Personal ordinariate

Christine Lagarde, Luis de Guindos: Monetary policy statement (with Q&A)

Retrieved on: 
Thursday, April 18, 2024

Stock market development and familiarity (language and distance) are considered key determinants for home bias.

Key Points: 
  • Stock market development and familiarity (language and distance) are considered key determinants for home bias.
  • The literature neglects however that investors often invest in foreign funds domiciled in financial centers.

Philip R. Lane: Disinflation in the euro area: an update

Retrieved on: 
Thursday, April 18, 2024

Stock market development and familiarity (language and distance) are considered key determinants for home bias.

Key Points: 
  • Stock market development and familiarity (language and distance) are considered key determinants for home bias.
  • The literature neglects however that investors often invest in foreign funds domiciled in financial centers.

Meeting of 6-7 March 2024

Retrieved on: 
Friday, April 5, 2024

We find that banks experiencing large deposit outflows reduce credit, but not the interest rate they charge, to the same borrower relative to other lenders.

Key Points: 
  • We find that banks experiencing large deposit outflows reduce credit, but not the interest rate they charge, to the same borrower relative to other lenders.
  • This credit restriction is stronger for fixed rate and longer maturity loans, but not for riskier borrowers.

Changes to the operational framework for implementing monetary policy

Retrieved on: 
Wednesday, April 3, 2024

This box investigates how households have responded to the 2021-23 inflationary episode using evidence from the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey.

Key Points: 
  • This box investigates how households have responded to the 2021-23 inflationary episode using evidence from the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey.
  • The findings suggest that households have primarily adjusted their consumption spending to cope with higher inflation.

ECB announces changes to the operational framework for implementing monetary policy

Retrieved on: 
Wednesday, April 3, 2024

- PRESS RELEASE

Key Points: 
  • - PRESS RELEASE
    ECB announces changes to the operational framework for implementing monetary policy
    13 March 2024
    - ECB concludes review that started in December 2022
    - Framework sets out how Governing Council will steer short-term money market rates in line with its monetary policy decisions as Eurosystem balance sheet normalises
    The Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) today decided on changes to the operational framework for implementing monetary policy to ensure that the framework remains appropriate as the Eurosystem balance sheet normalises.
  • In December 2022, the Governing Council announced a review of the operational framework for steering short-term interest rates in the euro area.
  • Today’s decisions establish key principles and parameters for implementing monetary policy and providing central bank liquidity as excess liquidity in the banking system, while remaining significant over the coming years, gradually declines.
  • “I am pleased to announce that the Governing Council has approved these changes to its operational framework, which acknowledge the significant changes in the financial system and monetary policy in recent years,” said President Christine Lagarde.

Christine Lagarde: Building confidence in the path ahead

Retrieved on: 
Wednesday, April 3, 2024

This box investigates how households have responded to the 2021-23 inflationary episode using evidence from the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey.

Key Points: 
  • This box investigates how households have responded to the 2021-23 inflationary episode using evidence from the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey.
  • The findings suggest that households have primarily adjusted their consumption spending to cope with higher inflation.

Piero Cipollone: The confidence to act: monetary policy and the role of wages during the disinflation process

Retrieved on: 
Wednesday, April 3, 2024

This box investigates how households have responded to the 2021-23 inflationary episode using evidence from the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey.

Key Points: 
  • This box investigates how households have responded to the 2021-23 inflationary episode using evidence from the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey.
  • The findings suggest that households have primarily adjusted their consumption spending to cope with higher inflation.

Measuring market-based core inflation expectations

Retrieved on: 
Thursday, February 15, 2024

Abstract

Key Points: 
    • Abstract
      We build a novel term structure model for pricing synthetic euro area core inflation-linked
      swaps, a hypothetical swap contract indexed to core inflation.
    • The model provides estimates of market-based expectations for core inflation, as
      well as core inflation risk premia, at daily frequency, whereas core inflation expectations from
      surveys or macroeconomic projections are typically only available monthly or quarterly.
    • We
      find that core inflation-linked swap rates are generally less volatile than headline inflationlinked swap rates and that market participants expected core inflation to be substantially
      more persistent than headline inflation following the 2022 energy price spike.
    • In this paper, we aim to infer market-based core inflation expectations, which are otherwise
      not directly observable because no financial asset directly tied to core inflation exists.
    • We deem this second assumption reasonable because HICP inflation itself is a linear combination
      of core as well as energy and food inflation.
    • The level of 2 percent and relatively low volatility of
      long-term inflation expectations suggests that inflation expectations are firmly anchored at the
      ECB?s 2 percent inflation target.
    • This assumption appears reasonably uncontroversial,
      as core inflation is a sub-component of headline inflation, which the observable headline ILS
      rates are tied to.
    • Our estimates of core ILS rates reflect both market participants? genuine core
      inflation expectations and a core inflation risk premium, but our model explicitly allows for
      this decomposition.
    • The model-implied estimates of core ILS rates appear reasonable along several dimensions:
      (i) like realized core inflation is less volatile than headline inflation, the core ILS rates are less
      volatile than headline ILS rates, (ii) core ILS rates comove less with oil prices than headline
      ILS rates, (iii) the core inflation expectations, as reflected in core ILS rates, typically evolve
      similarly as the core inflation projections by Eurosystem staff, and (iv) consistent with market
      commentary at the time, core ILS rates suggest that market participants expected core inflation
      to be substantially more persistent than headline inflation following the 2022 energy price spike.
    • To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to price core ILS rates and decompose them into
      market-based expectations for and risks around the core inflation outlook.
    • Our approach to inferring core ILS
      rates from headline ILS rates, realized headline and core inflation as well as survey expectations
      for headline and core inflation is also related to Ang et al.
    • Relative
      to their study, we separately measure core inflation expectations and risk premia, we provide
      core inflation expectations at a higher-frequency, and we provide evidence on the causal effects

