Central bank

The Eurosystem Integrated Reporting Framework ‒ an overview

Retrieved on: 
Friday, April 5, 2024

The Eurosystem Integrated

Key Points: 
    • The Eurosystem Integrated
      Reporting Framework ? an overview
      1

      Background
      European Union (EU) banks face a whole range of data reporting obligations,
      including for statistical, resolution and prudential information.

    • Existing ECB statistical regulations specify the information that must be reported, but
      not how the actual reporting process is to be carried out.
    • The Eurosystem Integrated Reporting Framework ? an overview

      1

      submitted by reporting agents to NCBs.

    • This arrangement dates back to when the ECB was set up in 1998 and was justified
      at the time, as it meant that statistical reporting could be founded on well-established
      national reporting frameworks.
    • Figure 1
      Current Eurosystem approach to collecting statistical information from banks

      Banks

      NCBs

      ECB

      Transformations by banks

      Transformations by NCBs
      Country A

      BSI & MIR

      Integrated approach
      ?

      SHS

      Country B

      Operational
      systems

      Monetary data

      b.o.p., i.i.p &
      sector accounts

      Credit register
      Sector accounts

      AnaCredit
      b.o.p.

    • Under the new paradigm, cross-border banks could unify the
      technical specifications of their reporting for all their European entities.
    • 2

      The scope of the IReF
      The IReF seeks to integrate existing ESCB statistical data requirements for banks as
      far as possible into a single, standardised reporting framework applicable across the
      euro area.

    • The feasibility of aligning the IReF
      more closely with the Financial Reporting (FINREP) requirements applicable at solo
      level11 is also being assessed.
    • Some NCBs have
      developed an integrated reporting framework for investment funds (covering both
      MMFs and non-MMFs).
    • The Eurosystem reviewed the results of the CBA to identify optimal features for
      banks, the Eurosystem and its users.
    • This time frame will give reporting agents and the Eurosystem enough lead time to
      prepare the legal and technical framework without unduly delaying the expected
      reduction in the reporting burden.
    • 16

      See ?On a Feasibility Study of an Integrated Reporting System under Article 430c CRR?, EBA, 2021;
      and ?The EBA?s feasibility study on integrated reporting system provides a long-term vision for
      increasing efficiencies and reducing reporting costs?, EBA, December 2021.

    • The Eurosystem is already cooperating closely with the banking industry to optimise
      reporting and reduce the overall reporting burden via the Banks? Integrated Reporting
      Dictionary (BIRD).19 BIRD offers a redundancy-free source (i.e.
    • The IReF describes statistical requirements in a redundancy-free layer
      and will represent future statistical reporting obligations issued by the ECB and
      applicable to Eurosystem banks.
    • Data quality should increase and costs decrease, as the BIRD input layer would
      provide a comprehensive and flexible tool to support data reporting.

Changes to the operational framework for implementing monetary policy

Retrieved on: 
Wednesday, April 3, 2024

This box investigates how households have responded to the 2021-23 inflationary episode using evidence from the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey.

Key Points: 
  • This box investigates how households have responded to the 2021-23 inflationary episode using evidence from the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey.
  • The findings suggest that households have primarily adjusted their consumption spending to cope with higher inflation.

Frank Elderson: Taking into account climate and nature in monetary policy and banking supervision around the world

Retrieved on: 
Wednesday, April 3, 2024

This box investigates how households have responded to the 2021-23 inflationary episode using evidence from the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey.

Key Points: 
  • This box investigates how households have responded to the 2021-23 inflationary episode using evidence from the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey.
  • The findings suggest that households have primarily adjusted their consumption spending to cope with higher inflation.

US monetary policy is more powerful in low economic growth regimes

Retrieved on: 
Tuesday, April 2, 2024
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Key Points: 

    The impact of regulatory changes on rating behaviour

    Retrieved on: 
    Tuesday, April 2, 2024
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    Abstract

