Deutsche Bundesbank

EQS-News: After its second-best financial year in 2023, flatexDEGIRO is aiming for a record year in 2024

Retrieved on: 
Wednesday, March 13, 2024

After its second-best financial year in 2023, flatexDEGIRO is aiming for a record year in 2024

Key Points: 
  • After its second-best financial year in 2023, flatexDEGIRO is aiming for a record year in 2024
    The issuer is solely responsible for the content of this announcement.
  • Frank Niehage, CEO of flatexDEGIRO: "We can be justifiably proud of what we have achieved as a team at flatexDEGIRO over the past few months.
  • At the same time, flatexDEGIRO significantly reduced its marketing expenses by 30.4 percent to EUR 34.0 million in 2023 (2022: EUR 48.9 million).
  • From 2024, flatexDEGIRO will therefore dispense with adjustments in order to establish simpler and more transparent key figures.

CGTN: China's economy shows vitality with innovative growth, booming market

Retrieved on: 
Sunday, February 25, 2024

Provinces have identified specific sectors to anchor new productive forces, including bio-manufacturing, the low-altitude economy, and emerging areas such as quantum technology and life sciences.

Key Points: 
  • Provinces have identified specific sectors to anchor new productive forces, including bio-manufacturing, the low-altitude economy, and emerging areas such as quantum technology and life sciences.
  • Efforts to integrate data with practical applications are also being made to bolster the digital economy.
  • Likewise, several western inland provinces are looking to capitalize on their advantages in computing power to further industry digitization.
  • This trend, coupled with a growing enthusiasm for shopping and leisure activities, indicates a steady recovery in China's consumer market.

CGTN: China's economy shows vitality with innovative growth, booming market

Retrieved on: 
Sunday, February 25, 2024

Provinces have identified specific sectors to anchor new productive forces, including bio-manufacturing, the low-altitude economy, and emerging areas such as quantum technology and life sciences.

Key Points: 
  • Provinces have identified specific sectors to anchor new productive forces, including bio-manufacturing, the low-altitude economy, and emerging areas such as quantum technology and life sciences.
  • Efforts to integrate data with practical applications are also being made to bolster the digital economy.
  • Likewise, several western inland provinces are looking to capitalize on their advantages in computing power to further industry digitization.
  • This trend, coupled with a growing enthusiasm for shopping and leisure activities, indicates a steady recovery in China's consumer market.

Philip R. Lane: The banking channel of monetary policy

Retrieved on: 
Friday, February 16, 2024

for rates, credit growth in deviation from the start of the cycle (t) in p.p.

Key Points: 
    • for rates, credit growth in deviation from the start of the cycle (t) in p.p.
    • Starting months correspond to the month immediately preceding the first hike or explicit announcement of the hike of the cycle.
    • The dotted lines shows counterfactuals for lending rates and lending volumes, taking December 2021 as the last observation and
      projecting volumes conditional on the path of monetary policy rates.
    • The one for lending volumes is based on the BVAR model in Altavilla,
      Giannone, and Lenza (2016).
    • Composite funding costs are a weighted average of deposit rates
      and average monthly bond yields, with outstanding amounts as weights.
    • Right chart shows
      the contributions of the components to the change in the composite bank funding cost
      between December 2021 and November 2023.
    • Latest observations: 8 February 2024 for bond yields; December 2023 for other series.
    • Notes: ?Others? include shares (listed and not listed as well as those issued by investment
      funds), and insurance and pension schemes.
    • Retail

      Specialised

      Universal

      10

      10

      8

      8

      6

      6

      4

      4

      2

      2

      0

      0

      -2

      -2

      -4
      Jan-20 Aug-20 Mar-21 Oct-21 May-22 Dec-22 Jul-23

      -4

      Sources: ECB (iBSI, iMIR) MPC Task Force on Banking Analysis and ECB calculations.

    • Investment refers to the net
      change in property plant and equipment over assets; cash refers to cash and cash
      equivalents over assets.
    • Households
      loans, credit standards and loan demand
      Rubric
      Changes in credit standards for
      loans to households, and
      contributing factors
      (net percentage)

      0

      30

      -40

      20

      Sources: ECB (BSI) and ECB calculations.

