Fiscal policy

Isabel Schnabel: Unconventional fiscal and monetary policy at the zero lower bound

Retrieved on:

Saturday, February 27, 2021

Economy, Money, Macroeconomics, Monetary policy, Public finance, Fiscal policy, Keynesian economics, Inflation, Euro, Central bank, Monetary inflation, Helicopter money

Keynote speech by Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Third Annual Conference organised by the European Fiscal Board on “High Debt, Low Rates and Tail Events: Rules-Based Fiscal Frameworks under Stress” Frankfurt am Main, 26 February 2021 One of the greatest conundrums and policy challenges of our times is the coincidence of persistently low real long-term interest rates and low inflation.

Key Points:

Keynote speech by Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Third Annual Conference organised by the European Fiscal Board on “High Debt, Low Rates and Tail Events: Rules-Based Fiscal Frameworks under Stress”

Frankfurt am Main, 26 February 2021 One of the greatest conundrums and policy challenges of our times is the coincidence of persistently low real long-term interest rates and low inflation.
Even before the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, inflation across many advanced economies had been falling short of central banks aims for nearly a decade.
In the euro area, hopes that inflation would sustainably recover to levels closer to 2% have been repeatedly and persistently disappointed, despite highly favourable financing conditions.
Years of subdued price pressures have raised the spectre of low inflation becoming entrenched in peoples expectations.

Monetary policy implications of persistent supply-side shocks

Slack was gradually disappearing, output gaps had closed and unemployment had declined to record low levels in many advanced economies (see slide 2).
At first sight, these developments seem to point to a weakened relationship between economic slack and inflation.
[1] Instead, Phillips curve models point to other factors putting persistent downward pressure on underlying inflation in recent years (see right chart slide 4).
The implications of these developments for monetary policy are twofold.
First, since monetary policy is acting on the demand side, it has less traction in countering persistent structural shocks to inflation.
Second, the decline in real interest rates limits the extent to which monetary policy can stabilise the economy in the wake of demand-side shocks.
Despite the unprecedented severity of the crisis and the large shortfall in aggregate demand, the ECB did not cut its key policy rates.
To circumvent the effective lower bound, central banks have resorted to unconventional monetary policies.

The euro area policy mix before and during the pandemic

For the euro area, there is evidence that public investment tends to crowd in private investment, rather than out.
[6] A public sector that is largely insensitive to interest rate changes significantly reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy, in particular in the euro area, where governments account for nearly half of total spending.
An unresponsive fiscal authority disregards the broad empirical evidence that fiscal policy is particularly effective at the lower bound.
[8] Fiscal policy, then, faces a difficult trade-off between business cycle stabilisation and debt sustainability, in particular in a situation with high legacy debt.
Risk premia on lower-rated sovereign bonds sky-rocketed in March last year, impairing the transmission of both monetary and fiscal policy.
For the first time, a euro area-wide instrument was created with the specific aim of ensuring that the aggregate euro area fiscal stance is appropriately countercyclical.
The policy response to the pandemic is a remarkable showcase for the power of monetary and fiscal policy interaction to boost confidence, stabilise aggregate demand and avoid a persistent destabilisation of medium to long-term inflation expectations.

Macroeconomic stabilisation in the future

Both facilities, however, are temporary and linked to the pandemic, while the effective lower bound is likely to remain a recurring constraint in the future.
The question, then, is how to ensure effective macroeconomic stabilisation in the euro area in the future.
The pandemic holds two lessons, one for monetary and one for fiscal policy.

First, monetary policy has to enable sustainable private and public spending.

Low rates do not mean that monetary policy no longer has a role to play.
On the contrary, monetary support will remain an important pillar of macroeconomic stabilisation.
The horizon of policy support will then depend on the extent to which the private and the public sector make use of accommodative monetary conditions.
The intensity of policy support, in turn, will evolve endogenously with the economic recovery.
For example, a rise in nominal yields that reflects an increase in inflation expectations is a welcome sign that the policy measures are bearing fruit.
To ultimately empower fiscal policy as a transmission channel of monetary policy, the ECB needs to provide liquidity when risks of self-fulfilling price spirals threaten to undermine stability in the euro area as a whole.

