Website

Demographics, labor market power and the spatial equilibrium

Retrieved on: 
Tuesday, February 13, 2024

Abstract

Key Points: 
    • Abstract
      This paper studies how demographics affect aggregate labor market power, the urban wage
      premium and the spatial concentration of population.
    • I develop a quantitative spatial model
      in which labor market competitiveness depends on the demographic composition of the local
      workforce.
    • If these factors differ across workers, labor market power has a role to
      play in explaining wage inequality.
    • This paper contributes to the literature on differences in labor market power by analyzing a
      new dimension of heterogeneity: demographics.
    • Since older workers are less mobile in terms of
      switching workplaces, firms have more labor market power over older workers.
    • I start by estimating labor market power by measuring the sensitivity of worker turnover to
      the wage paid.
    • I find a strong
      role of demographics in determining the degree of labor market power enjoyed by firms.
    • Next, I provide evidence of the importance of differences in labor market power for spatial
      wage inequality.
    • To explore the consequences of labor market sorting, I build a spatial general equilibrium
      model in which labor market competitiveness depends on the demographic composition of the

      ECB Working Paper Series No 2906

      2

      local workforce.

    • If these factors differ across workers, labor market power has a role to
      play in explaining wage inequality.
    • In
      the model, geographic sorting by age matters and leads to higher labor market power in rural
      areas, which implies an urban wage premium that is 4% larger than with uniform labor supply
      elasticities.
    • I follow Manning (2013) and estimate labor market power by measuring the sensitivity of worker
      turnover to the wage paid.
    • Bachmann et al., 2021; Ahlfeldt et al., 2022a; Berger et al.,
      2022) that nest a monopsonistic labor market in a spatial general equilibrium model (Redding
      and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017).
    • As firms have more labor market power
      over older workers, they face an upward-sloping labor supply curve that is less elastic in regions
      with an older workforce.
    • Firms choose in which labor market to operate in the sense that there is free
      entry at fixed costs into all locations.
    • How are differences in labor market competitiveness across space sustained in spatial equilibrium?
    • I use the model to quantify the importance of heterogeneity
      in labor market power for the urban wage premium and the spatial concentration of population.
    • My work is complementary to but quite different
      from this paper since I argue that population aging increases labor market power rather than
      product market power.
    • By analyzing the effects of a changing age composition of the workforce in the context
      of labor market power, I relate to literature on the labor market effects of population aging.
    • ECB Working Paper Series No 2906

      7

      after controlling for age, differences in labor market power between East and West Germany
      vanish.

    • They conclude that higher
      concentration is associated with higher labor market power (as in the model of Jarosch et al.,
      forthcoming).
    • I offer an alternative explanation why labor market power differs across regions:
      Since denser regions have a younger workforce, workers are more mobile in terms of switching
      jobs which implies lower labor market power of firms.
    • In this case, I infer a
      high labor supply elasticity and low labor market power of firms.
    • I contribute to this growing debate by
      quantifying differences in labor market power across worker groups and their effects on regional
      inequality.
    • While the model shows how demographics affect labor market power, the urban wage premium and agglomeration, one fundamental question remains open for future research: What
      are the policy implications of (differences in) labor market power?

Virtue Recovery Center in Houston Announces Partnership as Community-Approved Provider with the VA

Retrieved on: 
Monday, February 12, 2024

HOUSTON, Feb. 12, 2024 /PRNewswire-PRWeb/ -- Virtue Recovery Center in Houston Launches Specialized Programs for Veterans

Key Points: 
  • Virtue Recovery Center in Houston announces significant development for the center and the Veteran community.
  • Virtue Recovery Center in Houston is partnered with the Department of Veterans Affairs as a community-approved provider.
  • Virtue Recovery Center, a leading addiction treatment facility in Houston, is proud to announce its partnership with the Houston Veterans Affairs as a VA Community Approved Provider.
  • Understanding Veterans' complex needs, Virtue Recovery Center Houston offers a program that simultaneously addresses multiple treatment modalities.

The macroeconomic effects of global supply chain reorientation

Retrieved on: 
Saturday, February 10, 2024
Bank, Control, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Literature, Deutsche Bundesbank, Reconstruction, COVID-19, Monetary policy, Medical classification, Aggregate, Interest, Hail, Motion, Organization, WT, Policy, Smith, Elasticity, American Economic Review, Information, CHiPs, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Reproduction, Tagliapietra, Culture, Journal of International Economics, Section 3, European Commission, Communication, B16, Shock, NTM, European Chips Act, SSC, PHT, B17, Classification, Common, Tradability, Bank of Italy, Congressional Research Service, NT, Central bank, Private, Exercise, NIU, Labour, PDF, Website, European Parliament, Terrorism, Employment, B10, SUBST, Agricultural economics, F62, RTK, Bank of England, European Central Bank, Calibration, Agriculture, Foreign policy, Semiconductor, International Monetary Fund, Research Papers in Economics, Outline, Council, Openness, Bias, Economic system, European Council, Public policy, Deutsch, Statistics, GDP, Real, American Economic Journal, Table, Journal, YT, EAGLE, Household, Grossman, Science, Conference, Journal of Comparative Economics, Horse, SSRN, TC, Consumption, REA, F13, Section 2, University, Section 5, Legislation, Money, NTD, Central Bank of Ireland, Language, Capital, University of Limerick, Intermediate, CBI, Caselli, Macroeconomics, Crowding, Technical report, B14, Tax, Civil service commission, Growth, Commission, UNCTAD, Optimism, Politics, PIM, PX, Work, Social science, JEL, Government, Automation, HTT, Quarterly Journal, Canadian International Council, ECB, XT, METRO, ELAS, Credit, Bolt, Research, European Communities, American Journal, ArXiv, Unilateralism, Lerner, Motivation, International, C6, Committee, Security (finance)