    • Low-income households are those in the bottom 20 per cent
      of the income distribution; high-income households are those in the top 20 per cent.

Financial sanctions: banks’ reactions depend on their location, research reveals

Retrieved on: 
Tuesday, February 13, 2024

However, our latest research shows that even universally adopted sanctions can throw a spanner into the works of the global financial system for want of being enforced everywhere.

Key Points: 
  • However, our latest research shows that even universally adopted sanctions can throw a spanner into the works of the global financial system for want of being enforced everywhere.
  • Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, much ink has been spilled over the sanctions on Russia.
  • And since the late 1980s, there has been a shift toward imposing financial sanctions, which involve freezing assets and investments.

How sanctions impact lending

  • Sanctions will impose extra compliance costs on a bank, as it must fulfill reporting requirements and undertake due diligence checks to ensure its transactions are legal.
  • The bank will also have to factor in the litigation costs and the reputational risk involved if its due diligence should fail.
  • We wanted to understand how these costs and risks alter lending decisions.

Location, location, location

  • The data show how much each bank in Germany was lending in foreign countries from 2002 to 2015.
  • Importantly, German banks are also required to record how much their foreign affiliates (branches and subsidiaries outside Germany) are lending in each country.

The importance of the Financial Action Task Force

  • Founded in 1989, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), also known by its French name, Groupe d’action financière (GAFI), is an intergovernmental organisation that sets international standards to allow national authorities to go after illicit funds linked to money laundering, terrorism and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system.
  • Our analysis showed that German bank affiliates located outside the FATF increased their positions in sanctioned countries by an average of 95% relative to German banks inside the FATF.

Levelling the playing field

  • One key takeaway from this is that, regardless of whether it is the litigation risks or compliance costs that ultimately drive the decision to lend in sanctioned countries (or not), you don’t have a level playing field.
  • Banks in locations with weaker standards for the integrity of the financial system seem to find lending in sanctioned countries more attractive.
  • To guarantee a level playing field, it is also vital to make sure all countries effectively comply with these sanctions.


Grant of EUR 5000 from the French National Research Agency (ANR), “Investissements d’Avenir” (LabEx
Ecodec/ANR-11-LABX-0047). Deutsche Bundesbank (German central bank) provided on-site access to the database External Position Report and free accommodation on the premises of the central bank during the author’s research visits.

Gas price shocks and euro area inflation

Retrieved on: 
Tuesday, February 13, 2024
Transfer, Person, Marques, OPEC, Interval (mathematics), Policy, NBER, Research Papers in Economics, The Economic Journal, Danmarks Nationalbank, Socialism, Energy transition, VIX, Canadian International Council, Paper, E30, Great, Macroeconomics, VAR, Central bank, Balke, Quarterly Journal, Q43, Census, Elasticity, USD, Projection, PMI, Social science, Hou, Bank of France, Topa, Fertilizer, Electricity, SSRN, University, A.5, Section 2, Natural gas, COVID-19, Swings, Overalls, Rotation, Journal of Monetary Economics, Harmonization, Title Transfer Facility, Pain, Ferrari, Uncertainty, Statistics, Medical classification, C50, Harper (publisher), Democracy, Shock, IMF, TTF, Fed, PPI, Power, European Central Bank, Monetary economics, Temperature, Section 3, E31, Nature, Food, Local, Joseph Schumpeter, Website, Energy economics, Speech, DeSantis, GDP, Rigidity, BVAR, Confidence interval, Money, Refinitiv, Bank, Baumeister, Pressure, Oil, Deutsche Bundesbank, International Energy Agency, Employment, Section 4, GIZ, C54, Sun, ECB, European Economic Association, Weather, A.9, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Exercise, HICP, Technical report, Attention, Literature, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Reproduction, International economics, Political economy, Absorption, Joseph Stiglitz, Unemployment, Journal, American Economic Review, Index, Section 5, Business, IP, Bachmann, Research, Federal Reserve Bank, Government, PDF, IWH, Complexity, Failure, Energy Information Administration, Explosive

