Journal of Monetary Economics
Is home bias biased? New evidence from the investment fund sector
Central bank digital currency and monetary policy implementation
Transactional demand for central bank digital currency
Digital euro safeguards – protecting financial stability and liquidity in the banking sector
A digital euro would offer a wide range of
- A digital euro would offer a wide range of
financial stability benefits, including safeguarding the role of public money and
strengthening the strategic autonomy and monetary sovereignty of the euro area in
the digital era. - Keywords: CBDC, digital euro, bank intermediation, financial stability risks.
- A digital euro has the potential to offer a wide range of financial stability
benefits for the digital era. - A digital euro would
stimulate financial innovation among private sector entities and enhance the
efficiency and resilience of the financial system by supporting competition and
diversity within it.3 In addition, a digital euro would strengthen the strategic autonomy
and monetary sovereignty of the euro area. - A digital euro would be designed to minimise risks to the financial system.
- 2
The preparation phase will pave the way for a future decision on whether or not to issue a digital euro.
- When gauging the implications for the euro area banking sector of introducing a
digital euro, take-up would be key, as it would determine the level of deposit
outflows. - In the latter case, the
issuance of a digital euro would not affect banks? balance sheets, since banks would return euro
banknotes to the Eurosystem in exchange for digital euro. - Banknotes and digital euro are two different
types of central bank liability, so a swap between banknotes and digital euro would only affect the
composition and not the size of the Eurosystem?s balance sheet. - In our analysis, we model only the
substitution of commercial bank deposits with a possible future digital euro. - 8
The legislative proposal on a digital euro provides for the inclusion of such safeguards and establishes
specific criteria for the limits, aiming to contain the use of a digital euro as a store of value. - ECB Occasional Paper Series No 346
4
2
The added value of digital euro
safeguards such as holding limits
To understand the benefits of digital euro safeguards, such as holding limits, it
is useful to first consider the implications of introducing a CBDC without
adequate safeguards. - (2022), ?Central bank digital currency and bank intermediation: Exploring different
approaches for assessing the effects of a digital euro on euro area banks?, Occasional Papers, No 293,
European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, May. - deciding to adopt the digital euro, and (ii) the average amount of digital euro in a
wallet. - At the same time, as discussed in this paper, the design of a digital euro would
include effective safeguards, such as individual holding limits, to mitigate
potential financial stability risks. - ECB Occasional Paper Series No 346
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an upper bound on the amount of digital euro in circulation, thereby addressing and
limiting financial stability concerns associated with the introduction of a digital euro. - (2023), ?A digital euro: gauging the
financial stability implications?, Financial Stability Review, ECB, November.
As interest rates surge: flighty deposits and lending
ECB Consumer Expectations Survey results – February 2024
This box investigates how households have responded to the 2021-23 inflationary episode using evidence from the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey.
- This box investigates how households have responded to the 2021-23 inflationary episode using evidence from the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey.
- The findings suggest that households have primarily adjusted their consumption spending to cope with higher inflation.
Speculation in oil and gas prices in times of geopolitical risks
Overall, speculation has only a limited role in both oil and gas price dynamics, although the degree of speculation is somewhat higher in European gas markets than in US gas markets.
- Overall, speculation has only a limited role in both oil and gas price dynamics, although the degree of speculation is somewhat higher in European gas markets than in US gas markets.
- Empirical estimates also suggest that the role of speculation in amplifying the transmission of fundamental shocks to oil prices is limited, including in times of heightened geopolitical risk.