We analyse the macroeconomic

Key Points: 
    • We analyse the macroeconomic
      effects of supply chain reorientation through localisation policies, using a global dynamic
      general equilibrium model.
    • While arguments about comparative advantage, the potential forgone benefits of international specialisation and industry- and product-specific disruptions are familiar, there is less
      analysis on the macroeconomic effects of supply chain changes resulting from localisation policies.
    • The large sensitivity of the global economy to the recent supply chain shocks suggests that
      the international trade reconfiguration implied by localisation policies could also have sizable
      impacts on key macroeconomic variables such as output, employment and inflation.
    • Thus, localisation focuses on the
      goods in our model most closely related to global supply chains.
    • Retaliation also attenuates any positive effects from
      reshoring on output and implies a reduction in the volume of overall international trade.
    • This finding calls for limiting the scope of reshoring, such as by focusing on vital goods that are
      most susceptible to supply chain disruptions.
    • Either that, or the economic costs are considered a worthwhile trade-off for an increase
      in security of supply, for example.
    • While arguments about comparative advantage, the potential forgone benefits of international specialisation and industry- and product-specific disruptions are familiar, there is less
      analysis on the macroeconomic effects of supply chain changes resulting from localisation policies.
    • Recent supply chain shocks have had large effects, with disruptions in 2021 estimated
      to have reduced euro area GDP by around two percent and doubled the rate of manufacturing producer inflation (Celasun et al., 2022).
    • To analyse this issue, we simulate a (partial) reshoring of production back to Europe in
      a global dynamic general equilibrium framework.
    • Thus,
      localisation focuses on the goods in our model most closely related to global supply chains.3 We
      model reshoring through a direct change to the export goods? production-function parameters.
    • Since reshoring
      effectively shortens the supply chain, the sum of markups along the chain falls.
    • This means that imports that are at the end of the supply chain (i.e.
    • In particular, our work relates to papers examining the potential for countries to reduce
      their exposure to global supply chains.
    • (2021) demonstrate that reduced reliance on foreign inputs does not mitigate pandemicinduced contractions in labour supply.
    • (2021) find no evidence of a relationship
      between global value chain integration and macroeconomic volatility.
    • This dynamic, along with factors such as natural disasters, climate-change
      induced volatility and terrorism mean that supply chain disruptions could be a new normal
      (Grossman et al., 2021).
    • Our work contributes to the literature providing dynamic general equilibrium analyses of
      protectionist policies, in particular those using global macroeconomic models to quantify trade
      policy changes.
    • (2008) analyse the effect of a rise in protectionism in response
      to rising global trade imbalances.
    • Linde? and Pescatori (2019) find that although the macroeconomic costs of a
      trade war are substantial, a fully symmetric retaliation is the best response.
    • (2020) consider a rich input-output structure and demonstrate that closer integration amplifies
      the adverse effects of protectionist trade policies.
    • Several recent studies have also examined the economic effects of a global trade fragmentation.
    • First, we modify a dynamic general
      equilibrium model of the global economy in order to analyse the transmission of localisation
      policies.
    • This allows for a comprehensive treatment of cross-border macroeconomic interdependences and spillovers between the different regions.
    • 4

      There is, however, substantial cross-country heterogeneity in terms of impact, with small open economies
      (SOEs) reliant on global supply chains more affected.

    • ECB Working Paper Series No 2903

      7

      Second, we are able to assess both long-run effects and the transition dynamics of localisation
      policies.

    • Our model contains a detailed monetary block and captures inflation dynamics, which is a key
      concern for supply chain reorientation.
    • Overall, our paper contains a careful analysis of the key aspects of the localisation debate,
      including effects of localisation on domestic competition and efficiency.
    • Section 2 provides a brief overview of the model, the modifications to examine
      global supply chain reorientation, some key details on the calibration and a brief discussion of
      the nature of our exercise.
    • (2020) for discussions of the relative strengths and weaknesses of
      trade and macroeconomic models in assessing large economic shocks.
    • 2.1

      Supply chain reorientation

      Our analysis focuses on imported inputs used to produce goods for export, as the introduction
      of localisation policies is in response to recent disruptions to global supply chains.

    • Since reshoring
      effectively shortens the supply chain, the sum of markups along the chain falls.
    • Further to
      these effects, engagement with global firms provides an opportunity for knowledge spillovers to
      local firms (Criscuolo et al., 2017).
    • This finding calls for limiting the scope of reshoring, such as by focusing on vital goods that are
      most susceptible to supply chain disruptions.
    • (B12)

      Adjusting the share of local inputs in export goods, of course, affects prices and quantities all
      along the supply chain.