We document

Key Points: 
    • We document
      how gas price fluctuations have a heterogeneous pass-through to euro area prices
      depending on the underlying shock driving them.
    • How do gas price shocks feed through to euro area
      inflation, and is the pass-through shock-dependent?
    • We analyse the importance of gas price shocks
      for euro area inflation in two steps.
    • We identify three structural shocks driving European gas prices,
      inspired by the literature on oil but tailored to the European gas market: (i) a gas supply
      shock, which reduces the supply of natural gas to the European market, increases the
      gas price and lowers gas inventories; (ii) an economic activity shock, which lifts demand
      for gas due to higher economic production, and finally (iii) a shock to gas inventories,
      when gas prices are driven by precautionary demand by gas companies.
    • First, all three identified shocks are
      important drivers of gas price dynamics, but they differ in how persistently they push

      ECB Working Paper Series No 2905

      2

      up gas prices.

    • The effect on euro area HICP of a shock to gas supply is more
      persistent and somewhat higher than when gas prices are driven by economic activity
      shocks.
    • A final key finding is that the pass-through of gas market shocks to euro area inflation
      appears non-linear.
    • The unprecedented volatility of gas prices
      contributed to the inflation problem in the euro area, with the gas price shocks feeding
      through producer prices, wages and persistently lifting core inflation.
    • More expensive
      energy contributed substantially to the rise in inflation in Europe during 2022.2

      Figure 1: Gas price and euro area Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices.

    • How do gas price shocks feed through to euro area
      inflation, and is the pass-through shock-dependent?
    • For instance, about 75% of gas imports to the euro area arrives
      through pipelines, making gas imports difficult to substitute and gas markets subject to
      3

      See for example the evidence by Rubaszek and Uddin (2020) for the US economy.

    • We analyse the importance of gas price shocks for
      euro area inflation in two steps.
    • We identify three structural shocks driving European gas prices,
      inspired by the literature on oil but tailored to the European gas market: (i) a gas supply
      shock, which reduces the supply of natural gas to the European market, increases the
      gas price and lowers gas inventories; (ii) an economic activity shock, which lifts demand
      for gas due to higher economic production, and finally (iii) a shock to gas inventories,
      when gas prices are driven by precautionary demand by gas companies.
    • First, all three identified shocks are
      important drivers of gas price dynamics, but they differ in how persistently they push
      up gas prices.
    • But when gas prices are driven by
      inventory demand shocks, the price effect typically dies out within one quarter.
    • A final key finding is that the pass-through of gas market shocks to euro area inflation appears non-linear.
    • The unprecedented volatility of gas prices
      contributed to the inflation problem in the euro area, with the gas price shocks feeding
      through producer prices, wages and persistently lifting core inflation.
    • (2022) and Alessandri and Gazzani (2023) identify gas supply shocks using VAR models,
      finding that gas price shocks lead to persistent increases in headline inflation.14 Ba?bura
      et al.
    • (2023) find positive effects of gas price shocks on core inflation in a BVAR for
      the euro area that includes one type of gas shock along a longer list of macroeconomic
      shocks.
    • 3.1

      Data

      For the gas market BVAR model, we use gas quantities, gas prices, gas inventories and
      euro area industrial production, as displayed in Figure 2.

    • (2015) to optimize

      ECB Working Paper Series No 2905

      13

      the posterior distribution.16 The vector Y includes the European gas quantity proxy, gas
      inventories, the European gas price benchmark and euro area industrial production.

    • As demand for gas increases, the gas price also rises
      while inventories fall as agents use gas in storage to partially satisfy higher demand.
    • Shocks to gas
      quantities driven by gas supply or inventory shocks tend to revert to pre-shock levels after
      around five to seven months, while economic activity shocks lead to a more long-lived
      increase in gas demand.19 Dynamics in gas inventories are more similar across shocks.
    • 3.4

      Historical events in the European gas market

      Before analysing the transmission of the different types of gas shocks to euro area prices,
      we show how the model interprets the unprecedented gas price rise in 2022 in terms of
      driving factors, and compare it with previous historical episodes of heightened gas price
      volatility as a way of validating the model.