    Key Points: 
      • Abstract
        We examine rating behaviour after the introduction of new regulations regarding Credit Rating
        Agencies (CRAs) in the European securitisation market.
      • There is empirical evidence of rating catering in the securitisation market in the pre-GFC period (He et al.,
        2012; Efing and Hau, 2015).
      • Competition among
        CRAs could diminish ratings quality (Golan, Parlour, and Rajan, 2011) and promotes rating shopping by
        issuers resulting in rating inflation (Bolton et al., 2012).
      • This paper investigates the impact of the post-GFC regulatory changes in the European
        securitisation market.
      • In 2011, in addition to the creation of
        European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), a regulatory and supervisory body for CRAs was
        introduced.
      • We examine how rating behaviours have changed in the European securitisation market after the
        introduction of these new regulations.
      • We utilise the existence of multiple ratings and rating agreements between
        CRAs to identify the existence of rating shopping and rating catering, respectively (Griffin et al., 2013; He
        et al., 2012; 2016).
      • We find that the regulatory changes have been effective in tackling conflicts of interest between issuers
        and CRAs in the structured finance market.
      • Rating catering, which is a direct consequence of issuer and
        CRA collusion, seems to have disappeared after the introduction of these regulations.
      • There is empirical evidence of rating catering in the securitisation market in
        the pre-GFC period (He et al., 2012; Efing and Hau, 2015).
      • Competition among CRAs could diminish ratings quality (Golan, Parlour,
        and Rajan, 2011) and promotes rating shopping by issuers resulting in rating inflation (Bolton et
        al., 2012).
      • This paper investigates the impact of the post-GFC regulatory changes in the European
        securitisation market.
      • In 2011, in addition
        to the creation of European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), a regulatory and
        supervisory body for CRAs was introduced.
      • We find that the regulatory changes have been effective in tackling conflicts of interest
        between issuers and CRAs in the structured finance market.
      • Rating catering, which is a direct
        consequence of issuer and CRA collusion, seems to have disappeared after the introduction of
        these regulations.
      • Investors who previously demanded higher spreads for rating agreements for a
        multiple rated tranche, did not consider the effect of rating harmony as a risk in the post-GFC
        period.
      • Regarding rating shopping, we find that the effectiveness of the changes has been limited,
        potentially for two reasons.
      • Additionally, we also find that rating over-reliance might still be an issue, especially
        Rating catering is a broad term and it can involve rating shopping.
      • They re-examine the rating shopping and rating
        catering phenomena in the US market by looking at the post-crisis period between 2009 and 2013.
      • Using 622 CDO tranches, they also observe the existence of rating shopping and the diminishing
        of the rating catering.
      • Firstly, our main focus is the EU?s CRA Regulation and its effectiveness in reducing
        rating inflation and rating over-reliance.
      • To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to
        examine the effectiveness of the EU?s CRA regulatory changes on the investors? perception of
        rating inflation in the European ABS market.
      • Hence, the coverage and quality of our dataset constitutes significant addition
        to the literature and allows us to test the rating shopping and rating catering more authoritatively.
      • The following section reviews the literature
        on securitisation concerning CRAs and conflicts of interest, and outlines the regulatory changes
        introduced in the post-GFC period.
      • Firstly, ratings became ever more important as the Securities and
        Exchange Commission (SEC) 5 began heavily relying on CRA assessments for regulatory purposes
        (i.e.
      • the investment mandates that highlight rating agencies as the main benchmark for investment
        eligibility) (SEC, 2008; Kisgen and Strahan, 2010; Bolton et al., 2012).
      • issuers) as one of the main explanations for the rating inflation (He et al., 2011; 2012; Bolton
        et al., 2012; Efing and Hau, 2015).
      • Bolton et al., (2012) demonstrate that competition
        promotes rating shopping by issuers, leading to rating inflation.
      • The last phase, CRA III, was implemented in mid-2013 and involves an additional
        set of measures on reducing transparency and rating over-reliance.
      • As mentioned above, rating inflation can be caused by rating shopping
        In order to be eligible to use the STS classification, main parties (i.e.
      • The higher the difference in the number of ratings for a
        given ABS tranche, the greater the risk of rating shopping.
      • Alternatively, the impact of the new
        regulations could be limited when it comes to reducing rating shopping.
      • This is because, firstly,
        the conflict of interest between securitisation parties is not necessarily the sole cause for the
        occurrence of rating shopping.
      • L is a set of variables (Multiple ratings, CRA reported, Rating agreement) that
        we utilise interchangeably to capture the rating shopping and rating catering behaviour.
      • Hence, issuers are incentivised to report the highest possible rating and
        ensure each additional rating matches the desired level.
      • All in all, our results suggest that
        the new stricter regulatory measures have been effective in tackling conflicts of interest and
        reducing rating inflation caused by rating catering.
      • Self-selection might be a concern in analysing the impact of the
        new measures and investors? response with regard to the rating inflation.
      • This
        result is in line with the earlier findings suggesting that regulatory changes have reduced investors?
        suspicion of rating inflation and increased trust of CRAs.
      • Conclusion
        Several regulatory changes were introduced in Europe following the GFC aimed at tackling
        conflicts of interest between issuers and CRAs in the ABS market.
      • Utilising a sample of 12,469
        ABS issued between 1998 and 2018 in the European market, this paper examined whether these
        changes have had any impact on rating inflations caused by rating shopping and rating catering
        phenomena.
      • We find that the
        effectiveness of the changes has been more limited on rating shopping potentially for two reasons.
      • Tranche Credit Rating is the rating reported for a tranche at launch.