Economic Bulletin Issue 1, 2024

Retrieved on: 
Friday, February 9, 2024

= Update on economic, financial and monetary developments =Summary At its meeting on 25 January 2024, the Governing Council decided to keep the three key ECB interest rates unchanged.

Key Points: 


= Update on economic, financial and monetary developments =

Summary

  • At its meeting on 25 January 2024, the Governing Council decided to keep the three key ECB interest rates unchanged.
  • The incoming information broadly confirmed its previous assessment of the medium-term inflation outlook.
  • The Governing Council is determined to ensure that inflation returns to its 2% medium-term target in a timely manner.

Economic activity

  • However, some forward-looking survey indicators point to a pick-up in growth further ahead.
  • Following the recent ECOFIN Council agreement on the reform of the EU’s economic governance framework, the legislative process should be concluded swiftly so that the new rules can be implemented without delay.
  • Moreover, it is imperative that progress towards capital markets union and the completion of banking union be accelerated.

Inflation

  • Inflation rose to 2.9% in December 2023 as some of the past fiscal measures to cushion the impact of high energy prices dropped out of the annual inflation rate, although the rebound was weaker than expected.
  • [2] Aside from this base effect, the overall trend of declining inflation continued.
  • Inflation excluding energy and food also declined again, to 3.4%, due to a fall in goods inflation to 2.5%.
  • Measures of shorter-term inflation expectations have come down markedly, while those of longer-term inflation expectations mostly stand around 2%.

Risk assessment

  • Growth could be lower if the effects of monetary policy turn out stronger than expected.
  • A weaker world economy or a further slowdown in global trade would also weigh on euro area growth.
  • Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East are key sources of geopolitical risk.

Financial and monetary conditions

  • Market interest rates have moved broadly sideways since the Governing Council’s monetary policy meeting on 14 December 2023.
  • The Governing Council’s restrictive monetary policy continues to transmit strongly into broader financing conditions.
  • Lending rates on business loans declined slightly, to 5.2% in November, while mortgage rates increased further to 4.0%.

Monetary policy decisions

  • The asset purchase programme portfolio is declining at a measured and predictable pace, as the Eurosystem no longer reinvests the principal payments from maturing securities.
  • The Governing Council will continue applying flexibility in reinvesting redemptions coming due in the PEPP portfolio, with a view to countering risks to the monetary policy transmission mechanism related to the pandemic.
  • As banks are repaying the amounts borrowed under the targeted longer-term refinancing operations, the Governing Council will regularly assess how targeted lending operations and their ongoing repayment are contributing to its monetary policy stance.

Conclusion

  • At its meeting on 25 January 2024, the Governing Council decided to keep the three key ECB interest rates unchanged.
  • The Governing Council is determined to ensure that inflation returns to its 2% medium-term target in a timely manner.

1 External environment

  • Core inflation continued to decline in the fourth quarter, but further progress might be sluggish as wage growth is still high, remaining above long-term averages.
  • High frequency indicators, such as global retail sales, also suggest a slowdown in consumer spending towards the end of the year.
  • Merchandise trade growth momentum returned to positive territory in October 2023, amid broad-based improvements across countries globally.
  • This is due to the comparatively lower growth in demand for goods, higher spare shipping capacity and reduced congestion in ports currently being observed.
Chart 1
  • The global charter rate (HARPEX) is the HARPER PETERSEN Charter Rates Index, which tracks the cost of chartering container vessels operating on all routes globally.
  • Annual headline consumer price index (CPI) inflation across OECD member countries excluding Türkiye decreased to 3.4% in November, down from 3.6% in October, owing to some easing in food price inflation (Chart 2).
  • Core inflation (headline inflation excluding food and energy) also declined in November, falling 0.2 percentage points to 4.1%, but remains elevated.
Chart 2
  • Core inflation refers to headline inflation excluding food and energy.
  • Developments in energy commodity prices have been mixed since the Governing Council’s meeting in December 2023, amid higher oil prices and lower gas prices.
  • Oil prices in US dollars have risen by 10.4% amid concerns that attacks on ships in the Red Sea could affect shipments of oil through the Suez Canal, which serves as a key passage for global oil traded by sea (Chart 3).
Chart 3
  • The latest observations are for 24 January 2024 for oil and gas, and 19 January 2024 for commodities excluding energy.
  • Non-energy commodity prices have been stable amid slightly higher metal prices, but lower food prices.
  • Since the December meeting of the Governing Council, metal prices have increased by 1%, driven mainly by higher prices for tin, lead and aluminium.
  • Food commodity prices have declined by 1.7% on the back of falling soybean and grain prices.
  • [3] High frequency indicators, such as credit card spending, suggest a deceleration in consumer spending at the turn of the year.
  • At the same time, rising consumer loan delinquencies indicate that household balance sheets are coming under increasing pressure.
  • However, a recent fall in mortgage rates has stimulated new mortgage borrowing and could boost consumer spending to some extent.