    • Inventory shocks play a
      slightly smaller role, accounting for 17% of gas quantity and 23% of gas price fluctuations
      while the residual component (i.e.
    • 4

      Pass-through of gas price shocks to consumer prices

      The pass-through of gas price shocks to inflation is likely to be multi-faceted.

    • We first consider four outcome variables y: the European gas price, euro area HICP,
      core HICP and energy HICP.
    • Third, depending on the driving factor, gas price increases can pass through to core
      inflation in the euro area.
    • The results underline that gas price shocks can have important implications for inflation in the euro area ? depending on the driving factor of higher gas prices.
    • Casoli, C., Manera, M., and Valenti, D. ?Energy shocks in the euro area: disentangling
      the pass-through from oil and gas prices to inflation?.

Piero Cipollone: Modernising finance: the role of central bank money

Retrieved on: 
Saturday, February 10, 2024

The paper demonstrates how agreement-level data can be used to study drivers of aggregate negotiated wage growth, as well as monitor the breadth of wage increases and account for time-varying factors such as one-off payments, when assessing wage pressures.

Key Points: 
  • The paper demonstrates how agreement-level data can be used to study drivers of aggregate negotiated wage growth, as well as monitor the breadth of wage increases and account for time-varying factors such as one-off payments, when assessing wage pressures.
  • Lastly, the paper shows that the new indicators can provide reliable signals about current and future developments of wage pressures in the euro area while also serving as important cross-checking tools for negotiated wage growth forecasts.

The macroeconomic effects of global supply chain reorientation

Retrieved on: 
Saturday, February 10, 2024
Bank, Control, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Literature, Deutsche Bundesbank, Reconstruction, COVID-19, Monetary policy, Medical classification, Aggregate, Interest, Hail, Motion, Organization, WT, Policy, Smith, Elasticity, American Economic Review, Information, CHiPs, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Reproduction, Tagliapietra, Culture, Journal of International Economics, Section 3, European Commission, Communication, B16, Shock, NTM, European Chips Act, SSC, PHT, B17, Classification, Common, Tradability, Bank of Italy, Congressional Research Service, NT, Central bank, Private, Exercise, NIU, Labour, PDF, Website, European Parliament, Terrorism, Employment, B10, SUBST, Agricultural economics, F62, RTK, Bank of England, European Central Bank, Calibration, Agriculture, Foreign policy, Semiconductor, International Monetary Fund, Research Papers in Economics, Outline, Council, Openness, Bias, Economic system, European Council, Public policy, Deutsch, Statistics, GDP, Real, American Economic Journal, Table, Journal, YT, EAGLE, Household, Grossman, Science, Conference, Journal of Comparative Economics, Horse, SSRN, TC, Consumption, REA, F13, Section 2, University, Section 5, Legislation, Money, NTD, Central Bank of Ireland, Language, Capital, University of Limerick, Intermediate, CBI, Caselli, Macroeconomics, Crowding, Technical report, B14, Tax, Civil service commission, Growth, Commission, UNCTAD, Optimism, Politics, PIM, PX, Work, Social science, JEL, Government, Automation, HTT, Quarterly Journal, Canadian International Council, ECB, XT, METRO, ELAS, Credit, Bolt, Research, European Communities, American Journal, ArXiv, Unilateralism, Lerner, Motivation, International, C6, Committee, Security (finance)