The lesson for fiscal policy is that, in lower bound episodes, it has to become more responsive to downturns.

Put simply, unconventional monetary policy needs to be complemented by unconventional fiscal policy.
The concept of unconventional fiscal policy is not yet well established.
[12] A simple Google search, for example, returns more than 700,000 results for unconventional monetary policy but only about 8,000 entries for unconventional fiscal policy.
In essence, unconventional fiscal policy comprises measures that go beyond traditional automatic stabilisers, which tend to be too small to offset the effects of an adverse demand shock at the lower bound.

Creating a framework for effective stabilisation in the euro area

In 2019, the European Fiscal Board concluded that the current framework remained insufficient to deliver a more countercyclical fiscal policy stance.
[14] It also recommended focusing on a single operational indicator an expenditure rule and a single target, a debt anchor.
An intense debate has emerged, however, about the appropriate level of the debt anchor, and the EUs 60% reference value in particular.
[15] Not few observers point to the benign implications of the sharp decline in real and nominal interest rates for debt sustainability.
Despite much higher debt, interest rate expenses as a share of euro area GDP have declined from more than 5% in 1995 to 1.6% today (see left chart slide 9).
A credible debt anchor remains an important pillar of a stability-oriented policy framework and central bank independence.
A mechanical application of the current rules could imply fiscal adjustment needs in some euro area economies that would be severely damaging from a societal, economic and monetary policy perspective.
Public investment and structural policies hold the key to a higher sustainable growth path and higher interest rates.

Conclusion

My conclusion is therefore that the current era of low inflation and low interest rates which is unlikely to change in the near term in light of the pandemic forces us to reconsider how monetary and fiscal policy should complement each other to protect the economy from large downturns and to minimise risks of long-term scarring.
Effective macroeconomic stabilisation in the vicinity of the lower bound requires both unconventional monetary and fiscal policies.
Fiscal policy, in turn, needs to recognise its role in the transmission of monetary policy in a low inflation, low interest rate environment.

Theratechnologies Announces Fourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2020 Financial Results

Retrieved on:

Thursday, February 25, 2021

Financial crises, Economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, Fiscal policy

In the fourth quarter of Fiscal 2020, Trogarzo sales amounted to $8,372,000 compared to $7,669,000 for the same quarter of 2019, representing an increase of 9.2%.

Key Points:

In the fourth quarter of Fiscal 2020, Trogarzo sales amounted to $8,372,000 compared to $7,669,000 for the same quarter of 2019, representing an increase of 9.2%.
We recorded an expense of $795,000 in the fourth quarter of Fiscal 2020 compared to $642,000 for the same period of Fiscal 2019.
Finance costs for the fourth quarter of Fiscal 2020 were $1,445,000 compared to $1,275,000 for the same quarter of Fiscal 2019.
We ended the fourth quarter of Fiscal 2020 with $20,768,000 in cash, bonds and money market funds.

Fraser Institute News Release: Interest costs reach $12.5 billion in Ontario, $1.8 billion more than the government will spend on post-secondary education

Retrieved on:

Thursday, February 25, 2021

Fiscal policy, Government debt, ONTARIO, Canada

TORONTO, Feb. 25, 2021 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- The Ontario government will spend more on interest costs in 2020-21 than post-secondary education, finds a new study released today by the Fraser Institute, an independent, non-partisan, Canadian public policy think-tank.