2 Economic activity

  • [4] * This comes on the back of the prolonged weakness in global trade and of strong monetary policy transmission.
  • Incoming data show signs of a modest strengthening of growth in the first quarter of 2024.
  • The labour market remains resilient, although more recent indicators suggest signs of cooling following the protracted period of weak economic activity.
  • The euro area economy is expected to start gradually improving over the course of this year.
  • Growth is expected to be supported by rising real disposable income, which in turn should benefit from declining inflation and robust wage growth.
Chart 4
  • The European Commission’s Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) has been standardised and rescaled to have the same mean and standard deviation as the composite output PMI.
  • Although euro area output growth remains weak, it is expected to show some improvement at the beginning of 2024.
  • However, the composite output PMI improved slightly, further reflecting a robust increase in manufacturing output, alongside a small decline in services sector business activity (Chart 5).
Chart 5
  • The labour market remains resilient, albeit recent indicators signal a cooling following weaker economic activity.
  • Employment growth continued to be robust in the third quarter of the year, at a quarterly rate of 0.2%.
  • As the labour force continued to grow, the unemployment rate returned to its lowest level since the beginning of the euro, standing at 6.4% in November, down from 6.5% in October 2023 (Chart 6).
  • The improvement compared with December 2023 notwithstanding, the PMI composite employment indicator has, overall, followed a downward trend since April 2023.
Chart 6
  • The PMI is expressed in terms of the deviation from 50 divided by 10.
  • The latest observations are for the third quarter of 2023 for employment, January 2024 for the PMI assessment of employment and November 2023 for the unemployment rate.
  • Private consumption growth remained weak in the last quarter of 2023, reflecting continued subdued spending on goods.
  • By contrast, there was no strong downward correction in expected demand for contact-intensive services, which continued to hold up in December, remaining above its historical average (Chart 7).
Chart 7
  • Notes: “Contact-intensive services” refers to the weighted average of accommodation, food and travel services.
  • The latest observations are for December 2023.
    Business investment growth is likely to have slowed in the fourth quarter amid weak demand and tight financing conditions.
  • At the same time, while PMI new orders remained in contractionary territory in the fourth quarter of 2023, the existing stock of orders still assured capital goods production for a longer period than they did in pre-pandemic times, according to the European Commission’s business and consumer survey (Chart 8, panel a).
Chart 8
  • Business investment and PMI new orders for capital goods are expressed as deviations from the 1999-2019 average.
  • Months of assured capital goods production out of existing orders are expressed as deviations from the 1999-2019 average.
  • The index for building construction production is computed as the percentage change over the average level in the previous quarter.
  • Housing investment is likely to have fallen further in the fourth quarter of 2023, as shown by hard and soft indicators.
  • Looking ahead, as global activity recovers and the inventory drawdown diminishes, the drag on euro area exports should gradually fade.

3 Prices and costs

  • [5] * Inflation excluding energy and food declined again, from 3.6% in November to 3.4% in December, driven by the decline in goods inflation.
  • Measures of longer-term inflation expectations stand at around 2%, while measures of shorter-term expectations have come down markedly.
  • The increase was driven by a less negative energy inflation rate, mainly due to base effects.
  • Meanwhile food inflation and HICP inflation excluding energy and food declined further.
Chart 9
  • As expected, energy inflation saw an increase in December, but the change to -6.7% from -11.5% in November was smaller than anticipated.
  • The main driver of the less negative annual rate of change was a large base effect.
  • This was related to both the one-off gas support measures in Germany and a substantial drop in fuel prices in December 2022.
  • Food inflation continued to decline, to 6.1% in December from 6.9% in November, but remained elevated (Chart 10).
  • This reflected declines in energy costs and food commodity prices as measured by, for instance, euro area farm gate prices.
Chart 10
  • Note: The latest observations are for November 2023 for the producer price indices and December 2023 for euro area farm gate prices and HICP food inflation.
  • Producer and import price pressures continued to remain negative across all main industrial categories (Chart 11).
  • At the early stages of the pricing chain, producer price inflation for domestic sales of intermediate goods was negative and unchanged (-5.3% in November and October).
  • The same unwinding tendencies hold for producer prices and import prices in the manufactured consumer goods segment, confirming the general gradual easing of pipeline pressures on consumer goods prices.
Chart 11
  • Measures of underlying inflation in the euro area continued to decrease, as the impact from past shocks fades and demand eases amid tighter monetary policy (Chart 12).
  • The Persistent and Common Component of Inflation (PCCI) remained at the bottom of the range, declining further to 1.9% in December.
  • The Supercore indicator, which includes cyclically sensitive HICP items, continued its decline from 4.4% in November to 4.0% in December, but remains relatively high.
  • Domestic inflation (comprising items with a low import content) is also moderating from more elevated levels than other measures.
Chart 12
  • The grey dashed line represents the ECB’s inflation target of 2% over the medium term.
  • Wage growth measures had been moving broadly sideways recently, at elevated levels.
  • The forward-looking wage trackers signal continued high wage pressures, although with some tentative signs of a cooling down by the end of 2023.
  • Most survey-based indicators of longer-term inflation expectations in the euro area, as well as market-based measures of inflation compensation adjusted for risk premia, are at around 2% (Chart 13).
  • [6] With regard to perceptions of past inflation, they did not follow the decline in HICP inflation between June and October 2023.
  • However, they eased considerably from October 2023 onwards, with the median declining from 8.0% in September to 6.2% in December.
Chart 13
  • Notes: The market-based measures of inflation compensation series are based on the one-year spot inflation rate, the one-year forward rate one year ahead, the one-year forward rate two years ahead and the one-year forward rate three years ahead.
  • The observations for market-based measures of inflation compensation are for 24 January 2024.
  • Inflation fixings are swap contracts linked to specific monthly releases in euro area year-on-year HICP inflation ex.

