Fiscal policy

Beam Global Reports Fiscal Year 2020 Financial Results

Retrieved on: 
Tuesday, March 30, 2021

SAN DIEGO, March 30, 2021 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- Beam Global , (Nasdaq: BEEM , BEEMW) (Beam or the Company), the leading provider of innovative sustainable technology for electric vehicle (EV) charging, outdoor media and energy security, today announced financial results for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020.

Key Points: 
  • SAN DIEGO, March 30, 2021 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- Beam Global , (Nasdaq: BEEM , BEEMW) (Beam or the Company), the leading provider of innovative sustainable technology for electric vehicle (EV) charging, outdoor media and energy security, today announced financial results for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020.
  • We reported record revenues in fiscal 2020 of $6,210,350, compared to $5,111,545 in fiscal 2019, as a result of a strong fourth fiscal quarter.
  • During fiscal 2020, we diversified our customer base compared to fiscal 2019, selling to various municipalities, colleges, utilities and federal agencies.
  • The net loss was $5,213,025 for the 2020 fiscal year, compared to $3,933,922 for the 2019 fiscal year.

A Robust U.S. Economy Through 2021 and Beyond, with Slower Recovery Abroad, is Predicted by Panel at Quinnipiac University's Virtual GAME X Forum

Retrieved on: 
Thursday, March 25, 2021

"It's a very bullish environment, combining the unleashing of pent-up demand with massive stimulus amounts, plus the Fed staying accommodational.

Key Points: 
  • "It's a very bullish environment, combining the unleashing of pent-up demand with massive stimulus amounts, plus the Fed staying accommodational.
  • "That's where the growth will happen," said Eric Nierenberg, chief strategy officer at the Massachusetts-based pension fund MassPRIM.
  • But investments in those markets, and in Europe, are complicated by slower COVID recovery.
  • "Just when you think there's an established trend, the next day we are seeing a complete mirror image," she said.

AstroNova Reports Fiscal Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year 2021 Financial Results

Retrieved on: 
Thursday, March 25, 2021

AstroNova, Inc. (NASDAQ: ALOT), a global leader in data visualization technologies, today announced financial results for the fiscal fourth quarter and full year ended January 31, 2021.

Key Points: 
  • AstroNova, Inc. (NASDAQ: ALOT), a global leader in data visualization technologies, today announced financial results for the fiscal fourth quarter and full year ended January 31, 2021.
  • For the full year, revenue was $116.0 million in fiscal 2021 compared with $133.4 million in fiscal 2020.
  • For the full year, operating expenses were $38.9 million in fiscal 2021, down 16% compared with $46.3 million in fiscal 2020.
  • AstroNova will discuss its fiscal fourth-quarter and full-year 2021 financial results in an investor conference call at 9:00 a.m.

Cardify.ai Launches 2021 Stimulus Spending Tracker

Retrieved on: 
Tuesday, March 23, 2021

TORONTO, March 23, 2021 /PRNewswire/ -- Cardify.ai announces the launch of its 2021 Stimulus Spending Tracker to measure the real-time economic impact of US government funds to be distributed this month to more than 100 million American consumers.

Key Points: 
  • TORONTO, March 23, 2021 /PRNewswire/ -- Cardify.ai announces the launch of its 2021 Stimulus Spending Tracker to measure the real-time economic impact of US government funds to be distributed this month to more than 100 million American consumers.
  • Cardify's 2021 Stimulus Spending Tracker monitors the effects of the stimulus checks, the individual companies benefiting from the 2021 stimulus, and how spending behavior for recipients is impacted in real-time.
  • The 2021 Stimulus Spending Tracker covers consumer transaction data across discretionary spending, retail investing, cryptocurrency investing, and buy-now pay-later, increasingly used by consumers to finance purchases.
  • "Through Cardify's 2021 Stimulus Spending Tracker, we gain a better understanding of how stimulus check recipients put recovery funds to work, and whether the payments are truly driving economic growth," said Derrick Fung, CEO of Cardify.ai.