Key Points:

TORONTO, Feb. 25, 2021 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- The Ontario government will spend more on interest costs in 2020-21 than post-secondary education, finds a new study released today by the Fraser Institute, an independent, non-partisan, Canadian public policy think-tank.
Interest must be paid on government debt, and the more money governments spend on interest payments the less money is available for the programs and services that matter to Ontarians, said Steve Lafleur, a senior policy analyst at the Fraser Institute and author of Federal and Provincial Debt Interest Costs for Canadians .
In Ontario, taxpayers will pay $12.5 billion in provincial interest costs alone, which is more than the provincial government will spend on post-secondary education ($10.7 billion).
On a per person basis, each Ontarian will pay $1,375 in interest this year to service the federal and provincial debt.

CCAGW Leads a Coalition Urging Congress to Reject the Restoration of Earmarks

Retrieved on:

Tuesday, February 23, 2021

Congressional News, Views, White House, Federal Government, Public policy, Government, State, Local, Public policy, Other Policy Issues, Public choice theory, Earmark, Fiscal policy, Political terminology, Articles, Politics, Government

CCAGW President Tom Schatz said in a statement:

Key Points:

CCAGW President Tom Schatz said in a statement:
Earmarks are one of the most corrupt, inequitable, and wasteful practices in the history of Congress.
Earmarks are a lazy, unfair, and corrupt way to circumvent the authorization and appropriations process.
Members of Congress must be fiscally responsible and oppose the resurrection of earmarks.
Thank you to the coalition members who on behalf of taxpayers across the country are joining CCAGW in the fight to permanently ban rather than restore earmarks.

Speech of Eurogroup President, Paschal Donohoe, at the European Parliamentary Week, 22 February 2021

Retrieved on:

Tuesday, February 23, 2021

European Union, Economy of the European Union, Eurozone, Europe, Fiscal policy, Stock market crashes, European debt crisis, Keynesian resurgence

Thank you very much for inviting me to the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee meeting of this Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance in the EU.

Key Points:

Thank you very much for inviting me to the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee meeting of this Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance in the EU.
It is an honour to participate in this important forum.
I am grateful to the European Parliament and the Portuguese Presidency of the EU for having organised a timely discussion on this very important topic.

Economic outlook - setting the scene

I would like to set the scene and say a few words on the economic situation.
The Commission's 2021 Winter Forecast confirmed that the Covid-19 crisis caused economic activity in the euro area to contract in 2020 by an unprecedented 6.8%.
It goes without saying that without the swift and bold policy response by the member states and the European institutions, things would have been even worse.
At the same time, we need to be mindful that the positive economic outlook faces elevated uncertainty and is predicated on a positive public health situation.
It is against this background that we have to consider the fiscal-economic policy mix going forward.

Fiscal policy strategy

Let us start with fiscal policy, which played a crucial role in limiting the socio-economic fallout from the crisis by protecting incomes and jobs.
There is an international consensus that at least this year, fiscal policy needs to remain expansionary to ensure that a solid recovery indeed takes hold.
We should proceed cautiously to avoid cliff-edge effects related to the risk of a premature withdrawal of fiscal stimulus.
At the same time, we have to plan ahead and start thinking about the fiscal stance in 2022 and beyond.
I took good note of what President Christine Lagarde said recently when she presented the ECB's Annual Report to the European Parliament: monetary and fiscal policy should continue to work hand in hand.
Member states coordinated fiscal policy in the crisis, and this reinforced the credibility of the EU's crisis response.

Priorities for fiscal and economic policies

Maintaining emergency economic support

Rebalancing fiscal support

As we look into the future and the recovery starts to take hold, our second priority will be to gradually shift towards more targeted fiscal support measures.
We are very aware that some sectors and citizens are hit harder by this pandemic.
There will likely be a need to continue providing them with emergency support for longer.

Rebuilding the economy: investment and reforms

This will require ambitious investment and reforms.
This is why member states should take advantage of the current favourable financing conditions and of course the Next Generation EU programme, to increase investment in infrastructure and human capital.
To maximize public investment in the economy and make it a catalyst for private investment, public investment needs to be accompanied by structural reforms that will foster sustainable growth.
These include reforms to improve the functioning of labour and product markets, the public administration, and thereby also the business environment, which is key for spurring innovation.
The Recovery and Resilience Facility, the centrepiece of Next Generation EU which entered into force last week, will give impetus to the much needed investment and reform effort.