      ECB Working Paper Series No 2908

      6

      of monetary policy shocks on core inflation expectations and risk premia.

    • Specifically, we decompose the synthetic core ILS rates
      into average expected core inflation over the lifetime of the swap contract and a core inflation
      risk premium that compensates investors for core inflation risk.
    • In
      our model below, this term is constant over time and relatively small, so we will simply refer
      to the core inflation risk premium as the difference between the core ILS rate and the average
      expected core inflation over the lifetime of the swap contract.
    • 3.2

      Core ILS rates

      To have a joint model for headline and core ILS rates, we need one further assumption on the
      dynamics of realized core inflation.

    • The assumption that core inflation is driven by the same set of factors as headline inflation
      should be relatively uncontroversial: since headline inflation is a weighted average of core and
      food and energy inflation, it should reflect any factors driving core inflation.
    • If there are factors
      driving food and energy inflation, which do not show up in core inflation, then those factors
      should still show up in headline inflation.
    • In step two, to be able to infer the factor
      loadings of core inflation, we would regress realized core inflation onto the estimated latent
      factors to identify the additional parameters in equation (12).
    • Before the fourth
      quarter of 2016, the SPF did not ask respondents for their core inflation expectations, so we
      are not able to use survey-based information about core inflation before then.
    • Before
      2016, the fitted core inflation series is somewhat above the realized one, potentially reflecting
      that the model has limited information about core inflation over this early period due to the
      lack of information about core inflation from surveys.
    • This could have been the
      case if one of the factors moved core inflation and energy and food inflation in exactly offsetting
      direction, so the overall impact on headline inflation was exactly zero.
    • During 2021, for example, there were

      ECB Working Paper Series No 2908

      25

      Figure 7: Decomposition of synthetic core ILS rates
      2y core ILS

      5y core ILS

      5
      4

      5
      ILS

      premia

      exp

      4

      ILS

      premia

      exp

      3

      3

      2

      2

      1

      1

      0

      0

      -1

      -1

      -2
      2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

      -2
      2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

      10y core ILS

      5y5y core ILS

      5
      4

      5
      ILS

      premia

      exp

      4

      ILS

      premia

      exp

      3

      3

      2

      2

      1

      1

      0

      0

      -1

      -1

      -2
      2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

      -2
      2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

      Note: Synthetic core ILS rates decomposed into genuine core inflation expectations and core inflation risk
      premia.

    • ECB Working Paper Series No 2908

      26

      Figure 8: Decomposition of ILS rates
      2y ILS

      5y ILS

      5
      4

      5
      ILS

      premia

      exp

      4

      3

      3

      2

      2

      1

      1

      0

      0

      -1

      -1

      -2
      2006

      2010

      2014

      2018

      2022

      -2
      2006

      ILS

      2010

      10y ILS

      2018

      2022

      5
      ILS

      premia

      exp

      4

      3

      3

      2

      2

      1

      1

      0

      0

      -1

      -1

      -2
      2006

      2014

      exp

      5y5y ILS

      5
      4

      premia

      2010

      2014

      2018

      2022

      -2
      2006

      ILS

      2010

      premia

      2014

      2018

      exp

      2022

      Note: ILS rates decomposed into genuine core inflation expectations and core inflation risk premia.

    • We find that the headline inflation risk premium
      indeed does responds more strongly than the core inflation risk premium.
    • The key
      assumption underlying our approach is that traded headline ILS rates span core inflation, which

      ECB Working Paper Series No 2908

      35

      should be reasonably uncontroversial as core inflation is a sub-component of headline inflation.

    • We fit the model to euro area headline ILS rates, realized headline and core inflation, and
      both headline and core inflation expectations reported in the SPF.
    • Decomposing our core ILS rates into genuine core inflation expectations and core
      inflation risk premia shows that shorter maturities mainly reflect core inflation expectations,
      while the core inflation risk premium matters relatively more for longer maturities.
    • Our results suggest that a monetary policy tightening surprise significantly lowers
      near-term core inflation expectations, although less so than it lowers headline inflation expectations.

Policy expectation errors during the recent tightening cycle – insights from the ECB’s Survey of Monetary Analysts

Retrieved on: 
Friday, February 9, 2024

This box measures the size and dynamics of policy expectation errors.

Key Points: 
  • This box measures the size and dynamics of policy expectation errors.
  • Based on information from the ECB’s Survey of Monetary Analysts, it suggests that these expectation errors were driven mainly by revisions to macroeconomic expectations, indicating that analysts perceived a broadly consistent policy reaction to macroeconomic developments.