Phoenix Lending Survey Results Reveals the Third Stimulus Package Will Cause Inflationary Pressure in the U.S. Economy

Retrieved on: 
Wednesday, March 17, 2021

PHILADELPHIA, March 17, 2021 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- From the first quarter Phoenix Management Lending Climate in America survey results reveals the third stimulus package will cause inflationary pressure in the U.S. economy.

Key Points: 
  • PHILADELPHIA, March 17, 2021 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- From the first quarter Phoenix Management Lending Climate in America survey results reveals the third stimulus package will cause inflationary pressure in the U.S. economy.
  • The third stimulus package includes nearly $2 trillion in coronavirus relief funds and puts money in the hands of millions of Americans.
  • When asked whether the United States should prepare for inflationary pressures going forward, 77% of lenders agree that these historic economic stimulus packages will cause inflationary pressure in the U.S. economy.
  • While the majority of lenders surveyed seem to believe the third stimulus package will cause inflationary pressure going forward, the outlook for the U.S. economy in the near-term steadily improves.

$1,400 COVID Stimulus Checks Will Cover Less Than One Month of Household Bills for Most Americans

Retrieved on: 
Monday, March 8, 2021

According to doxos recently released 2021 U.S. Bill Pay Market Size & Category Breakout report, the average U.S. household spends $22,668 per year, or $1,889 per month on the 10 most common household bills, which suggests that the American Rescue Plans $1,400 stimulus checks will not even cover a months worth of household bills for most Americans.

Key Points: 
  • According to doxos recently released 2021 U.S. Bill Pay Market Size & Category Breakout report, the average U.S. household spends $22,668 per year, or $1,889 per month on the 10 most common household bills, which suggests that the American Rescue Plans $1,400 stimulus checks will not even cover a months worth of household bills for most Americans.
  • The average household spends $22,668 per year, or $1,889 per month on household bills.
  • An encouraging nine in ten people believe the stimulus checks will make a positive impact on them personally.
  • Breaking out the average amount spent per year on household bills, this is how far the $1,400 stimulus check will go toward each of the 10 most common bill pay categories:

Hurco Reports First Quarter Results for Fiscal 2021

Retrieved on: 
Friday, March 5, 2021

Orders in the Americas for the first quarter of fiscal 2021 increased by 31%, compared to the corresponding period in fiscal 2020, primarily due to increased customer demand for Hurco machines.

Key Points: 
  • Orders in the Americas for the first quarter of fiscal 2021 increased by 31%, compared to the corresponding period in fiscal 2020, primarily due to increased customer demand for Hurco machines.
  • Gross profit for the first quarter of fiscal 2021 was $11,547,000, or 21% of sales, compared to $9,159,000, or 21% of sales, for the corresponding prior year period.
  • Additionally, similar to fiscal 2020, the first quarter of fiscal 2021 gross profit continued to be impacted by the allocation of fixed costs on lower production volumes year-to-date.
  • The effective tax rate for the first quarter of fiscal 2021 was 45%, compared to 40% in the corresponding prior year period.

Fabio Panetta: Mind the gap(s): monetary policy and the way out of the pandemic

Retrieved on: 
Wednesday, March 3, 2021

Speech by Fabio Panetta, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at an online event organised by Bocconi UniversityIn 2020, with the pandemic raging, the direction of policy support was obvious and the choices facing policymakers were relatively narrow.

Key Points: 

Speech by Fabio Panetta, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at an online event organised by Bocconi University

    • In 2020, with the pandemic raging, the direction of policy support was obvious and the choices facing policymakers were relatively narrow.
    • Monetary and fiscal authorities everywhere intervened to support the economy on a massive scale.
    • But in 2021, with the progress made on vaccine technology, policy choices have become less clear-cut.
    • As such, it might be tempting to conclude that there is less need for monetary policy support.
    • We will still face two prominent gaps that we need to close: the output gap and the inflation gap.
    • At present, the risks of providing too little policy support still far outweigh the risks of providing too much.

