European Banking Authority

Complementary cost-benefit assessment on the Integrated Reporting Framework - Closer alignment with FINREP solo

Retrieved on: 
Friday, April 5, 2024

Complementary cost-benefit assessment on the Integrated Reporting Framework ?

Key Points: 
    • Complementary cost-benefit assessment on the Integrated Reporting Framework ?
      Executive summary

      2

      towards closer alignment of the two frameworks, rather than implementing all
      changes at once.

    • Complementary cost-benefit assessment on the Integrated Reporting Framework ?
      Executive summary

      3

      1

      Introduction
      The complementary IReF cost-benefit assessment (CBA) followed an earlier
      consultation on an initial CBA that was launched in 2020.

    • The report summarises the feedback received from the banking industry on the
      possible closer alignment of the IReF with FINREP solo.
    • Complementary cost-benefit assessment on the Integrated Reporting Framework ?
      Introduction

      4

      2

      General question on closer alignment
      with FINREP solo
      Closer alignment between the IReF and FINREP solo could allow more substantial
      use of the IReF dataset for supervisory purposes, with the potential benefit of
      reducing ad hoc requests to reporting agents due to a more analytical and stable
      dataset.

    • The ECB legal framework for collecting FINREP solo information (Regulation (EU)
      2015/34)4 currently sets up four different levels of reporting for proportionality
      measures:
      ?

      FINREP data points;

      ?

      over-simplified FINREP;

      ?

      simplified FINREP;

      ?

      full FINREP.

    • Closer alignment does not mean that data
      under the IReF will be collected from reporting agents at the level of the legal entity
      in its entirety.
    • Complementary cost-benefit assessment on the Integrated Reporting Framework ? General
      question on closer alignment with FINREP solo

      5

      Chart 2.1
      General assessment on closer alignment between the IReF and FINREP solo

      Notes: The percentages are calculated for each driver as the simple average of the corresponding frequencies across euro area
      countries.

    • See Annex B of the report ?Complementary cost-benefit assessment of the Integrated Reporting Framework ? Extension of
      the IReF Regulation to cover country-specific requirements? published on the ECB?s website for information on how national results
      are calculated.
    • Members also raised the point that IReF
      information required for closer alignment with FINREP solo would only be collected
      from institutions that are currently subject to FINREP solo reporting.
    • The open text comments that were received in the complementary CBA show that
      different approaches to reporting at the level of the reporting agent may result in
      different expectations regarding closer alignment.
    • There
      were also several comments regarding the frequency and timeliness of the reporting
      of attributes needed for closer alignment with FINREP.
    • Many comments questioned which accounting standards will underpin IReF
      reporting, as those applicable to statistical reporting are often different from those
      relating to FINREP solo reporting.
    • Complementary cost-benefit assessment on the Integrated Reporting Framework ? General
      question on closer alignment with FINREP solo

      7

      3

      Extensions related to concepts already
      available in the IReF baseline scenario
      The IReF baseline scenario includes several accounting concepts that only apply to
      specific financial instruments.

    • See
      Annex B of the report ?Complementary cost-benefit assessment of the Integrated Reporting Framework ? Extension of the IReF
      Regulation to cover country-specific requirements? published on the ECB?s website for information on how national results are
      calculated.
    • See
      Annex B of the report ?Complementary cost-benefit assessment of the Integrated Reporting Framework ? Extension of the IReF
      Regulation to cover country-specific requirements? published on the ECB?s website for information on how national results are
      calculated.
    • See
      Annex B of the report ?Complementary cost-benefit assessment of the Integrated Reporting Framework ? Extension of the IReF
      Regulation to cover country-specific requirements? published on the ECB?s website for information on how national results are
      calculated.
    • See
      Annex B of the report ?Complementary cost-benefit assessment of the Integrated Reporting Framework ? Extension of the IReF
      Regulation to cover country-specific requirements? published on the ECB?s website for information on how national results are
      calculated.
    • See
      Annex B of the report ?Complementary cost-benefit assessment of the Integrated Reporting Framework ? Extension of the IReF
      Regulation to cover country-specific requirements? published on the ECB?s website for information on how national results are
      calculated.
    • See
      Annex B of the report ?Complementary cost-benefit assessment of the Integrated Reporting Framework ? Extension of the IReF
      Regulation to cover country-specific requirements? published on the ECB?s website for information on how national results are
      calculated.
    • See
      Annex B of the report ?Complementary cost-benefit assessment of the Integrated Reporting Framework ? Extension of the IReF
      Regulation to cover country-specific requirements? published on the ECB?s website for information on how national results are
      calculated.
    • See
      Annex B of the report ?Complementary cost-benefit assessment of the Integrated Reporting Framework ? Extension of the IReF
      Regulation to cover country-specific requirements? published on the ECB?s website for information on how national results are
      calculated.
    • Complementary cost-benefit assessment on the Integrated Reporting Framework ? Annex A
      Results by type and size of respondent

      57

      ? European Central Bank, 2024
      Postal address
      Telephone
      Website

      60640 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
      +49 69 1344 0
      www.ecb.europa.eu

      All rights reserved.

