Corruption

• But it has not answered the fundamental question of what a winning – or even surviving – strategy in the war with Russia could look like as it moves into its third year.
• Several dynamics have come together that are deeper and more complex than just a major reshuffle of the military leadership.
• This is especially the case if victory for Ukraine means forcing Russia’s complete withdrawal from all territory occupied since 2014.

• It also represents, at best, pyrrhic victories for Russia – as in the case of Bakhmut.
• But taken together, and seen in the context of the failed 2023 counter-offensive, these were not just symbolic defeats.
• They marked a real and extremely wasteful loss of financial resources, manpower and military equipment.

Faltering international support

• The second key factor to keep in mind is that Ukraine’s battlefield successes in 2022 occurred at a time when western support for Ukraine was in full swing.
• This has been evident in the protracted battles in the US congress over sending more military aid to Ukraine.
• Despite some detractors, the EU remains committed to support for Ukraine.

War fatigue

• Meanwhile, Ukrainian society is increasingly suffering from war fatigue.
• Military setbacks, economic decline, deteriorating living conditions, corruption and the scale of the loss of lives – among troops and civilians alike – makes sustaining the war effort at present levels more difficult as well.
• Its provisions, including lowering the conscription age from 27 to 25 years, mandatory digital certificates and electronic prescription notifications and stricter penalties for evading military service, are further evidence of the waning enthusiasm in Ukrainian society for the war effort.
• Yet, because replacing Zaluzhny has not come with a signal that Ukraine’s war strategy will fundamentally change, this is a very risky move on the part of Zelensky.

• He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.
• Tetyana Malyarenko receives funding from Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and University of Regensburg, Germany

• The booklet series also reports that orphanages in Haiti often serve as breeding grounds for sexual and physical abuse, neglect, and corruption.
• To access the first two installments of the "Orphanages are NOT the Answer" booklet series, interested readers are encouraged to visit www.orphanagesarenottheanswer.org .
• To be informed of the release of the third booklet of this series, sign up for our newsletter on the website.
• Join Overture International in revolutionizing the narrative and advocating for a future where families thrive and communities flourish.

Ambitious and mercurial, with a dark past, former army general Prabowo Subianto has spent a lifetime vying for the ultimate prize in Indonesian politics. Now, with a large lead in the latest polls ahead of this week’s election, it looks as though the presidency is finally within his grasp. So, who is Prabowo and how will he change Indonesia if he wins?

A rapid rise through the military ranks – and fall

• Prabowo’s grandfather was the founder of Indonesia’s first state bank and a prominent member of Indonesia’s independence movement.
• His father was a leading economist who served as minister of finance, minister of trade and minister for research in the government.

• An ambitious military officer serving mostly in the Special Forces (Kopassus), his marriage to a daughter of the authoritarian former president, Soeharto, fast-tracked his career.
• Prabowo rose to the rank of lieutenant general and, finally, the key position of commander of the powerful Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) in the capital, Jakarta.
• As Soeharto’s regime began to falter amid the financial crisis of 1997, Prabowo become involved in covert operations to defend Soeharto’s army-backed and repressive New Order regime against its critics.
• He went into voluntary exile in Jordan for some years and it seemed his career was over.

Three unsuccessful bids for higher office

• By 2009, he was a wealthy business figure and had co-founded his own political party, Gerindra.
• He had also rehabilitated himself enough to make a formal bid for power, running for vice president in the 2009 elections on a ticket with former president Megawati Soekarnoputri.
• In 2019, he tried once again against Jokowi, this time turning to conservative Islamists to support him.
• Dumping his supporters, he took the position of defence minister in the cabinet of his rival, Jokowi.

Controversial political moves

• In his current run for president, Prabowo has selected Jokowi’s son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, as his vice-presidential running mate.
• (Although Jokowi has never explicitly endorsed Prabowo, Gibran’s candidacy makes Jokowi’s preferences crystal clear.)
• His actions also pose a major threat to PDI-P’s prospects in the legislative elections (held at the same time as the presidential vote).
• To the PDI-P leader, former president Megawati, and many of her supporters, Jokowi is now a traitor and enemy who may inflict huge damage on their political prospects.

Why this election matters

• However, Prabowo has undergone (yet another) spectacular reinvention in recent months that has helped as well.
• In fact, he has repeatedly said Indonesia’s democratic system is not working and the country should return to its original 1945 constitution.
• This would mean unravelling most of the reforms introduced since Soeharto fell, which are largely based on constitutional amendments.
• This means many have no memory of Soeharto’s oppressive and abusive New Order that Prabowo seems to want to revive.

Tim Lindsey receives funding from the Australian Research Council

• Kenya has scores of youth gangs known for their violence and links to the politically powerful.
• None is more infamous than the Mungiki movement, with a past membership estimated to be at least a million.

What gave rise to Mungiki?

• The early 1990s witnessed the first bout of politically instigated inter-ethnic conflict intended to diminish Kikuyu influence in local politics.
• Mungiki emerged as a Kikuyu youth movement, defending the dispossessed: women, migrants and landless youth.
• At this time the grouping also opposed the autocratic and corrupt government of Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin.
• In the 1997, 2002 and 2007 parliamentary and presidential elections, leading politicians mobilised violent youth militia in support of their campaigns.
• In Nairobi’s shantytowns, Mungiki activists and militia competed with other militias like Kamjesh, and the Taliban in Mathare Valley.

What are the group’s practices and beliefs?

• Mungiki operates primarily in urban neighbourhoods where it combines vigilante, welfare, cultural and criminal activities.
• It reaches back into Kenya’s pre-colonial and colonial history for the origins of its beliefs and practices.
• The values underlying these practices continued during Kenya’s anti-colonial struggle in the 1940s and 1950s, in the liberation movement known as Mau Mau, which was predominantly Kikuyu.
• These values, although modified and expanded, still form the core of Mungiki’s practices and beliefs.

Why was it banned?

• Throughout its existence, the organisation has resorted to violence to recruit and keep members.
• At the political level, national and local leaders may see the popularity and persistence of the movement as a threat to stability and their own hold on power.

Though banned, it hasn’t really gone away, has it?

• He made public his conversion to Christianity in 2006, and on his release in 2009 he declared the movement finished.
• It has a moral appeal to young men and women for stressing “clean living”, without loose sex and alcohol.
• Kenyan politics are still violent, the domain of elderly, entitled men, and ridden with mistrust and corruption.

Bodil Folke Frederiksen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.