key Points: 


On Thursday, the European Parliament adopted three resolutions on human rights issues in Belarus, Iran and Nigeria.Subcommittee on Human Rights Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

How Iran controls a network of armed groups to pursue its regional strategy

Retrieved on: 
Wednesday, February 7, 2024

But when it did, it hit at least 85 targets across Iraq and Syria.

Key Points: 
  • But when it did, it hit at least 85 targets across Iraq and Syria.
  • The Pentagon was careful not to directly attack Iran itself, but it targeted Iranian-backed groups which have been conducting raids on US military assets in the region since before Hamas launched its attack on Israel on October 7.
  • But who are these groups that Iran can rely on to act in its interests and how much of a threat do they pose to regional security?
  • It wants to remove the US from the Middle East and to replace it as the guarantor of regional security.
  • And it refuses to recognise the state of Israel, instead working with Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah to pressure the Jewish state.

Quds Force

  • The Quds Force is part of the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and is the IRGC’s primary vehicle for foreign affairs.
  • According to the Council on Foreign Relations, Quds is largely responsible for providing training, weapons, money and military advice to a range of groups in the so-called “Axis of Resistance”.

Syria

  • Quds activities in Syria are reportedly overseen by Khalil Zahedi, nicknamed Abu Mahdi al-Zahdi.
  • Iran’s principal aims in Syria are to keep the Assad regime in power, maximise Iranian influence, protect Shia minorities and reduce and – if possible – eliminate the US presence in Syria.

Iraq

  • In Iraq, since the US invasion, Iran-backed armed groups come under an umbrella organisation called the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) or Quwwāt al-Ḥashd ash-Shaʿbī.
  • The PMF claims to have as many as 230,000 fighters, mainly Shia.
  • The same year PMF’s political wing contested elections in Iraq, coming second in the poll.

Lebanon

  • Hezbollah (Party of God) was formed in 1982 to fight against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.
  • While heavily involved both politically and economically in Lebanon, Hezbollah is also active throughout the region, doing Iran’s business rather than looking after Lebanese interests.

Major headache for the west

  • Many of these groups now wield significant political influence in the countries in which they are embedded, so confronting them is not simply a military exercise.
  • And, as the dramatic rise in tensions in the region following the assault by Hamas on Israel (also planned with Iranian help) suggests, Iran is capable of fomenting trouble for the west almost at will across the region.


Christoph Bluth does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Ecowas: why withdrawal of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso signals fresh trouble for the Sahel

Retrieved on: 
Wednesday, February 7, 2024

On 27 January 2024, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger announced their plan to withdraw from membership of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), despite repeated efforts at reconciliation. Diplomacy scholar Nicholas Westcott explains how the decision may be the latest symptom of a deepening crisis in the Sahel, the area south of the Sahara desert stretching from Mauritania in the west to Chad in the east.Why does their decision pose a threat to the region?So does the risk of potential hostility to Malian and Burkinabe migrants in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal.

Key Points: 


On 27 January 2024, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger announced their plan to withdraw from membership of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), despite repeated efforts at reconciliation. Diplomacy scholar Nicholas Westcott explains how the decision may be the latest symptom of a deepening crisis in the Sahel, the area south of the Sahara desert stretching from Mauritania in the west to Chad in the east.

Why does their decision pose a threat to the region?

  • So does the risk of potential hostility to Malian and Burkinabe migrants in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal.
  • Stopping free movement between these three countries and the rest of west Africa would have serious economic consequences for all concerned.
  • Other western countries risk being tarred with the same neocolonial brush unless they reform international institutions to reflect African concerns.

What are the drivers?

  • This has been brought on by years of sluggish growth following the 2008 financial crisis, COVID and the Ukraine war, the impact of climate change and population growth.
  • Elected governments are finding it increasingly difficult to satisfy the expectations of their citizens.
  • It is almost a re-run of the 1970s when drought, corruption and development failures led to a rash of coups in the region.

Why have regional bodies like Ecowas not been able to help?

  • Faced with the juntas’ threat of secession, African regional organisations, in this case Ecowas and the African Union, face a dilemma.
  • Or do they compromise their principles to preserve at least nominal unity, and allow authoritarian governments back into the club?
  • Nevertheless, it’s possible that the departure announcement is a bargaining chip to get more lenient terms for their reintegration into Ecowas.

What lies behind the military regimes’ announcement?


Regime survival has become their overriding objective. Their explicit intention seems to be to undermine the principle that African nations should apply standards to each other. The fact that African governments themselves signed up to these principles is as irrelevant to the insurrectionists, who want to retain power, as it is to the jihadists, who want to seize it. They have set out the following justifications for their withdrawal:
Ecowas provided no support against the jihadists
Ecowas has imposed “illegal” sanctions that are harming the people
Ecowas has fallen under the influence of foreign governments.