    AnaCredit plausibility checks, version 2.0

    Retrieved on: 
    Tuesday, April 2, 2024

    AnaCredit plausibility

    Key Points: 
      • AnaCredit plausibility
        checks
        Plausibility checks performed on
        AnaCredit datasets
        Version 2.0

        March 2024

        Contents
        1

        Introduction

        2

        2

        Plausibility checks

        3

        2.1

        Definitions

        3

        2.2

        Classification

        4

        3

        AnaCredit external plausibility checks

        7

        3.1

        Plausibility checks with other statistical reporting frameworks

        8

        3.2

        Plausibility checks with supervisory reporting frameworks

        AnaCredit plausibility checks ? Contents

        27

        1

        1

        Introduction
        This document sets out the AnaCredit plausibility checks.

      • AnaCredit plausibility checks ? Plausibility checks

        3

        are erroneous and require revision; second, where the AnaCredit data are correct
        but the BSI data have not been reported correctly; third, where methodological
        differences in the requirements of the two datasets justify the discrepancy.

      • Figure 1
        Types of AnaCredit plausibility check
        Structure

        Stability

        per OA

        Consistency within or across attributes

        Time consistency of aggregate metrics

        across OAs

        Consistency with data of other OAs

        Changes in relative position compared
        to other OAs

        Benchmark
        comparisons

        Consistency with statistical and/or
        supervisory reporting

        Consistency of ratios over time

        Internal
        plausibility

        External
        plausibility

        AnaCredit plausibility checks ? Plausibility checks

        4

        2.2.1

        Internal plausibility checks
        Internal plausibility checks are self-contained within the AnaCredit data set, i.e.

      • AnaCredit plausibility checks ? Plausibility checks

        5

        2.2.2

        External plausibility checks
        External plausibility checks assess the consistency of data reported under AnaCredit
        with other datasets.

      • AnaCredit plausibility checks ? Plausibility checks

        6

        3

        AnaCredit external plausibility checks
        The following subsections contain the details of the AnaCredit external plausibility
        checks.

      • List of external plausibility checks performed under AnaCredit
        Table 1 shows the external plausibility checks under AnaCredit.
      • Plausibility checks with other statistical reporting
        frameworks
        This section includes AnaCredit external plausibility checks against other statistical
        reporting frameworks.
      • AnaCredit plausibility checks ? AnaCredit external plausibility checks

        9

        3.1.1.2

        ?

        loans to other financial intermediaries, financial auxiliaries, captive financial
        institutions and money lenders (S.125+S.126+S.127) across all maturity
        breakdowns;

        ?

        loans to insurance corporations (S.128) across all maturity breakdowns;

        ?

        loans to pension funds (S.129) across all maturity breakdown.

      • AnaCredit plausibility checks ? AnaCredit external plausibility checks

        10

        instruments (loans), so the resulting aggregate is a good match to the BSI statistic.

      • AnaCredit plausibility checks ? AnaCredit external plausibility checks

        12

        loans.

      • AnaCredit plausibility checks ? AnaCredit external plausibility checks

        14

        If any of the input data necessary for this calculation are missing or inconsistent, the
        [relevant BSI balance] resolves to NULL for the instrument concerned.

      • AnaCredit plausibility checks ? AnaCredit external plausibility checks

        16

        the latter assuming the credit risk and the MFI being responsible for managing the
        loan.