4 Financial market developments

  • Over the review period (14 December 2023 to 24 January 2024), developments in the euro area financial markets reflected evolving policy rate expectations as markets continued to focus on the pace of disinflation and the expected monetary policy adjustments.
  • By contrast, policy rate expectations over longer horizons fluctuated more markedly, but ended the review period close to their mid-December levels.
  • * *Equity prices remained range bound as declines in earnings expectations were offset by a reduction in the equity risk premium.
  • Euro area corporate bond markets were broadly unchanged, with some decline in the high-yield segment.
  • Euro area near-term risk-free rates ended the review period broadly in line with the levels prevailing around the time of the December Governing Council meeting.
Chart 14
  • Notes: The vertical grey lines denote the start of the review period on 14 December 2023.
  • Corporate bond spreads were largely unchanged over the review period, with spreads in the high-yield segment narrowing.
  • The spreads for investment-grade firms ended the review period broadly unchanged, while spreads in the high-yield segment were more volatile, narrowing by 34 basis points.
  • Euro area equity prices remained range bound as declines in earnings expectations were offset by a reduction in the equity risk premium.
  • In foreign exchange markets, the euro appreciated slightly in trade-weighted terms (Chart 15).
Chart 15
  • Changes in the exchange rate of the euro vis-à-vis selected currencies
    (percentage changes)

    Source: ECB calculations.

  • Notes: EER-41 is the nominal effective exchange rate of the euro against the currencies of 41 of the euro area’s most important trading partners.

5 Financing conditions and credit developments

  • Demand for loans by firms and households continued to decrease substantially, albeit less steeply than in the previous quarter.
  • In the second half of 2023, bank lending conditions for firms tightened more in the real estate and construction sectors than in others.
  • The weakness in bank lending to firms and households continued in November, reflecting the strong pass-through of policy tightening to lending rates, combined with lower loan demand and tighter credit standards.
  • Money growth continued to contract, with annual rates close to historical lows, owing to high opportunity costs, subdued credit growth and the reduction in the Eurosystem balance sheet.
Chart 16
  • Notes: Composite bank funding costs are a weighted average of the composite cost of deposits and unsecured market-based debt financing.
  • The latest observations are for November 2023 for banks’ composite cost of debt financing and for 24 January 2024 for bank bond yields.
  • In November 2023 lending rates for firms declined slightly for the first time since July 2022, while the rates for housing loans increased further.
  • This led to a sharp increase in lending rates for both firms and households across euro area countries (Chart 17).
  • The cross-country dispersion of lending rates for firms and households remained at a low level (Chart 17), suggesting smooth monetary policy transmission across euro area countries.
Chart 17
  • Notes: Composite bank lending rates for non-financial corporations (NFCs) are calculated by aggregating short and long-term rates using a 24-month moving average of new business volumes.
  • The cross-country standard deviation is calculated using a fixed sample of 12 euro area countries.
  • the composite cost of bank borrowing, market-based debt and equity – declined significantly from the multi-year high reached in October and stood at 6.07%, which is almost 50 basis points lower than in the previous month (Chart 18).
Chart 18
  • According to the January 2024 euro area bank lending survey , credit standards for loans to firms tightened moderately further in the fourth quarter of 2023 (Chart 19).
  • The impact of past tightening will continue to dampen loan growth in the coming quarters.
  • Euro area banks expect the tightening of credit standards for loans to firms to pick up in the first quarter of 2024.
Chart 19
  • Banks reported a further net tightening of credit standards for loans to households in the fourth quarter of 2023, which was small for housing loans and more pronounced for consumer credit.
  • For both loan categories, the net tightening was lower than in the third quarter, in line with banks’ expectations.
  • Banks also reported a further net increase in the share of rejected loan applications for loans to firms and for housing loans.
  • Reflecting a large monthly flow, annual growth in loans to NFCs rebounded slightly to stand at 0.0% in November, up from ‑0.3% in October (Chart 20, panel a), amid considerable heterogeneity across countries and maturities.
  • The annual growth rate of loans to households edged down to 0.5% in November, after 0.6% in October (Chart 20, panel b), amid negative housing market prospects, somewhat tighter credit standards and higher lending rates.
  • unincorporated small businesses), while consumer loans remained more resilient, despite a further tightening of credit standards and low consumer confidence.
Chart 20
  • The cross-country standard deviation is calculated using a fixed sample of 12 euro area countries.
  • Households continued to reallocate overnight deposits to time deposits in November, while firms moderated these shifts as their deposit allocation normalised.
  • The annual growth rate of overnight deposits continued its double-digit decline to stand at ‑10.9% in November, up from ‑11.5% in October (Chart 21).
Chart 21
  • In November 2023 money growth continued to contract at annual rates close to recent historical lows driven by high opportunity costs, subdued credit growth and the reduction in the Eurosystem balance sheet.
  • Annual broad money (M3) growth in the euro area stabilised around historically low rates, standing at ‑0.9% in November, up from ‑1.0% in October and ‑1.2% in September (Chart 21).
  • Annual narrow money (M1) growth continued to decline at a close to double-digit rate, with weak monetary dynamics being reinforced by portfolio shifts.
  • At the same time, a growing current account surplus amid weak imports has led to higher monetary inflows from the rest of the world.