Eliminating downside risks

    • There is a good chance that a recovery will take hold in the latter part of this year.
    • But that is not a justification for policies to run on neutral.
    • First, in a dramatic crisis like this one, macroeconomic policymakers should not bank on the most favourable scenario materialising.
    • As I have argued elsewhere, the pandemic has produced an asymmetric balance of risks, which requires an asymmetric reaction function.
    • Just as we looked though temporary negative inflation in recent months, we will look through this transitory hump in inflation.
    • And this shallow growth path remains vulnerable to a series of downside risks.
    • This divergence will bring risks of its own: in fact, we are already seeing undesirable contagion from rising US yields into the euro area yield curve.
    • The risks to private consumption growth are therefore substantial.
Chart 1 Household financial situation and savings

    (change in percentage balance from January 2020 to January 2021)
    • Given the weak financial starting point of many firms, investment is likely to only increase gradually and cautiously.
    • [5] A risk management approach would therefore clearly call for policy to eliminate these risks and reinforce the central growth path.
    • And, if we were to do too much and push the economy onto a stronger growth path, that would in fact be a welcome result.

Closing the gaps faster

    • But the experience of the last cycle suggests that it is hard to lift inflation dynamics without demand testing potential more dynamically.
    • Despite several years of robust economic growth, the euro area economy might still have been operating with significant economic slack even on the eve of the pandemic.
Chart 2 Pre-crisis and recent estimates of the output gap in the euro area

    (% of potential output) Source: ECB staff calculations.
    • In the decade after the Lehman crash, yearly domestic demand growth in the euro area was almost 2 percentage points lower on average than it had been in the previous decade, and it was much lower than that of our main trading partners (Chart 3).
    • This contributed to compressing inflation persistently below our aim, leading to a significant price level gap (Chart 4).
    • [6] That was not the case in the United States or the United Kingdom, where domestic demand stayed on a stronger trajectory.
Chart 4 Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP)

    (all-items, January 1999=100)
    • This clearly called for action, as reflected in the additional support we decided on in December.
    • Boosting demand is also necessary to reduce hysteresis risks after the pandemic.
    • [8] Policy should not accept hysteresis as a reality which imposes new supply constraints, but rather explicitly set out to test those constraints.
    • [9] A tight job market also improves the outlook for future demand, thereby strengthening business investment.

Delivering the necessary policy stance

    • So the challenge we face is how to deliver the necessary policy stance.
    • Since the start of the pandemic, monetary policy in the euro area has gone through three phases.
    • In the first phase the phase of fragmentation the flexibility of our pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP)[10] averted an unjustified widening of spreads which would have disrupted monetary policy transmission.
    • In the second phase, the PEPP increasingly became a tool for steering the overall monetary policy stance.
    • This essentially means more focus on anchoring key financial variables above all, lending rates and the yield curve as key indicators of the monetary policy stance.
    • So, that constellation of financing conditions should be seen as the reference point for our policy moving forward.
Chart 5 Euro area real and nominal rates
    • In this way, we can prevent a tightening of financing conditions which would otherwise lead to inflation remaining below our aim for longer.
    • Eventually, firm commitment to steering the euro area yield curve may allow us to slow the pace of our purchases.
    • But in order to reach that point, we must establish the credibility of our strategy by demonstrating that unwarranted tightening will not be tolerated.

From policy fatalism to policy coordination

    • But counterfactual analysis shows that after the financial crisis and during the COVID-19 shock the ECBs expansionary policies have been highly effective.
    • Without our policies, inflation and GDP growth would have been dramatically lower and many more people would have lost their jobs.
    • Preserving favourable financing conditions will have a powerful effect on demand and inflation.
    • However, given the fall of the natural rate of interest,[14] monetary policy is more effective if deployed in sync with other policies.
    • Monetary, fiscal and structural policies must reinforce each other in order to cut slack and close the gap between saving and investment.
    • Fiscal policies continue to be a key channel for transmitting monetary policy to the real economy[15] and they are expected to remain supportive in 2021.
Chart 6 Euro area real and potential GDP

    (EUR billions)
    • They need to target investment in technology, education and infrastructure, creating an environment that bolsters growth and supports the sustainability of debt.
    • We have a joint interest in making the European economy more dynamic.
    • [16] NGEU is an important tool precisely because it ensures that common spending triggers growth-enhancing reforms that subsequently benefit all.