The impact of regulatory changes on rating behaviour

Retrieved on: 
Tuesday, April 2, 2024
Długosz, Disagreement, Pi bond, Direct lending, Key, Research Papers in Economics, Finance Secretary (India), University of Oxford, STS, Journal of Economic Perspectives, International, American Economic Review, Life, Columbia Business School, British Academy of Management, Risk assessment, ABS, Rating, EBA, Development, Reputational damage, OBS, CRA, Bond credit rating, Cras, Journal of Monetary Economics, CDO, Becker, Paper, 2007–2008 financial crisis, Raja, University, Environment, Journal of Financial Economics, Perception, H3, Website, Securitization, Working paper, Market, Collection, Total, European Banking Authority, Quarterly Journal of Economics, BBB, Whetten, Column, ESMA, European Journal, Issuer, Asset quality, Information revolution, Federal Reserve Bank, OLS, Statistics, PDF, Private, ECB, Surety, Weighted-average life, CCC, European Commission, Social science, Journal of Financial Stability, JEL, Real, Bias, Journal, Research, Classification, Certification, Commission, Credit, The Journal of Finance, Literature, Karel Škréta, European Central Bank, AA, Finance Research Letters, Origination (telephony), Monetary economics, Section 5, Xia, Kraft Foods, Government, AAA, Mukherjee, Finance, Deku, DOI, White, Risk, IOSCO, MBS, OECD, Wang, Section 4, University Challenge 2013–14, Section 3, Ashcraft, Financial management, Accounting, Financial economics, Fannie Mae, Conference, Pressure, Central bank, Griffin, University of Michigan, Systematic review, EPRS, Freddie Mac, Loan, BCBS, Palgrave Macmillan, R2, Microeconomics, Quarterly Journal, Financial statement analysis, The Japanese Economic Review, Christian Social Union (UK), Green, University of Huddersfield, PSM, Management, Security (finance), Security, Civil service commission, Private placement, American Economic Journal, GFC, Reproduction, IMF, Small business, Trustee, Data