1 Global trade in the post-pandemic environment

  • When global activity collapsed at the start of the pandemic, triggering the deepest global recession (albeit short-lived) since the Second World War amid large-scale policy support, there was also a sweeping fall in world trade.
  • In the first two quarters of 2020, global trade contracted by 16%, exceeding even the shock observed during the global financial crisis.
  • According to the December 2023 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections, global trade may have grown by just 1.1% in 2023, well below its average annual growth over the pre-pandemic period (2012 to 2019) and subpar compared with global GDP growth in 2023 (Chart A, panel b).

2 Is the PMI a reliable indicator for nowcasting euro area real GDP?

  • More
    The euro area composite output Purchasing Managers' Index (PMI) tends to be strongly correlated with real GDP growth (Chart A).
  • The PMI survey output question asks about the actual unit volume of output this month compared to the previous month.
  • Moreover, the euro area composite output is based solely on the four largest euro area countries and Ireland.

3 Main findings from the ECB’s recent contacts with non-financial companies

  • This box summarises the findings of recent contacts between ECB staff and representatives of 70 leading non-financial companies operating in the euro area.
  • There was still a lot of variation both within and across sectors in terms of reported dynamics.
  • Consequently, developments in manufacturing activity were now considered to better reflect the evolution of final consumption and investment demand.

4 Assessing the macroeconomic effects of climate change transition policies

  • More
    This box gauges the macroeconomic impact of climate change policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
  • The box therefore goes on to illustrate the medium-term impact of alternative transition policy scenarios using model simulations.

5 Corporate vulnerabilities as reported by firms in the SAFE

  • More
    This box analyses corporate vulnerabilities as derived from firm-level replies to the *Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE) [13] The concept is particularly relevant when assessing the implications for the transmission of monetary policy as it provides strong signals on the financial health of firms.
  • *.A firm is considered vulnerable if it simultaneously reports lower turnover, lower profits, higher interest expenses and a higher or unchanged debt-to-assets ratio over the past six months.

6 Policy expectation errors during the recent tightening cycle – insights from the ECB’s Survey of Monetary Analysts

  • More
    Information from the Survey of Monetary Analysts * (SMA) on respondents’ expectations about the future evolution of the ECB’s monetary policy measures can provide insights into the source of expectation errors during the recent tightening cycle.
  • Accordingly, policy expectation errors have been large and have only recently started to diminish.

7 Estimates of the natural interest rate for the euro area: an update

  • More
    The natural rate of interest, r* (or “r-star”), is defined as the real rate of interest that is neither expansionary nor contractionary.
  • [15] In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, real interest rates (as measured by deducting inflation expectations from a nominal rate of interest) slumped to exceptionally low levels in advanced economies, including the euro area.

8 Fiscal policy measures in response to the energy and inflation shock and climate change

  • This box provides estimates and projections of discretionary fiscal measures taken by euro area governments relating to the energy crisis, high inflation, and climate change, updated as part of the December 2023 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections.
  • More
    The discretionary fiscal measures to support households and companies in response to the energy price and high inflation shocks are projected to largely wind down in the coming years.
  • The share of subsidies in total energy and inflation support measures is expected to fall significantly in 2024 and to be negligible as of 2025.

1 The Eurosystem policy response to developments in retail payments

Vooglam's Aurora Series: Crafting the Future with Echoes of the Past

Retrieved on: 
Thursday, February 8, 2024

AUSTIN, Texas, Feb. 8, 2024 /PRNewswire/ -- Vooglam proudly unveils the Aurora Series glasses, a testament to our ethos of blending the timeless allure of tradition with the dynamic pulse of innovation. This collection stands at the intersection of past and present, offering eyewear that transcends mere fashion to become a deeply felt experience. Each frame in the Aurora Series reflects Vooglam's dedication to craftsmanship and design, marrying the elegance of classic aesthetics with the boldness of contemporary trends.

Key Points: 
  • This collection stands at the intersection of past and present, offering eyewear that transcends mere fashion to become a deeply felt experience.
  • Each frame in the Aurora Series reflects Vooglam's dedication to craftsmanship and design, marrying the elegance of classic aesthetics with the boldness of contemporary trends.
  • With the launch of the Aurora Series, Vooglam is transcending the conventional boundaries of eyewear design, crafting frames that echo the timeless elegance of the past while embracing the boldness of the present.
  • The Aurora Series is a homage to the classics, reimagined for the modern wearer who walks the line between subtlety and statement, between heritage and avant-garde.

VikingCloud Announces Industry’s First PCI L4 Compliance Program with Integrated Cyber Risk Score

Retrieved on: 
Wednesday, February 7, 2024

VikingCloud , the leading predict-to-prevent cybersecurity and compliance company, today announced CCS Advantage, a first-of-its-kind self-service Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) compliance and cybersecurity program for Level 4 ( L4 ) businesses.

