Projection

• Iran’s attack involved around 170 drones, over 30 cruise missiles and more than 120 ballistic missiles, all directed against Israel and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.
• But various options have been canvassed, including a strike of some sort against Iran’s nuclear weapons programme.
• It has assassinated a number of nuclear scientists over the years, and launched a number of attacks on the country’s nuclear facilities.
• Believed to have been created through collaboration between US and Israeli intelligence, the Stuxnet malware was designed to severely disrupt centrifuge operations at Natanz and is thought to have set back Iran’s nuclear weapons programme by years.

Iran’s nuclear weapons history

• The country developed a civil nuclear programme under the late Shah, and in 1970 ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, committing the country not to possess nor develop nuclear weapons.
• During the late 1990s and early 2000s, Iran pursued a secret nuclear weapons development project, known as the Amad Plan.

• But it is thought that by then, Iran had the capacility to build a small and fairly crude nuclear device.
• A great deal of what we know about the development of Iran’s nuclear weapons programme stems from the 2018 Mossad raid.
• This revealed that work on weapons development was not entirely halted, and that Iran continued to work on improving its nuclear weapons capability.
• It has resumed operations at nuclear facilities previously prohibited under the terms of the agreement and, since February 2021, has prevented the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from effectively monitoring its nuclear sites.

Can an Iranian ‘bomb’ be prevented?

• First, Iran possesses the requisite expertise to develop nuclear weapons, which cannot be eradicated through bombing raids.
• While targeting Iranian facilities would temporarily hinder the programme, any setbacks would likely be short-lived.
• Destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities in Natanz would be essential, but accessing these facilities would necessitate a significant number of airstrikes penetrating deep into Iranian territory, while circumventing or overpowering its air defence systems.

Christoph Bluth does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.