  • They reflect an attempt to look like defenders of the poor and opponents of western influence.
  • Populations are being mobilised and armed to fight the jihadists.
  • Their official justification may be anti-terrorist duties, but their real purpose is to protect the regime from further threats of mutiny, coup or invasion.
  • The migrant trade is already thriving again in Agadez, the key transit point in northern Niger to the Mediterranean coast.


Nicholas Westcott does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Middle East crisis: US airstrikes against Iran-backed armed groups explained

Retrieved on: 
Tuesday, February 6, 2024

US airstrikes on Iran-backed armed groups on February 2 have been anticipated for some time.

Key Points: 
  • US airstrikes on Iran-backed armed groups on February 2 have been anticipated for some time.
  • Since the Hamas attacks in Israel on October 7, US forces in the Middle East have been targeted more than 150 times.
  • These attacks, mainly on US bases in Iraq and Syria caused minimal damage thanks to US air defence capabilities.

Militant groups targeted

  • There are about 40 militant groups in the region backed by Iran.
  • These include high-profile groups such as Hamas, which carried out the October 7 attack in Israel as well as Hezbollah, which has been engaged in cross-border fire with Israel on the Lebanon border since October.


Iran provides a mix of training, intelligence, funding and weapons to groups within its self-described “axis of resistance”. But Tehran does not fully control the militias, who operate with varying degrees of autonomy, and who might be better seen as affiliates than proxies.

US political choices

  • With the election year, Biden is also facing additional scrutiny from home on his foreign policy decisions.
  • The calibrated airstrikes of the weekend will probably attract further criticism from both sides – for going too far or not far enough.

Gaza conflict

  • But it’s undeniable that the crisis in Gaza has emboldened armed groups around the region, who have repeatedly used the war to justify their actions.
  • The US, Egypt and Qatar have been mediating between Israel and Hamas to negotiate a deal that would see a halt of military operations in Gaza in return for a phased release of hostages.

Preventing regional war

  • This suggests that Tehran – like Washington – is still keen to avoid a head-to-head conflict with the US.
  • For the Biden administration, the aim of preventing a regional war is still the right objective, even – perhaps especially – in the face of rising tensions.


Julie M Norman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

US raids in Iraq and Syria: How retaliatory airstrikes affect network of Iran-backed militias

Retrieved on: 
Monday, February 5, 2024

U.S. bombers struck dozens of sites across Iraq and Syria on Feb. 2, 2024, to avenge a drone attack that killed three American service members just days earlier.

Key Points: 
  • U.S. bombers struck dozens of sites across Iraq and Syria on Feb. 2, 2024, to avenge a drone attack that killed three American service members just days earlier.
  • The retaliatory strikes were the first following a deadly assault on a U.S. base in Jordan that U.S. officials blamed on Iranian-backed militias.
  • Sites associated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were among those hit by American bombs.
  • The Conversation U.S. turned to American University’s Sara Harmouch and Nakissa Jahanbani at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center – both experts on Iran’s relationship with its network of proxies – to explain what the U.S. strikes hoped to achieve and what could happen next.

Who was targeted in the U.S. retaliatory strikes?

  • This term, Islamic Resistance in Iraq, does not refer to a single group per se.
  • Rather, it encompasses an umbrella organization that has, since around 2020, integrated various Iran-backed militias in the region.
  • Iran officially denied any involvement in the Jan. 28 drone strike.
  • In recent months, parts of this network of Iran-backed militias have claimed responsibility for more than 150 attacks on bases housing U.S. forces in Syria and Iraq.
  • As such, the U.S. retaliatory strikes targeted over 85 targets across Iraq and Syria, all associated with Iranian-supported groups and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

What do we know about the network targeted in the strike?

  • The Islamic Resistance in Iraq acted as a collective term for pro-Tehran Iraqi militias, allowing them to launch attacks under a single banner.
  • Over time, it evolved to become a front for Iran-backed militias operating beyond Iraq, including those in Syria and Lebanon.
  • Today, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq operates as a cohesive force rather than as a singular entity.
  • Operating under this one banner of Islamic Resistance, these militias effectively conceal the identities of the actual perpetrators in their operations.

What are the strikes expected to accomplish?

  • The strikes targeted key assets such as command and control centers, intelligence facilities, storage locations for rockets, missiles, drones and logistics and munitions facilities.
  • The goal is not only to degrade their current operational infrastructure but also to deter future attacks.
  • The action followed the discovery of an Iranian-made drone used in an attack on Jordan.

How will this affect Iran’s strategy in the region?

  • It is possible that the cessation was the result of pressure from Tehran, though this has been met with skepticism in Washington.
  • The U.S. airstrikes – combined with sanctions and charges – serve as a multifaceted strategy to deter further aggression from Iran and its proxies.
  • The comprehensive and broad nature of the U.S. response signals a robust stance against threats to regional stability and U.S. interests.
  • The aim is to isolate Iran diplomatically and economically, while squeezing its support for regional proxies.
  • Yet the impact and repercussions of such sanctions on Iran and the broader regional dynamics is complex.
  • Editor’s note: Parts of this story were included in an article published on Jan. 29, 2024.