Abstract

Key Points: 
    • Abstract
      We examine rating behaviour after the introduction of new regulations regarding Credit Rating
      Agencies (CRAs) in the European securitisation market.
    • There is empirical evidence of rating catering in the securitisation market in the pre-GFC period (He et al.,
      2012; Efing and Hau, 2015).
    • Competition among
      CRAs could diminish ratings quality (Golan, Parlour, and Rajan, 2011) and promotes rating shopping by
      issuers resulting in rating inflation (Bolton et al., 2012).
    • This paper investigates the impact of the post-GFC regulatory changes in the European
      securitisation market.
    • In 2011, in addition to the creation of
      European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), a regulatory and supervisory body for CRAs was
      introduced.
    • We examine how rating behaviours have changed in the European securitisation market after the
      introduction of these new regulations.
    • We utilise the existence of multiple ratings and rating agreements between
      CRAs to identify the existence of rating shopping and rating catering, respectively (Griffin et al., 2013; He
      et al., 2012; 2016).
    • We find that the regulatory changes have been effective in tackling conflicts of interest between issuers
      and CRAs in the structured finance market.
    • Rating catering, which is a direct consequence of issuer and
      CRA collusion, seems to have disappeared after the introduction of these regulations.
    • There is empirical evidence of rating catering in the securitisation market in
      the pre-GFC period (He et al., 2012; Efing and Hau, 2015).
    • Competition among CRAs could diminish ratings quality (Golan, Parlour,
      and Rajan, 2011) and promotes rating shopping by issuers resulting in rating inflation (Bolton et
      al., 2012).
    • This paper investigates the impact of the post-GFC regulatory changes in the European
      securitisation market.
    • In 2011, in addition
      to the creation of European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), a regulatory and
      supervisory body for CRAs was introduced.
    • We find that the regulatory changes have been effective in tackling conflicts of interest
      between issuers and CRAs in the structured finance market.
    • Rating catering, which is a direct
      consequence of issuer and CRA collusion, seems to have disappeared after the introduction of
      these regulations.
    • Investors who previously demanded higher spreads for rating agreements for a
      multiple rated tranche, did not consider the effect of rating harmony as a risk in the post-GFC
      period.
    • Regarding rating shopping, we find that the effectiveness of the changes has been limited,
      potentially for two reasons.
    • Additionally, we also find that rating over-reliance might still be an issue, especially
      Rating catering is a broad term and it can involve rating shopping.
    • They re-examine the rating shopping and rating
      catering phenomena in the US market by looking at the post-crisis period between 2009 and 2013.
    • Using 622 CDO tranches, they also observe the existence of rating shopping and the diminishing
      of the rating catering.
    • Firstly, our main focus is the EU?s CRA Regulation and its effectiveness in reducing
      rating inflation and rating over-reliance.
    • To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to
      examine the effectiveness of the EU?s CRA regulatory changes on the investors? perception of
      rating inflation in the European ABS market.
    • Hence, the coverage and quality of our dataset constitutes significant addition
      to the literature and allows us to test the rating shopping and rating catering more authoritatively.
    • The following section reviews the literature
      on securitisation concerning CRAs and conflicts of interest, and outlines the regulatory changes
      introduced in the post-GFC period.
    • Firstly, ratings became ever more important as the Securities and
      Exchange Commission (SEC) 5 began heavily relying on CRA assessments for regulatory purposes
      (i.e.
    • the investment mandates that highlight rating agencies as the main benchmark for investment
      eligibility) (SEC, 2008; Kisgen and Strahan, 2010; Bolton et al., 2012).
    • issuers) as one of the main explanations for the rating inflation (He et al., 2011; 2012; Bolton
      et al., 2012; Efing and Hau, 2015).
    • Bolton et al., (2012) demonstrate that competition
      promotes rating shopping by issuers, leading to rating inflation.
    • The last phase, CRA III, was implemented in mid-2013 and involves an additional
      set of measures on reducing transparency and rating over-reliance.
    • As mentioned above, rating inflation can be caused by rating shopping
      In order to be eligible to use the STS classification, main parties (i.e.
    • The higher the difference in the number of ratings for a
      given ABS tranche, the greater the risk of rating shopping.
    • Alternatively, the impact of the new
      regulations could be limited when it comes to reducing rating shopping.
    • This is because, firstly,
      the conflict of interest between securitisation parties is not necessarily the sole cause for the
      occurrence of rating shopping.
    • L is a set of variables (Multiple ratings, CRA reported, Rating agreement) that
      we utilise interchangeably to capture the rating shopping and rating catering behaviour.
    • Hence, issuers are incentivised to report the highest possible rating and
      ensure each additional rating matches the desired level.
    • All in all, our results suggest that
      the new stricter regulatory measures have been effective in tackling conflicts of interest and
      reducing rating inflation caused by rating catering.
    • Self-selection might be a concern in analysing the impact of the
      new measures and investors? response with regard to the rating inflation.
    • This
      result is in line with the earlier findings suggesting that regulatory changes have reduced investors?
      suspicion of rating inflation and increased trust of CRAs.
    • Conclusion
      Several regulatory changes were introduced in Europe following the GFC aimed at tackling
      conflicts of interest between issuers and CRAs in the ABS market.
    • Utilising a sample of 12,469
      ABS issued between 1998 and 2018 in the European market, this paper examined whether these
      changes have had any impact on rating inflations caused by rating shopping and rating catering
      phenomena.
    • We find that the
      effectiveness of the changes has been more limited on rating shopping potentially for two reasons.
    • Tranche Credit Rating is the rating reported for a tranche at launch.

OTP Bank, one of the leading banking groups in Central and Eastern Europe chooses eMACH.ai based complete Digital Core and Lending platform to transform their banking experience

Retrieved on: 
Friday, December 8, 2023

BUDAPEST, Hungary, Dec. 8, 2023 /PRNewswire/ -- OTP Bank has chosen Intellect Digital Core (IDC) core banking system by Intellect Global Consumer Banking (iGCB), the consumer banking arm of Intellect Design Arena Limited to power its banking experience. The contract was signed by OTP Bank represented by Péter Csányi, Deputy CEO, Chief Digital Officer of OTP Bank and András Becsei Deputy CEO for Retail, and Rajesh Saxena, the CEO of Intellect Global Consumer Banking, Intellect Design Arena today further to the cooperation agreement signed in May 2023.

Key Points: 
  • OTP Group is one of the largest independent financial service providers in the Central Eastern European region.
  • OTP Group is the 4th most stable banking group in Europe, based on the European Banking Authority's stress test in 2023.
  • Microservices-based, API-enabled, Cloud Native, Headless with underlying AI models) are the most comprehensive Open Finance enabled core banking solution and lending platform globally.
  • Starting today, Intellect platforms will be implemented in parallel in two members of OTP Group: OTP Bank and its subsidiary in Bulgaria, DSK Bank.