Conclusion

    • My main message today can be summed up with the title of a song by the electronic music duo Daft Punk[18]: Harder, better, faster, stronger.
    • The harder we push to close the output and inflation gaps, the better the outlook for the euro area economy.
    • Achieving this will require the right combination of monetary and fiscal support at the EU level, and it will require continued, determined reforms at the national level.

Fabio Panetta: Mind the gap(s): monetary policy and the way out of the pandemic

Retrieved on: 
Wednesday, March 3, 2021

Speech by Fabio Panetta, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at an online event organised by Bocconi UniversityIn 2020, with the pandemic raging, the direction of policy support was obvious and the choices facing policymakers were relatively narrow.

Key Points: 

Speech by Fabio Panetta, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at an online event organised by Bocconi University

    • In 2020, with the pandemic raging, the direction of policy support was obvious and the choices facing policymakers were relatively narrow.
    • Monetary and fiscal authorities everywhere intervened to support the economy on a massive scale.
    • But in 2021, with the progress made on vaccine technology, policy choices have become less clear-cut.
    • As such, it might be tempting to conclude that there is less need for monetary policy support.
    • We will still face two prominent gaps that we need to close: the output gap and the inflation gap.
    • At present, the risks of providing too little policy support still far outweigh the risks of providing too much.

Eliminating downside risks

    • There is a good chance that a recovery will take hold in the latter part of this year.
    • But that is not a justification for policies to run on neutral.
    • First, in a dramatic crisis like this one, macroeconomic policymakers should not bank on the most favourable scenario materialising.
    • As I have argued elsewhere, the pandemic has produced an asymmetric balance of risks, which requires an asymmetric reaction function.
    • Just as we looked though temporary negative inflation in recent months, we will look through this transitory hump in inflation.
    • And this shallow growth path remains vulnerable to a series of downside risks.
    • This divergence will bring risks of its own: in fact, we are already seeing undesirable contagion from rising US yields into the euro area yield curve.
    • The risks to private consumption growth are therefore substantial.
Chart 1 Household financial situation and savings

    (change in percentage balance from January 2020 to January 2021)
    • Given the weak financial starting point of many firms, investment is likely to only increase gradually and cautiously.
    • [5] A risk management approach would therefore clearly call for policy to eliminate these risks and reinforce the central growth path.
    • And, if we were to do too much and push the economy onto a stronger growth path, that would in fact be a welcome result.

Closing the gaps faster

    • But the experience of the last cycle suggests that it is hard to lift inflation dynamics without demand testing potential more dynamically.
    • Despite several years of robust economic growth, the euro area economy might still have been operating with significant economic slack even on the eve of the pandemic.
Chart 2 Pre-crisis and recent estimates of the output gap in the euro area

    (% of potential output) Source: ECB staff calculations.
    • In the decade after the Lehman crash, yearly domestic demand growth in the euro area was almost 2 percentage points lower on average than it had been in the previous decade, and it was much lower than that of our main trading partners (Chart 3).
    • This contributed to compressing inflation persistently below our aim, leading to a significant price level gap (Chart 4).
    • [6] That was not the case in the United States or the United Kingdom, where domestic demand stayed on a stronger trajectory.
Chart 4 Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP)

    (all-items, January 1999=100)
    • This clearly called for action, as reflected in the additional support we decided on in December.
    • Boosting demand is also necessary to reduce hysteresis risks after the pandemic.
    • [8] Policy should not accept hysteresis as a reality which imposes new supply constraints, but rather explicitly set out to test those constraints.
    • [9] A tight job market also improves the outlook for future demand, thereby strengthening business investment.