Key Points: 
  • VikingCloud , the leading predict-to-prevent cybersecurity and compliance company, today announced CCS Advantage, a first-of-its-kind self-service Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) compliance and cybersecurity program for Level 4 ( L4 ) businesses.
  • CCS Advantage integrates VikingCloud’s new Cyber Risk Score and proprietary threat scanning technology into its global PCI DSS compliance process.
  • VikingCloud’s Cyber Risk Score is a patent-pending innovation for automated cybersecurity risk assessments and remediation recommendations based on VikingCloud’s unique cybersecurity and PCI compliance dataset.
  • Patent-pending persona-based recommendations: Businesses with identified cyber risk will automatically receive risk reduction recommendations based on their unique online and PCI compliance security environments.

Correlate and Carbonsight Partner, Unleashing Data-Driven Decarbonization and Sustainable Energy Solutions

Retrieved on: 
Wednesday, February 7, 2024

BOISE, Idaho, Feb. 07, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- Correlate Energy Corp. (OTCQB: CIPI) (“Correlate” or the “Company”), a growth-oriented distributed energy company, proudly announces a strategic partnership with Carbonsight (by Autocase), an online decarbonization planning tool for real estate portfolios.

Key Points: 
  • BOISE, Idaho, Feb. 07, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- Correlate Energy Corp. (OTCQB: CIPI) (“Correlate” or the “Company”), a growth-oriented distributed energy company, proudly announces a strategic partnership with Carbonsight (by Autocase), an online decarbonization planning tool for real estate portfolios.
  • The collaboration brings together Carbonsight's cutting-edge decarbonization planning software and Correlate's expertise in developing and financing renewable and clean energy projects.
  • As building owners and operators establish decarbonization strategies with Carbonsight, they can seamlessly quantify costs, savings, and timelines for implementing targeted energy projects.
  • Additionally, Correlate's commitment to provide optimal financing for renewable and clean energy projects aligns with Carbonsight's mission, providing businesses with financially viable and environmentally sustainable solutions.

The effect of new housing supply in structural models: a forecasting performance evaluation

Retrieved on: 
Sunday, February 4, 2024
BET, Section 2, Model, XT, CIT, LTV, Forecasting, Total, Bank, RT, Elasticity, GDP, Website, University of Chicago Press, Process control block, Fiscal, Reproduction, University, WTP, Johns Hopkins University Press, E32, Faculty, Writing, KMR, Monetary economics, Household, Root mean square, YT, GFC, Language, VAR, A6, Motivation, Growth, PLT, Hartman–Grobman theorem, Research, House, Observation, Friction, Section 4, Classification, Macroeconomic model, BAA, AP, Kálmán, Odyssean Wicca, Parameter, Blue chip, A5, HPT, Mark Gertler, Learning, Smets, Inflation, ECB, Q2, Trade, CE, Hit, SPF, Review of Economic Dynamics, ZBW, Kolasa, LTM, R21, Patient, Prior, Shock, Movement, ZT, Australasian, M1, Lens, Great, Nobuhiro, European Central Bank, Estimator, Policy, LTI, COVID-19, Attention, HP, Feedback, Goethe University Frankfurt, International Journal of Forecasting, Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve Bank, Behavior, Health, Blue Chip Economic Indicators, Inverse, Zero lower bound, The Blue, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Economic forecasting, Matrix, Economy, Federal, R31, LTP, Chinese Blackjack, WTI, CES, Sim, Bit, Section 5, Capital market, Quantitative Economics, Credit, Motion, Central bank, Journal of Political Economy, Political economy, Taylor & Francis, Journal of Monetary Economics, Act, Binning, CPT, DPT, Point, MCMC, RealTime, Literature, Metropolis–Hastings algorithm, ZLB, TFP, Research Papers in Economics, Del Negro, GBT, Communication, Kalman filter, Markov, Cycle, Business cycle, Eurozone, DFF, PDF, Filter, Medical classification, American Economic Journal, Demand shock, Comparison, Employment, KTEH, Cobb–Douglas production function, Nonprofit organization, Sampler, PTW, Par, Liquidity trap, Paper, Nominal interest rate, QT, Exercise, Monetary policy, RTD, Interest rate, A7, University of Cambridge, Control, Statistics, Posterior, Pressure, American Economic Review, E37, Financial intermediary, Social science, Basel II, Delphic, Depreciation, European Economic Review, HPD, Ai, Calendar, E17, Government, Journal of Econometrics, HTM, Freedom, LTE, Probability, Face, Calibration, Oxford University Press, New Keynesian economics, Sun, HH, Me, Uncertainty, FPI, Production, Dynamics, Handbook, Real estate

Key Points: 

    Deposit market concentration and monetary transmission: evidence from the euro area