We analyse the macroeconomic

Key Points: 
    • We analyse the macroeconomic
      effects of supply chain reorientation through localisation policies, using a global dynamic
      general equilibrium model.
    • While arguments about comparative advantage, the potential forgone benefits of international specialisation and industry- and product-specific disruptions are familiar, there is less
      analysis on the macroeconomic effects of supply chain changes resulting from localisation policies.
    • The large sensitivity of the global economy to the recent supply chain shocks suggests that
      the international trade reconfiguration implied by localisation policies could also have sizable
      impacts on key macroeconomic variables such as output, employment and inflation.
    • Thus, localisation focuses on the
      goods in our model most closely related to global supply chains.
    • Retaliation also attenuates any positive effects from
      reshoring on output and implies a reduction in the volume of overall international trade.
    • This finding calls for limiting the scope of reshoring, such as by focusing on vital goods that are
      most susceptible to supply chain disruptions.
    • Either that, or the economic costs are considered a worthwhile trade-off for an increase
      in security of supply, for example.
    • While arguments about comparative advantage, the potential forgone benefits of international specialisation and industry- and product-specific disruptions are familiar, there is less
      analysis on the macroeconomic effects of supply chain changes resulting from localisation policies.
    • Recent supply chain shocks have had large effects, with disruptions in 2021 estimated
      to have reduced euro area GDP by around two percent and doubled the rate of manufacturing producer inflation (Celasun et al., 2022).
    • To analyse this issue, we simulate a (partial) reshoring of production back to Europe in
      a global dynamic general equilibrium framework.
    • Thus,
      localisation focuses on the goods in our model most closely related to global supply chains.3 We
      model reshoring through a direct change to the export goods? production-function parameters.
    • Since reshoring
      effectively shortens the supply chain, the sum of markups along the chain falls.
    • This means that imports that are at the end of the supply chain (i.e.
    • In particular, our work relates to papers examining the potential for countries to reduce
      their exposure to global supply chains.
    • (2021) demonstrate that reduced reliance on foreign inputs does not mitigate pandemicinduced contractions in labour supply.
    • (2021) find no evidence of a relationship
      between global value chain integration and macroeconomic volatility.
    • This dynamic, along with factors such as natural disasters, climate-change
      induced volatility and terrorism mean that supply chain disruptions could be a new normal
      (Grossman et al., 2021).
    • Our work contributes to the literature providing dynamic general equilibrium analyses of
      protectionist policies, in particular those using global macroeconomic models to quantify trade
      policy changes.
    • (2008) analyse the effect of a rise in protectionism in response
      to rising global trade imbalances.
    • Linde? and Pescatori (2019) find that although the macroeconomic costs of a
      trade war are substantial, a fully symmetric retaliation is the best response.
    • (2020) consider a rich input-output structure and demonstrate that closer integration amplifies
      the adverse effects of protectionist trade policies.
    • Several recent studies have also examined the economic effects of a global trade fragmentation.
    • First, we modify a dynamic general
      equilibrium model of the global economy in order to analyse the transmission of localisation
      policies.
    • This allows for a comprehensive treatment of cross-border macroeconomic interdependences and spillovers between the different regions.
    • 4

      There is, however, substantial cross-country heterogeneity in terms of impact, with small open economies
      (SOEs) reliant on global supply chains more affected.

    • ECB Working Paper Series No 2903

      7

      Second, we are able to assess both long-run effects and the transition dynamics of localisation
      policies.

    • Our model contains a detailed monetary block and captures inflation dynamics, which is a key
      concern for supply chain reorientation.
    • Overall, our paper contains a careful analysis of the key aspects of the localisation debate,
      including effects of localisation on domestic competition and efficiency.
    • Section 2 provides a brief overview of the model, the modifications to examine
      global supply chain reorientation, some key details on the calibration and a brief discussion of
      the nature of our exercise.
    • (2020) for discussions of the relative strengths and weaknesses of
      trade and macroeconomic models in assessing large economic shocks.
    • 2.1

      Supply chain reorientation

      Our analysis focuses on imported inputs used to produce goods for export, as the introduction
      of localisation policies is in response to recent disruptions to global supply chains.

    • Since reshoring
      effectively shortens the supply chain, the sum of markups along the chain falls.
    • Further to
      these effects, engagement with global firms provides an opportunity for knowledge spillovers to
      local firms (Criscuolo et al., 2017).
    • This finding calls for limiting the scope of reshoring, such as by focusing on vital goods that are
      most susceptible to supply chain disruptions.
    • (B12)

      Adjusting the share of local inputs in export goods, of course, affects prices and quantities all
      along the supply chain.

Liquidity conditions and monetary policy operations from 2 August to 31 October 2023

Retrieved on: 
Friday, January 19, 2024

This box describes liquidity conditions and the Eurosystem’s monetary policy operations during the fifth and sixth maintenance periods of 2023, from 2 August to 31 October 2023.

Key Points: 


This box describes liquidity conditions and the Eurosystem’s monetary policy operations during the fifth and sixth maintenance periods of 2023, from 2 August to 31 October 2023.