Conclusion

This brings me to the conclusion of my remarks.
The pandemic plunged our societies and economies into an unprecedented crisis, which, I am confident, we will overcome.
The outlook is improving, but we have a journey to complete.
There is a lot at stake and we owe it to our citizens to get it right.

Press contacts

FR Data Insights' New Nationwide Survey Exposes Stimulus Plan Will Fail

Retrieved on:

Wednesday, February 3, 2021

Fiscal policy, Keynesian economics, United States federal legislation, Public policy, Stimulus, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Travers, Economic policy

RALEIGH, N.C., Feb. 3, 2021 /PRNewswire/ --A new, nationwide studyof United States adultsby FR Data Insights casts doubts on the potential effectiveness of the new stimulus bills pushed by Congress and the new administration.

Key Points:

RALEIGH, N.C., Feb. 3, 2021 /PRNewswire/ --A new, nationwide studyof United States adultsby FR Data Insights casts doubts on the potential effectiveness of the new stimulus bills pushed by Congress and the new administration.
Drew Travers, head writer with FR insights notes "the common wisdom that a blanket stimulus will revive the economy is wrong at best, and dangerous at worst.
All geographic regions (Northeast, Midwest, South and West) responded that their stimulus check would primarily be used for savings.
- Drew Travers, Chief Editor for FR Data Insights.

The initial fiscal policy responses of euro area countries to the COVID-19 crisis

Retrieved on:

Wednesday, February 3, 2021

European Union, Eurozone, Economy, Fiscal policy, Units of time, European Central Bank, Great Recession in Europe, Keynesian economics, Austerity, European Union stimulus plan

Prepared by Stephan Haroutunian, Steffen Osterloh and Kamila Sawiska Euro area countries have relied extensively on fiscal policy to counter the harmful impact of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic on their economies.

Key Points:

Prepared by Stephan Haroutunian, Steffen Osterloh and Kamila Sawiska Euro area countries have relied extensively on fiscal policy to counter the harmful impact of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic on their economies.
Since all euro area countries were hit by the economic shock largely through the same channels, their fiscal responses in the early stages of the crisis were similar in terms of the instruments used.
Fiscal emergency packages were mostly aimed at limiting the economic fallout from containment measures through direct measures to protect firms and workers in the affected industries.
In order to support the recovery, fiscal policy needs to provide targeted and mostly temporary stimulus, tailored to the specific characteristics of the crisis and countries fiscal positions.

1 Introduction

This article discusses the initial fiscal policy responses of euro area countries to the COVID-19 crisis and the implications for further policy measures.
It examines the specific fiscal policy measures taken in the course of 2020 and elaborates on the experiences of euro area countries during the pandemic.
The article finds that successful recovery strategies from previous crisis episodes cannot be replicated without being adapted to the current crisis circumstances.
Looking forward, it discusses the implications for the fiscal stance and considers the main policy questions such as the design and timing of fiscal measures.
These two types of fiscal measure affect both the expenditure and the revenue side of government budgets (see Table 1).

Table 1

Those measures were aimed at supporting the firms and households particularly affected by the health crisis.
Section 2 presents the overall fiscal policy response during the initial phases of the crisis.
Budgetary and liquidity measures on the expenditure side are discussed in Sections 3 and 4 respectively.
Sections 5 and 6 give an overview of budgetary and liquidity measures on the revenue side.
Section 7 elaborates on the challenges associated with the assessment of the fiscal stance using standard measures, and Section 8 concludes.

