Chinese Communist Party

• WASHINGTON, D.C., Feb. 15, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- Today, the Organization for Competitive Markets (OCM) and Competitive Markets Action (CMA), publicly announced the recipients of their 2023 Congressional Leadership Awards and their Competitive Markets Legislator of the Year Award recipient, U.S. Rep. Alex Mooney, R-WV.
• Rep. Alex Mooney, R-WV, was selected as the Competitive Markets overall Legislator of the Year for 2023.
• Quotes from the Members of Congress:
  “I’m honored to be named the Competitive Markets Legislator of the Year in Congress.
• The foundation of the Organization for Competitive Markets is to fight for competitive markets in agriculture for farmers, ranchers and rural communities.

• Sayari , a supply chain risk intelligence company, has supported a year-long research effort by the Atlantic Council, which culminated in the recently released report on The Reach and Role of Chinese Corporate Entities .
• Authored by Dr. William Piekos, nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, the report underscores the importance of open-source tools such as Sayari Graph to examine methods and channels of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) economic coercion.
• Chinese state-owned shipping company COSCO’s expanding role in logistics networks in Southeastern Europe makes it a PRC economic statecraft instrument to monitor.
• To learn more about the topic and mechanisms of research, register for Sayari’s upcoming webinar Countering Chinese Economic Statecraft: An Exploration with Atlantic Council and Sayari here.

• Each time, the Chinese government has had to deal with the diplomatic fallout of its own repression.
• On the one hand, they have tried to rally developing countries behind the idea that the “right to subsistence” trumps concerns over other human rights.
• China is seeking not merely to resist but to dismantle a foundational idea of the post-Cold War international order – the universality of human rights.

A new approach cloaked in ‘democratic’ values

• And it’s become a major weapon in the Chinese party-state’s foreign propaganda arsenal.
• The initiative was first announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in March.
• It complements two previously announced (and similarly named) diplomatic tools: the Global Development Initiative and Global Security Initiative.

A selective approach to human rights

• First, in contrast to the respect for universal human rights in the liberal international order, China’s strategy calls for a cultural relativist approach based on each country’s “national conditions and unique features.” In other words, there shouldn’t be a universal standard of human rights at all.
• As China’s former foreign minister, Qin Gang, said earlier this year:
  There is no one-size-fits-all model in the protection of human rights.
• This approach is problematic because it allows governments to apply international human rights standards selectively.

A network of despots with similar views

• The [Chinese Communist Party] will continue to safeguard international fairness and justice and promote world peace and stability.
• To promote this new strategy, Chinese officials have also been using benign-sounding language, such as “dialogue”, “cooperation” and “common prosperity”.
• Read more:
  How China is remaking the world in its vision

  Again, this strategy can provide a smokescreen for China.

• It creates a global network of like-minded regimes whose diplomats can shield Beijing’s human rights abuses from scrutiny and criticism in international forums.

• Beijing is positioning itself to increase its global power at the end of the Ukraine war.
• There are various scenarios that are the most likely ways the war could proceed, or end.

Scenario 1 – Ukraine wins

• Russia’s loss in Ukraine would send a powerful signal confirming both the west’s resilience and weakness of authoritarian aggressors.
• The victory of Ukraine supported by the west would put Xi in a particularly uncomfortable position, challenging his favourite phrases of the “east wind prevailing” and “changes unseen in a century”.

Scenario 2 – Russia wins

• Beijing might be tempted to move to much more risky behaviour, especially in its neighbourhood.
• It could also be argued that a weakened or defeated Russia could be an opportunity for China.

Scenario 3 – stalemate

• It is entirely plausible that the war will continue in a state of stalemate for some time.
• The frozen conflict scenario allows Beijing to continue its policy of alleged neutrality while promoting its peacemaker role, without having to make any difficult choices.

China’s current position

• China has already attempted to position itself as a peacemaker.
• Its “peace plan” announced in February was less a plan and more a reaffirmation of existing positions.
• Despite China’s robust partnership with Russia, it is attempting to position itself as peacemaker in the event that Russia loses, in order to be in prime position to reap the rewards of economic reconstruction of Ukraine.

Challenges

• The challenges for Xi consist of how to square China’s support for Russia’s reading of the global order with Chinese principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty.
• In the shorter term, Beijing is exploiting a sanctioned Russia by benefiting from cheap Russian commodities.
• But the continuation of the war means the disruption of global supply chains, including deliveries of grain and fertiliser on which China is heavily reliant.
• Should this not succeed, Beijing may decide to step up its support for Moscow, ranging from financial assistance to arms deliveries.