      • AnaCredit plausibility checks ? AnaCredit external plausibility checks

        17

        Intra-company instrument flag
        BSI statistics also include intra-company loans, i.e.

      • AnaCredit plausibility checks ? AnaCredit external plausibility checks

        18

        Settled loans
        BSI statistics only include loans which have been settled, i.e.

      • AnaCredit plausibility checks ? AnaCredit external plausibility checks

        20

        resolves to NULL for the instrument concerned.

      • AnaCredit plausibility checks ? AnaCredit external plausibility checks

        25

        divided by the number of the main debtors.

      • AnaCredit plausibility checks ? AnaCredit external plausibility checks

        26

        3.2

        Plausibility checks with supervisory reporting frameworks
        This section includes AnaCredit external plausibility checks against supervisory
        reporting frameworks.

      • AnaCredit plausibility checks ? AnaCredit external plausibility checks

        27

        FINREP templates and compared with suitably computed AnaCredit equivalents for
        banks reporting the supervisory financial information under Regulation ECB/2015/13
        (FINREP solo).

      • AnaCredit plausibility checks ? AnaCredit external plausibility checks

        28

        Figure 3
        Calculation flow ? schematic overview of the comparison with FINREP solo

        By stacking the FINREP solo benchmark side-by-side with its AnaCredit equivalent,
        the deviation between the values can be quantified.

      • AnaCredit plausibility checks ? AnaCredit external plausibility checks

        29

        3.2.2.1

        FINREP solo benchmark value
        As mentioned, comparing AnaCredit with supervisory financial information helps
        ensure accounting information on loan portfolios that must be reported to AnaCredit
        is reported properly.

      • AnaCredit plausibility checks ? AnaCredit external plausibility checks

        30

        Table 3
        The formula for the benchmark DP_FNRP_F1800_ALL_00 from data points from the
        reporting templates of the EBA reporting framework.

      • The composition of FINREP solo reporters thus defined serves as a basis for
        determining (i) which AnaCredit observed agents correspond to which FINREP solo
        reporters, and (ii) the extent to which the perimeter of a FINREP solo reporter can be
        reconstructed from AnaCredit (given that some observed agents may have been

        AnaCredit plausibility checks ? AnaCredit external plausibility checks

        32

        derogated from reporting to AnaCredit).

      • AnaCredit plausibility checks ? AnaCredit external plausibility checks

        34

        For a given FINREP solo reporter, the result of the calculation described in this
        section (i.e.

      • AnaCredit plausibility checks ? AnaCredit external plausibility checks

        35

        ? European Central Bank, 2024
        Postal address
        Telephone
        Website

        60640 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
        +49 69 1344 0
        www.ecb.europa.eu

        All rights reserved.

    Business as usual: bank climate commitments, lending, and engagement

    Retrieved on: 
    Tuesday, April 2, 2024
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    Key Points: 

      Letter from Piero Cipollone to Ms Irene Tinagli, ECON Chair, on technical considerations on the provision of multiple digital euro accounts to individual end users

      Retrieved on: 
      Tuesday, April 2, 2024

      To keep you informed about the latest developments in the project, I would like to update you on the ECB’s

      Key Points: 
      • To keep you informed about the latest developments in the project, I would like to update you on the ECB’s
        work regarding the provision of multiple digital euro accounts to individual end users.
      • Under the European Commission’s proposal for a regulation on the establishment of the digital euro, digital euro
        users would be able to hold one or more digital euro payment accounts with the same or different payment
        service providers (PSPs).
      • : +49 69 1344 0
        Website: www.ecb.europa.eu

        ECB-PUBLIC

        The attached technical analysis, to be published on our website today, examines the potential impact of users
        holding multiple digital euro accounts.

      • 4

        Yours sincerely,
        [signed]
        Piero Cipollone

        See “Letter from Piero Cipollone to Irene Tinagli, ECON Chair, on the update on work of digital euro Rulebook Development
        Group and start of selection procedure for potential digital euro providers”, 3 January 2024.