2 Budgetary impact of fiscal responses

The fiscal deficits and the contraction in GDP led to an increase in the euro area debt ratio from 85.9% of GDP in 2019 to a projected 101.7% of GDP in 2020.
The deterioration in fiscal balances partly reflects the operation of automatic stabilisers, which are designed to dampen the effects of the economic cycle.
According to European Central Bank (ECB) estimates, these account for around one-third of the large budget deficit in 2020.
[1] But the worsening of the fiscal outlook is principally a result of the discretionary fiscal measures adopted since the outbreak of the crisis.
However, these projections are subject to exceptionally high uncertainty, as they depend, inter alia, on the course of the pandemic.

Chart 1

Fiscal measures were implemented via sequences of fiscal packages that reflected the change in priorities over the course of 2020.
These packages aimed to address the health crisis and to support the sectors most hit by lockdown measures.
Later, some of the countries announced further fiscal packages to extend the liquidity and emergency measures included in the first package.
3.9% of GDP) and in September France launched its France Relance package comprising measures worth 100 billion, (i.e.
Later, around mid-October, several other Member States announced in their draft budgetary plans for 2021 additional measures for 2021 and subsequent years.
Overall, the timing of the recovery packages is much more heterogeneous than that of the emergency measures taken in the spring.

Figure 1

Quantifying the discretionary fiscal measures in response to the COVID-19 crisis and comparing them across countries is subject to major challenges.
First, there is no consistent track record of the measures that countries have implemented.
[2] The stability programmes published in spring 2020 did not provide full details on fiscal measures, especially in the longer term, as countries considered uncertainty to be too high.
Second, statistical recording of the often unprecedented measures is challenging, even with Eurostat providing guidance.
[3] All reporting countries had legislated for substantial fiscal packages in 2020, with a weighted average of slightly above 4% of GDP.
However, as mentioned above, the cross-country comparison is cumbersome owing to heterogeneity in the reporting of the measures.

Chart 2

By comparison, at the height of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2009, the overall amount of discretionary stimulus in EU countries amounted to 1.5% of GDP.
[5] Moreover, the heterogeneity of measures appears to have been larger during the GFC than in the COVID-19 crisis.
In 2009 stimulus measures reached over 3% in Luxembourg, while some countries did not provide any stimulus at all, even implementing considerable consolidation measures.
In Chart 3, the composition of aggregate discretionary fiscal measures in the euro area is estimated based on information provided in the DBPs for 2021.

Chart 3

For 2021, the overall amount of planned discretionary measures reported in the DBPs is substantially smaller and more heterogeneous across Member States compared with that for 2020.
On average, the size of the concrete discretionary measures included in the DBPs amounts on average to slightly above 1% of GDP.
Among the larger Member States, Germany stands out with measures amounting to 2.1% of GDP in 2021.
For the euro area as a whole, the decline compared to 2020 mostly reflects the planned unwinding of the bulk of emergency measures.
In particular, additional support measures for firms appear likely in the case of new lockdowns, as already observed in autumn 2020.
They facilitated companies access to external financing and allowed them to shift tax obligations to when normal activity resumes.

3 Budgetary measures on the expenditure side

Such schemes aim to prevent the loss of human capital and stabilise consumption for those who would have become unemployed.
Moreover, the extension of such schemes supports private demand and business confidence during the recovery phase.
Moreover, such State aid measures need to address competition concerns, as differing approaches across countries might impair the Single Market.
The effectiveness of other spending measures to support private demand is hampered by the COVID-19 crisis.
The emergency measures supported incomes and allowed households to maintain their living standards to a large extent.
However, as a consequence of the containment measures, their immediate impact on consumption was reduced.
These measures prevented consumers from making purchases and led to a strong increase in the saving ratio particularly in the higher income groups.
In fact, several countries have already taken measures consisting of targeted transfers to certain households, such as families or the unemployed.
Such measures can be assumed to have a stronger impact insofar as they target households with a higher propensity to consume.
Most of this expenditure should be spent on investment and growth-enhancing structural reforms (see Box 1).
[21] The experience has shown that the implementation of sufficiently large, timely and properly designed green stimulus measures can generate economic growth while also delivering environmental benefits.