Delivering the necessary policy stance

    • So the challenge we face is how to deliver the necessary policy stance.
    • Since the start of the pandemic, monetary policy in the euro area has gone through three phases.
    • In the first phase the phase of fragmentation the flexibility of our pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP)[10] averted an unjustified widening of spreads which would have disrupted monetary policy transmission.
    • In the second phase, the PEPP increasingly became a tool for steering the overall monetary policy stance.
    • This essentially means more focus on anchoring key financial variables above all, lending rates and the yield curve as key indicators of the monetary policy stance.
    • So, that constellation of financing conditions should be seen as the reference point for our policy moving forward.
Chart 5 Euro area real and nominal rates
    • In this way, we can prevent a tightening of financing conditions which would otherwise lead to inflation remaining below our aim for longer.
    • Eventually, firm commitment to steering the euro area yield curve may allow us to slow the pace of our purchases.
    • But in order to reach that point, we must establish the credibility of our strategy by demonstrating that unwarranted tightening will not be tolerated.

From policy fatalism to policy coordination

    • But counterfactual analysis shows that after the financial crisis and during the COVID-19 shock the ECBs expansionary policies have been highly effective.
    • Without our policies, inflation and GDP growth would have been dramatically lower and many more people would have lost their jobs.
    • Preserving favourable financing conditions will have a powerful effect on demand and inflation.
    • However, given the fall of the natural rate of interest,[14] monetary policy is more effective if deployed in sync with other policies.
    • Monetary, fiscal and structural policies must reinforce each other in order to cut slack and close the gap between saving and investment.
    • Fiscal policies continue to be a key channel for transmitting monetary policy to the real economy[15] and they are expected to remain supportive in 2021.
Chart 6 Euro area real and potential GDP

    (EUR billions)
    • They need to target investment in technology, education and infrastructure, creating an environment that bolsters growth and supports the sustainability of debt.
    • We have a joint interest in making the European economy more dynamic.
    • [16] NGEU is an important tool precisely because it ensures that common spending triggers growth-enhancing reforms that subsequently benefit all.

Conclusion

    • My main message today can be summed up with the title of a song by the electronic music duo Daft Punk[18]: Harder, better, faster, stronger.
    • The harder we push to close the output and inflation gaps, the better the outlook for the euro area economy.
    • Achieving this will require the right combination of monetary and fiscal support at the EU level, and it will require continued, determined reforms at the national level.

Isabel Schnabel: Unconventional fiscal and monetary policy at the zero lower bound

Retrieved on: 
Saturday, February 27, 2021

Keynote speech by Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Third Annual Conference organised by the European Fiscal Board on “High Debt, Low Rates and Tail Events: Rules-Based Fiscal Frameworks under Stress” Frankfurt am Main, 26 February 2021 One of the greatest conundrums and policy challenges of our times is the coincidence of persistently low real long-term interest rates and low inflation.

Key Points: 

Keynote speech by Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Third Annual Conference organised by the European Fiscal Board on “High Debt, Low Rates and Tail Events: Rules-Based Fiscal Frameworks under Stress”

    • Frankfurt am Main, 26 February 2021 One of the greatest conundrums and policy challenges of our times is the coincidence of persistently low real long-term interest rates and low inflation.
    • Even before the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, inflation across many advanced economies had been falling short of central banks aims for nearly a decade.
    • In the euro area, hopes that inflation would sustainably recover to levels closer to 2% have been repeatedly and persistently disappointed, despite highly favourable financing conditions.
    • Years of subdued price pressures have raised the spectre of low inflation becoming entrenched in peoples expectations.

Monetary policy implications of persistent supply-side shocks

    • Slack was gradually disappearing, output gaps had closed and unemployment had declined to record low levels in many advanced economies (see slide 2).
    • At first sight, these developments seem to point to a weakened relationship between economic slack and inflation.
    • [1] Instead, Phillips curve models point to other factors putting persistent downward pressure on underlying inflation in recent years (see right chart slide 4).
    • The implications of these developments for monetary policy are twofold.
    • First, since monetary policy is acting on the demand side, it has less traction in countering persistent structural shocks to inflation.
    • Second, the decline in real interest rates limits the extent to which monetary policy can stabilise the economy in the wake of demand-side shocks.
    • Despite the unprecedented severity of the crisis and the large shortfall in aggregate demand, the ECB did not cut its key policy rates.
    • To circumvent the effective lower bound, central banks have resorted to unconventional monetary policies.