The views, conclusions, and recommendations in this article are the authors’ own and do not reflect those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. Sara Harmouch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

Jeddah Historic District Program: The Discovery of 25.000 Fragments of Artifacts That Dates to the Early Islamic Era

Retrieved on: 
Sunday, February 4, 2024

In addition to 685 building materials which weigh 87 kg, as well as 187 glass artifacts which weigh 5kg and 71 metal artifacts of 7kg.

Key Points: 
  • In addition to 685 building materials which weigh 87 kg, as well as 187 glass artifacts which weigh 5kg and 71 metal artifacts of 7kg.
  • The wood's origin has been identified to be Ceylon Island in the Indian Ocean which highlights the far-reaching trade connections of Historic Jeddah.
  • Moreover, several tombstones of Mangabi stone, marble, and granite were also found in different locations in Historic Jeddah.
  • Jeddah Historic District Program in cooperation with the Heritage Commission supervised the documentation, registration, and preservation of archaeological artifacts discovered in Historic Jeddah, and listed the finds in the National Archaeological Register.

Jeddah Historic District Program: The Discovery of 25.000 Fragments of Artifacts That Dates to the Early Islamic Era

Retrieved on: 
Sunday, February 4, 2024

In addition to 685 building materials which weigh 87 kg, as well as 187 glass artifacts which weigh 5kg and 71 metal artifacts of 7kg.

Key Points: 
  • In addition to 685 building materials which weigh 87 kg, as well as 187 glass artifacts which weigh 5kg and 71 metal artifacts of 7kg.
  • The wood's origin has been identified to be Ceylon Island in the Indian Ocean which highlights the far-reaching trade connections of Historic Jeddah.
  • Moreover, several tombstones of Mangabi stone, marble, and granite were also found in different locations in Historic Jeddah.
  • Jeddah Historic District Program in cooperation with the Heritage Commission supervised the documentation, registration, and preservation of archaeological artifacts discovered in Historic Jeddah, and listed the finds in the National Archaeological Register.

Drone attack on American troops risks widening Middle East conflict – and drawing in Iran-US tensions

Retrieved on: 
Tuesday, January 30, 2024

A drone attack that killed three American troops and wounded at least 34 more at a base in Jordan has increased fears of a widening conflict in the Middle East – and the possibility that the U.S. may be further drawn into the fighting.

Key Points: 
  • A drone attack that killed three American troops and wounded at least 34 more at a base in Jordan has increased fears of a widening conflict in the Middle East – and the possibility that the U.S. may be further drawn into the fighting.
  • President Joe Biden vowed to respond to the assault, blaming Iran-backed militias for the first U.S. military casualties in months of such strikes in the region.
  • The Conversation turned to Sara Harmouch, an expert on asymmetric warfare and militant groups in the Middle East, to answer these and other questions.

What do we know about the group that claimed responsibility?

  • Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyah fi al-Iraq, which translates as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, has claimed responsibility for the drone attack.
  • However, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is not a single group per se.
  • Rather, it is a term used to describe an umbrella organization, which, since around 2020, has included various Iran-backed militias in the region.
  • This deliberate strategy hinders direct attribution and poses challenges for countries attempting to identify and retaliate against the precise culprits.

What do they hope to achieve in attacking a US target?

  • Since the beginning of the conflict in October 2023, Iranian-backed militias have repeatedly struck American military bases in Iraq and Syria, recently expanding their attacks to include northeastern Jordan near the Syrian border.
  • The attack in Jordan forms part of a strategy by Iranian-backed militias to counter Washington’s support for Israel in the Gaza conflict.
  • But it is also aimed at advancing a wider goal of pushing U.S. forces out of the Middle East entirely.

What role did Iran have in the attack?

  • But the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is known to be part of the networks of militia groups that Tehran supports.
  • Iran, through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, has provided such militias with money, weapons and training.
  • By doing so, Iran maintains plausible deniability when it comes to attacks carried out by its proxies.

What options does the US have to respond?

  • The Biden administration faces complex dynamics when it comes to responding to attacks linked to Iranian-backed militias.
  • This strategy has been employed in the past, yet it has not significantly curbed Iran’s or its proxies’ aggressive actions.
  • The concern is that while such strikes are precise, they may not be enough to deter ongoing or future attacks.
  • The Biden administration’s need to balance a strong response with the geopolitical consequences highlights the difficulties of navigating a tense and evolving situation.

How might the attack affect the wider Middle East conflict?

  • How the U.S. responds could reshape the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape and influence the dynamics of proxy warfare in the region.
  • A strong military response from Washington might deter Iranian-backed militias from future attacks, but it could also provoke them into taking more aggressive actions.
  • In the short term, any U.S. retaliation – especially if it targets Iranian interests directly – could escalate tensions in the region.


Sara Harmouch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.