4 Liquidity measures on the expenditure side

In the early phase of the COVID-19 crisis, loan guarantees were the predominant instrument used to address firms liquidity shortages.
Such guarantees aimed to avert liquidity shortages for firms particularly affected by the containment policies, in particular SMEs.
In addition, several Member States provided additional liquidity to firms in the form of loans through State-owned development banks.
At the euro area level, announced guarantees amounted to over 16% of GDP (see Chart 4).

Chart 4

The guarantees granted to the financial sector during the GFC mainly aimed at restoring confidence and ensuring the proper financing of the financial sector.
Commitments for those guarantees amounted to about 18% of GDP in 2010,[23] a similar dimension as current guarantees to non-financial corporations.
Moral hazard arose as guarantees reduced banks incentives to screen and monitor the quality of loans, leading to riskier loans as firms undertook riskier projects.
In principle, moral hazard concerns could arise if banks replace existing problematic loans from before the crisis with new ones guaranteed by the State.
Moreover, the extensive fiscal support to firms can partly compensate their losses during the pandemic.

5 Budgetary measures on the revenue side

Under the assumption of full pass-through, the VAT cut in Germany would reduce euro area HICP inflation in July 2020 by around 0.6 percentage points.
[28] However, the actual impact of this measure is uncertain, as it is temporary and taken in a situation of weak economic activity and high uncertainty.
Overall, in that specific case, a temporary VAT cut was successful in bringing forward consumption of durable goods.
[30] The continued health restrictions and behavioural changes posed some challenges to the operation of temporary VAT cuts as stimulus policy.
Most notably, France has announced a reduction in production taxes in 2021 in order to improve the competitiveness of firms.
Such temporary and targeted measures can be efficient instruments to support labour reallocation in the recovery phase.

6 Liquidity measures on the revenue side

Very early on in the pandemic, all euro areas countries took measures to relieve the immediate tax payments of firms severely affected by the lockdowns.
Typically, such measures did not reduce the overall tax obligations of firms but shifted the payment dates from the time of the broad lockdowns in the first half of the year to later dates, thus providing additional liquidity to firms.
However, the overall effect of these measures on the budget balance in 2020 is relatively small for two reasons.
Tax-related liquidity measures were an efficient instrument to increase the liquidity of firms.
As tax obligations typically only react with a delay to changes in revenues, such tax measures serve as a stabiliser for firms earnings.

Box 1 EU reaction to the COVID-19 crisis

Prepared by Stephan Haroutunian The response of the European Union (EU) to the coronavirus (COVID-19) crisis has been unprecedented and significantly complements the fiscal measures taken at the national level.
The EUs response has also been tailored to the challenges arising in the different phases of the crisis.
It thus allows them to undertake the budgetary measures needed to achieve a counter-cyclical response in a situation of generalised crisis caused by a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the EU as a whole.
The ECOFIN Council activated the clause for the first time since its inclusion in the rules in 2011.
Measures are aimed at ensuring that the EU rules-based framework is supportive of the implementation of emergency measures.
With regard to the EU budget, the European Commission set up the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative, which allows the use of funds under the EUs cohesion policy to address the consequences of the COVID-19 crisis.
Safety nets for sovereigns in the euro area: To safeguard euro area countries financing, the Pandemic Crisis Support tool was developed.
The aim of this tool is to ensure access to financing during the crisis.

7 Implications for the fiscal stance

The interpretation of the fiscal stance for 2020 and 2021 is challenging owing to the one-off impact of the emergency measures.
As shown above, the overall amount of fiscal measures specified in the DBPs for 2021 is substantially lower than that for 2020.
However, this mainly results from the expiry of the fiscal emergency measures, which have different economic implications from standard stimulus measures, with a more durable positive effect on growth.
The substantial fiscal measures taken in 2020 counteracted the output losses related to the crisis.
As shown above, the specific features of the COVID-19 crisis had an impact on the effectiveness of fiscal measures.