The euro area policy mix before and during the pandemic

    • For the euro area, there is evidence that public investment tends to crowd in private investment, rather than out.
    • [6] A public sector that is largely insensitive to interest rate changes significantly reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy, in particular in the euro area, where governments account for nearly half of total spending.
    • An unresponsive fiscal authority disregards the broad empirical evidence that fiscal policy is particularly effective at the lower bound.
    • [8] Fiscal policy, then, faces a difficult trade-off between business cycle stabilisation and debt sustainability, in particular in a situation with high legacy debt.
    • Risk premia on lower-rated sovereign bonds sky-rocketed in March last year, impairing the transmission of both monetary and fiscal policy.
    • For the first time, a euro area-wide instrument was created with the specific aim of ensuring that the aggregate euro area fiscal stance is appropriately countercyclical.
    • The policy response to the pandemic is a remarkable showcase for the power of monetary and fiscal policy interaction to boost confidence, stabilise aggregate demand and avoid a persistent destabilisation of medium to long-term inflation expectations.

Macroeconomic stabilisation in the future

    • Both facilities, however, are temporary and linked to the pandemic, while the effective lower bound is likely to remain a recurring constraint in the future.
    • The question, then, is how to ensure effective macroeconomic stabilisation in the euro area in the future.
    • The pandemic holds two lessons, one for monetary and one for fiscal policy.

First, monetary policy has to enable sustainable private and public spending.

    • Low rates do not mean that monetary policy no longer has a role to play.
    • On the contrary, monetary support will remain an important pillar of macroeconomic stabilisation.
    • The horizon of policy support will then depend on the extent to which the private and the public sector make use of accommodative monetary conditions.
    • The intensity of policy support, in turn, will evolve endogenously with the economic recovery.
    • For example, a rise in nominal yields that reflects an increase in inflation expectations is a welcome sign that the policy measures are bearing fruit.
    • To ultimately empower fiscal policy as a transmission channel of monetary policy, the ECB needs to provide liquidity when risks of self-fulfilling price spirals threaten to undermine stability in the euro area as a whole.

The lesson for fiscal policy is that, in lower bound episodes, it has to become more responsive to downturns.

    • Put simply, unconventional monetary policy needs to be complemented by unconventional fiscal policy.
    • The concept of unconventional fiscal policy is not yet well established.
    • [12] A simple Google search, for example, returns more than 700,000 results for unconventional monetary policy but only about 8,000 entries for unconventional fiscal policy.
    • In essence, unconventional fiscal policy comprises measures that go beyond traditional automatic stabilisers, which tend to be too small to offset the effects of an adverse demand shock at the lower bound.

Creating a framework for effective stabilisation in the euro area

    • In 2019, the European Fiscal Board concluded that the current framework remained insufficient to deliver a more countercyclical fiscal policy stance.
    • [14] It also recommended focusing on a single operational indicator an expenditure rule and a single target, a debt anchor.
    • An intense debate has emerged, however, about the appropriate level of the debt anchor, and the EUs 60% reference value in particular.
    • [15] Not few observers point to the benign implications of the sharp decline in real and nominal interest rates for debt sustainability.
    • Despite much higher debt, interest rate expenses as a share of euro area GDP have declined from more than 5% in 1995 to 1.6% today (see left chart slide 9).
    • A credible debt anchor remains an important pillar of a stability-oriented policy framework and central bank independence.
    • A mechanical application of the current rules could imply fiscal adjustment needs in some euro area economies that would be severely damaging from a societal, economic and monetary policy perspective.
    • Public investment and structural policies hold the key to a higher sustainable growth path and higher interest rates.

Conclusion

    • My conclusion is therefore that the current era of low inflation and low interest rates which is unlikely to change in the near term in light of the pandemic forces us to reconsider how monetary and fiscal policy should complement each other to protect the economy from large downturns and to minimise risks of long-term scarring.
    • Effective macroeconomic stabilisation in the vicinity of the lower bound requires both unconventional monetary and fiscal policies.
    • Fiscal policy, in turn, needs to recognise its role in the transmission of monetary policy in a low inflation, low interest rate environment.