US monetary policy is more powerful in low economic growth regimes
The impact of regulatory changes on rating behaviour
Abstract
- Abstract
We examine rating behaviour after the introduction of new regulations regarding Credit Rating
Agencies (CRAs) in the European securitisation market. - There is empirical evidence of rating catering in the securitisation market in the pre-GFC period (He et al.,
2012; Efing and Hau, 2015). - Competition among
CRAs could diminish ratings quality (Golan, Parlour, and Rajan, 2011) and promotes rating shopping by
issuers resulting in rating inflation (Bolton et al., 2012). - This paper investigates the impact of the post-GFC regulatory changes in the European
securitisation market. - In 2011, in addition to the creation of
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), a regulatory and supervisory body for CRAs was
introduced. - We examine how rating behaviours have changed in the European securitisation market after the
introduction of these new regulations. - We utilise the existence of multiple ratings and rating agreements between
CRAs to identify the existence of rating shopping and rating catering, respectively (Griffin et al., 2013; He
et al., 2012; 2016). - We find that the regulatory changes have been effective in tackling conflicts of interest between issuers
and CRAs in the structured finance market. - Rating catering, which is a direct consequence of issuer and
CRA collusion, seems to have disappeared after the introduction of these regulations. - There is empirical evidence of rating catering in the securitisation market in
the pre-GFC period (He et al., 2012; Efing and Hau, 2015). - Competition among CRAs could diminish ratings quality (Golan, Parlour,
and Rajan, 2011) and promotes rating shopping by issuers resulting in rating inflation (Bolton et
al., 2012). - This paper investigates the impact of the post-GFC regulatory changes in the European
securitisation market. - In 2011, in addition
to the creation of European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), a regulatory and
supervisory body for CRAs was introduced. - We find that the regulatory changes have been effective in tackling conflicts of interest
between issuers and CRAs in the structured finance market. - Rating catering, which is a direct
consequence of issuer and CRA collusion, seems to have disappeared after the introduction of
these regulations. - Investors who previously demanded higher spreads for rating agreements for a
multiple rated tranche, did not consider the effect of rating harmony as a risk in the post-GFC
period. - Regarding rating shopping, we find that the effectiveness of the changes has been limited,
potentially for two reasons. - Additionally, we also find that rating over-reliance might still be an issue, especially
Rating catering is a broad term and it can involve rating shopping. - They re-examine the rating shopping and rating
catering phenomena in the US market by looking at the post-crisis period between 2009 and 2013. - Using 622 CDO tranches, they also observe the existence of rating shopping and the diminishing
of the rating catering. - Firstly, our main focus is the EU?s CRA Regulation and its effectiveness in reducing
rating inflation and rating over-reliance. - To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to
examine the effectiveness of the EU?s CRA regulatory changes on the investors? perception of
rating inflation in the European ABS market. - Hence, the coverage and quality of our dataset constitutes significant addition
to the literature and allows us to test the rating shopping and rating catering more authoritatively. - The following section reviews the literature
on securitisation concerning CRAs and conflicts of interest, and outlines the regulatory changes
introduced in the post-GFC period. - Firstly, ratings became ever more important as the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) 5 began heavily relying on CRA assessments for regulatory purposes
(i.e. - the investment mandates that highlight rating agencies as the main benchmark for investment
eligibility) (SEC, 2008; Kisgen and Strahan, 2010; Bolton et al., 2012). - issuers) as one of the main explanations for the rating inflation (He et al., 2011; 2012; Bolton
et al., 2012; Efing and Hau, 2015). - Bolton et al., (2012) demonstrate that competition
promotes rating shopping by issuers, leading to rating inflation. - The last phase, CRA III, was implemented in mid-2013 and involves an additional
set of measures on reducing transparency and rating over-reliance. - As mentioned above, rating inflation can be caused by rating shopping
In order to be eligible to use the STS classification, main parties (i.e. - The higher the difference in the number of ratings for a
given ABS tranche, the greater the risk of rating shopping. - Alternatively, the impact of the new
regulations could be limited when it comes to reducing rating shopping. - This is because, firstly,
the conflict of interest between securitisation parties is not necessarily the sole cause for the
occurrence of rating shopping. - L is a set of variables (Multiple ratings, CRA reported, Rating agreement) that
we utilise interchangeably to capture the rating shopping and rating catering behaviour. - Hence, issuers are incentivised to report the highest possible rating and
ensure each additional rating matches the desired level. - All in all, our results suggest that
the new stricter regulatory measures have been effective in tackling conflicts of interest and
reducing rating inflation caused by rating catering. - Self-selection might be a concern in analysing the impact of the
new measures and investors? response with regard to the rating inflation. - This
result is in line with the earlier findings suggesting that regulatory changes have reduced investors?
suspicion of rating inflation and increased trust of CRAs. - Conclusion
Several regulatory changes were introduced in Europe following the GFC aimed at tackling
conflicts of interest between issuers and CRAs in the ABS market. - Utilising a sample of 12,469
ABS issued between 1998 and 2018 in the European market, this paper examined whether these
changes have had any impact on rating inflations caused by rating shopping and rating catering
phenomena. - We find that the
effectiveness of the changes has been more limited on rating shopping potentially for two reasons. - Tranche Credit Rating is the rating reported for a tranche at launch.