      Consumer participation in the credit market during the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond

      Retrieved on: 
      Tuesday, April 2, 2024
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      We find that credit demand is highest when

      Key Points: 
        • We find that credit demand is highest when
          the first lockdown ends and it drops when supportive monetary compensation schemes are implemented.
        • Credit is more likely to be
          accepted under favourable borrowing conditions and after the approval of national recovery plans.
        • We also find
          that demographic, economic factors, perceptions and expectations are associated with the demand for credit and
          the credit grant.
        • First, it adds to a rapidly growing literature on household
          borrowing behaviour during the COVID-19 pandemic; see, for example, Ho et al.
        • We provide evidence that credit applications and credit acceptances display a different pattern over
          time.
        • Credit is more likely to be accepted under favourable borrowing conditions and after the
          approval of national recovery plans.
        • In almost all countries
          households are significantly less likely to apply and to get their credit approved than in Germany.
        • In line with literature, we show that
          demographic and economic factors affect the probability for credit applications and credit approval.
        • In addition,
          the paper shows that consumer perceptions and expectations matter when they decide to apply for credit.
        • Introduction

          The participation of households in the credit market receives wide attention in the consumer finance literature
          because consumer credit enters the monetary policy transmission mechanism through the so-called ?credit
          channel?: changes in credit demand and supply have an effect on consumers' spending and investment, which in
          turn affect economic growth.

        • We use microdata from the ECB?s Consumer Expectations Survey (hereinafter CES), a survey that
          measures consumer expectations and behaviour in the euro area.
        • Its panel dimension allows for an assessment of
          how consumer behaviour changes over time and how consumers respond to critical economic shocks.
        • This way we can gauge how credit applications and credit acceptances change under different, almost
          opposite, borrowing conditions.
        • We also distinguish between the demand for long-term secured loans (mortgages) and for short-term
          uncollateralized loans (consumer loans).
        • ECB Working Paper Series No 2922

          3

          We use probit models to estimate the probability of the consumer to apply for credit and the credit being granted.

        • The rate peaks in 2020Q3 which reflects the rebound in the demand for loans when the first lockdown ended.
        • In almost all countries households are significantly less likely
          to apply and to get their credit approved than in Germany.
        • However,
          when it comes to credit acceptance, we observe that the two groups of households are more similar.
        • Finally, we find some heterogeneity with respect to the type of credit, particularly between secured and unsecured
          debt.
        • The demand for
          consumer credit is insignificant for liquid households and decreases significantly for constrained households in
          the last two quarters of our timespan.
        • The first consists of a recently growing literature which
          explores consumer behaviour in the credit market during the COVID-19 pandemic, mostly in the United States.
        • Sandler and Ricks (2020) show that consumers did not use credit card debt for financial liquidity in the early stage
          of the COVID-19 pandemic.
        • (2020) report that credit card applications and new mortgage loans
          declined during the first months of the pandemic in regions with more unemployment insurance claims.
        • Lu and
          Van der Klaauw (2021) show that there was a sharp drop in consumer credit demand, especially for credit cards.
        • (2022) document that there was a substantial decrease in the usage of credit cards and home equity lines
          of credit by Canadian consumers.
        • Our paper is also consonant with studies on the association between financial and demographic factors and
          consumers? participation in the credit market as well as on the demand for specific types of credit.
        • January 2020 ? October 2020 - The two main events are the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the
          consequential lockdowns in the euro area.
        • 4 If the
          respondent has applied for more than one type of credit, she is asked to refer to the most recent credit application.
        • Between 2021Q3 and 2022Q3 the acceptance
          rate stays above the average values, mirroring the easing of credit standards for consumer credit and other lending
          to households during this period.
        • Second, we can investigate the presence of nonlinearities in how liquidity and the credit type interact in explaining credit applications.
        • (2023) ? who show that in the United States the local pandemic severity had a strong
          negative effect on credit card spending early in the pandemic, which diminished over time.
        • First, we select mortgages and consumer credit as the two mostly reported categories for secured and

          13

          The full estimation results are reported in Table 3.

        • The right-hand side panel of Figure 6 shows that the demand for consumer credit is insignificant for both liquid
          and illiquid households.
        • It also shows that
          subjective perceptions of credit access, financial concerns and expectations on interest rates matter for the demand
          for credit.
        • In Bertola, G., Disney
          R., and Grant, C. (eds) The Economics of Consumer Credit, Cambridge MA, MIT Press.
        • Horvath, A., Kay, B. and Wix, C. (2023) The COVID-19 shock and consumer credit: Evidence from credit card
          data.
        • Magri, S. (2007) Italian households? debt: The participation to the debt market and the size of the loan.