OTP Bank, one of the leading banking groups in Central and Eastern Europe chooses eMACH.ai based complete Digital Core and Lending platform to transform their banking experience

Retrieved on: 
Friday, December 8, 2023

BUDAPEST, Hungary, Dec. 8, 2023 /PRNewswire/ -- OTP Bank has chosen Intellect Digital Core (IDC) core banking system by Intellect Global Consumer Banking (iGCB), the consumer banking arm of Intellect Design Arena Limited to power its banking experience. The contract was signed by OTP Bank represented by Péter Csányi, Deputy CEO, Chief Digital Officer of OTP Bank and András Becsei Deputy CEO for Retail, and Rajesh Saxena, the CEO of Intellect Global Consumer Banking, Intellect Design Arena today further to the cooperation agreement signed in May 2023.

Key Points: 
  • OTP Group is one of the largest independent financial service providers in the Central Eastern European region.
  • OTP Group is the 4th most stable banking group in Europe, based on the European Banking Authority's stress test in 2023.
  • Microservices-based, API-enabled, Cloud Native, Headless with underlying AI models) are the most comprehensive Open Finance enabled core banking solution and lending platform globally.
  • Starting today, Intellect platforms will be implemented in parallel in two members of OTP Group: OTP Bank and its subsidiary in Bulgaria, DSK Bank.

European Supervisory Authorities publish joint criteria on the independence of supervisory authorities

Retrieved on: 
Thursday, November 9, 2023

25 October 2023

Key Points: 
  • 25 October 2023
    The three European Supervisory Authorities– the European Banking Authority (EBA), European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) (EBA, EIOPA and ESMA – the ESAs) – today published their joint criteria on the independence of supervisory authorities.
  • Supervisory independence is key to ensure that fair, effective and transparent decisions are taken by appropriately resourced supervisory authorities.
  • Building on these reports and based on the 2021 EIOPA’s criteria and international standards, the ESAs further worked together to issue joint criteria on the independence of supervisory authorities.
  • The criteria can be used by supervisory authorities as a tool to enhance their independence and, at a later stage, by the ESAs to assess supervisory independence in the EU.

The EBA issues Opinion on a measure to address macroprudential risk following a notification by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority

Retrieved on: 
Thursday, November 9, 2023

The measure entails a credit institution-specific minimum level of 25% for the average risk weight of Swedish housing loans applicable to credit institutions that have adopted the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach to calculate their capital requirements..

Key Points: 
  • The measure entails a credit institution-specific minimum level of 25% for the average risk weight of Swedish housing loans applicable to credit institutions that have adopted the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach to calculate their capital requirements..
  • The measure targets retail exposures secured by real estate, both small and medium-sized (SME) and non-SME exposures.
  • In its Opinion, addressed to the Council, the European Commission, and the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, the EBA do not object to the extension of the current measure.
  • The EBAtakes note of ongoing concerns regarding systemic risk relating to the housing market and the persistence of macroprudential vulnerabilities in the Swedish financial system.

EBA releases the technical package for phase 3 of its 3.3 reporting framework

Retrieved on: 
Thursday, November 9, 2023

30 October 2023

Key Points: 
  • 30 October 2023
    The European Banking Authority (EBA) today published the technical package for phase 3 of version 3.3 of its reporting framework.
  • This provides the standard specifications that include the validation rules, the Data Point Model (DPM) and the XBRL taxonomies to support the new reporting on Interest Rate Risk in the Banking Book (IRRBB).
  • This technical package will be first used in the ad-hoc data collection for the banks under the QIS (Quantitative Impact Study) with reference date 31 December 2023, in line with the BoS decision EBA BS 2023 514.
  • In the future, this technical package will also be used for the Implementing Technical Standards (ITS) on supervisory reporting concerning IRRBB, currently being adopted by the European Commission (Reporting framework v3.4).

The EBA consults on draft technical standards on own funds requirements and stress testing of issuers under MiCAR

Retrieved on: 
Thursday, November 9, 2023

08 November 2023

Key Points: 
  • 08 November 2023
    The European Banking Authority (EBA) today a launched two consultations on draft Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) on own funds requirements and stress testing of issuers under the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCAR) which form part of the prudential package of MiCAR products.
  • The first RTS specify the adjustment of own funds requirements and stress testing of issuers of asset-referenced tokens and e-money tokens.
  • The second RTS specify the procedure and timeframe to adjust its own funds requirements for issuers of significant asset-referenced tokens or of e-money tokens.
  • These consultations, together with other consultations papers published today, form part of the third batch of MiCAR policy products.