Chart 5

The favourable macroeconomic developments observed up to 2020 induced some euro area countries to reduce their budget deficits and build substantial fiscal buffers.
In particular, countries with a favourable starting position in terms of a positive budget balance and lower debt level were able to provide considerable support to the economy in a timely manner (see Chart 5).
Looking forward, the NGEU package will provide additional stimulus in 2021-26 on top of national measures shown above.
The additional investment spending of the NGEU is expected to provide additional stimulus for Member States in the years 2021 to 2026.
However, it will not be reflected in the their deficits but will lead to fiscal liabilities at the EU level.

8 Conclusions and policy implications

Given the specific nature of the crisis, it is assumed that those instruments were well targeted to the specific challenges of the first crisis phase of broad lockdowns.
The recovery needs to be supported by appropriate measures which take into account the future path of the pandemic and the effectiveness of policy instruments.
For 2021, the amount of stimulus announced in the DBPs differs substantially across Member States.
Consequently, additional stimulus measures could support the recovery in the medium run but should not hamper necessary structural changes to the economies.
In fact, the impact of the funds on growth will be magnified if they are accompanied by appropriate structural policies.

Fraser Institute News Release: Canada’s combined federal-provincial debt will reach $2 trillion in 2020/21; Ontario’s combined debt now exceeds 100% of the province’s economy

Retrieved on:

Tuesday, February 2, 2021

Fiscal policy, Government debt, Economy of Canada, Government budget balance, NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR, Government, Economy, Money

The study finds that not only has Canadas projected combined government debt (the federal debt and the provincial debt of all 10 provinces) doubled since 2007/08, the year before the last recession, but the combined debt now equals 91.6 per cent of the Canadian economyup from 65.2 per cent last year.

Key Points:

The study finds that not only has Canadas projected combined government debt (the federal debt and the provincial debt of all 10 provinces) doubled since 2007/08, the year before the last recession, but the combined debt now equals 91.6 per cent of the Canadian economyup from 65.2 per cent last year.
Crucially, on a per person basis, the combined debt this year ranges from a low of $43,635 in British Columbia to a high of $64,224 in Newfoundland & Labrador.
Ontarios combined government debt in 2020/21 exceeds 100 per cent of the provincial GDP, meaning it would take every dollar in Ontarios economy for a full year to eliminate the combined government debt of Ontarians.
Its important for Canadians to understand the magnitude of the countrys combined debt because deficits and debt today could result in higher taxes in the future, said Steve Lafleur, senior policy analyst at the Fraser Institute and study co-author.

Philadelphia Selected as Pilot City for American Dream 2021: Showcase of Smart Homes

Retrieved on:

Tuesday, January 26, 2021

Market, Electric vehicles, Fiscal policy, Keynesian economics

The virtual home buying event is limited to selected markets in the United States--admission is free to consumers.

Key Points:

The virtual home buying event is limited to selected markets in the United States--admission is free to consumers.
Free stimulus incentives apply to all contracts executed from January 27-April 15, 2021 for registered home buyers.
WHEN: American Dream 2021 Pilot Program will include free stimulus incentives on fully executed purchase contracts betweenJanuary 27- April 15, 2021.
WHERE: American Dream 2021 is limited to home purchases in selected pilot cities available on houseX.com.

Raleigh/Durham Selected as Pilot Market for American Dream 2021: Showcase of Smart Homes

Retrieved on:

Thursday, March 14, 2024

Market, Electric vehicles, Fiscal policy, Keynesian economics

The virtual home buying event is limited to selected markets in the United States--admission is free to consumers.

Key Points:

The virtual home buying event is limited to selected markets in the United States--admission is free to consumers.
Free stimulus incentives apply to all contracts executed from January 27-April 15, 2021 for registered home buyers.
WHEN: American Dream 2021 Pilot Program will include free stimulus incentives on fully executed purchase contracts betweenJanuary 27- April 15, 2021.
WHERE: American Dream 2021 is limited to home purchases in selected pilot cities available on houseX.com.