    Retrieved on: 
    Sunday, February 4, 2024

    Abstract

    Key Points: 
      • Abstract
        I study the transmission of monetary policy to deposit rates in the euro area with a
        focus on asymmetries and the role of banking sector concentration.
      • Moreover, the
        gap between deposit rates across euro area member states - despite being exposed to the same
        key ECB interest rates - has widened.
      • This begs the question whether deposit rates are more
        sluggish in response to both policy rate increases and cuts, and what factors might influence the
        transmission of monetary policy to deposit rates.
      • Whether banks are indeed able to adjust deposit rates asymmetrically to positive and
        negative changes in policy rates could thus well depend on how much market power they hold
        in the deposit market.
      • Arguing that market power increases in the degree of market concentration,
        I further consider whether more concentrated banking sectors set rates (more) asymmetrically.
      • The response of deposit rates in banking sectors with an average degree of concentration does
        not appear asymmetric.
      • The degree of market concentration is often pointed at, but recent evidence
        for the euro area is scarce.
      • In this paper, I provide empirical evidence on the asymmetric response of deposit rates to
        monetary policy, and relate this to the degree of concentration within a country?s banking sector.
      • Both papers
        provide empirical evidence based on US deposit markets showing that deposit rates respond
        more rigidly to upward changes in market rates than downward changes, especially so in more
        concentrated markets.
      • Recent research on euro area deposit markets,
        instead, has focused more on the transmission of negative policy rates (see e.g.
      • Whether banks are able to set deposit rates that materially differ from policy rates is affected

        ECB Working Paper Series No 2896

        4

        by market concentration: market power is assumed to increase in the degree of concentration in
        the banking sector.

      • Concentration thus appears to matter for how quickly ECB monetary policy has
        been transmitted to deposit rates across the euro area.
      • Banks thus have a motive to be
        rigid in adjusting deposit rates to a ?positive? monetary policy shock.
      • While customers are generally (and potentially rationally) inattentive, swift and substantial
        nominal deposit rate declines may trigger deposit outflows.
      • relative deposit rate = deposit rate - short term rate
        The inverse of the wedge, the relative deposit rate will allow us to see more clearly how
        the deposit rate evolves in comparison to the short-term rate.
      • This then translates to (more
        pronounced) effects on the transmission of policy to the deposit wedge, reinforcing the asymmetry discussed before.
      • More concentration would mean more rigid deposit rates (and thus an
        increase in the deposit wedge) in case of positive surprises, and more flexible deposit rates (and
        thus a decrease in the deposit wedge) in case of negative surprises (see also e.g.
      • I add an identical
        altered-linex adjustment cost for deposit rates, to capture the upward rigidity and downward
        flexibility of deposit rates as well.
      • As discussed
        previously, the deposit rate is particularly rigid in case of a positive shock, illustrating the dividend smoothing motive and bank market power.
      • Without the asymmetric adjustment cost,
        the response of the deposit rates to positive and negative changes in policy would have been
        symmetric.
      • This appears a reasonable assumption
        in general, as market concentration or market shares are slow-moving concepts.
      • 3

        Methods and data

        I study the dynamic response to an unexpected change in monetary policy on deposit rates
        in different countries in the euro area.

      • deposit rate - short-term rate), which for the sake of
        brevity I will refer to as the ?relative deposit rate?.
      • Positive IRFs for the relative deposit rate imply that
        the deposit rate has increased by more than the short-term rate, narrowing the wedge between
        the short-term rate and the deposit rate.
      • 0
        ?2

        ?2
        ?4
        ?6

        ?4
        4

        8

        12

        4

        Months

        8

        12

        Months

        Figure 9: NFC rate response - linear combination of ?0 and ?1

        Relative deposit rate at 1 month

        Relative deposit rate at 4 months

        0.0

        0
        ?1

        p.p.

      • 0
        0

        ?2
        ?1
        ?4
        4

        8

        12

        4

        8

        Months

        12

        Months

        Figure 12: NFC rate response - linear combination of ?0 and ?1

        Relative deposit rate at 1 month

        Relative deposit rate at 4 months
        2.0

        1.5

        p.p.

      • And, (2) how quickly
        households and NFCs learn about changes in monetary policy, via the deposit rate, may vary
        across the monetary union.
      • ?0 , ?1 )
        Figure A16: NFC overnight deposits, small member states

        Relative deposit rate (average)

        Relative deposit rate (interaction)

        2

        10
        5

        p.p.

      • ?0 , ?1 )
        Figure A19: NFC overnight deposits, four lags

        Relative deposit rate (average)

        Relative deposit rate (interaction)
        5

        0

        p.p.

      • ?0 , ?1 )
        Figure A28: NFC overnight deposits, small member states

        Relative deposit rate (average)

        Relative deposit rate (interaction)

        3

        5.0

        2

        2.5

        p.p.

      • ?0 , ?1 )
        Figure A31: NFC overnight deposits, four lags

        Relative deposit rate (average)

        Relative deposit rate (interaction)

        3
        2

        p.p.

    Sandy Spring Bancorp Reports Fourth Quarter Earnings of $26.1 Million

    Retrieved on: 
    Tuesday, January 23, 2024

    Net interest income for the fourth quarter of 2023 declined $3.4 million or 4% compared to the previous quarter and $24.9 million or 23% compared to the fourth quarter of 2022.

    Key Points: 
    • Net interest income for the fourth quarter of 2023 declined $3.4 million or 4% compared to the previous quarter and $24.9 million or 23% compared to the fourth quarter of 2022.
    • Non-interest income for the fourth quarter of 2023 decreased by 5% or $0.8 million compared to the linked quarter and grew by 16% or $2.3 million compared to the prior year quarter.
    • Net interest income for the fourth quarter of 2023 decreased $3.4 million or 4% compared to the previous quarter and $24.9 million or 23% compared to the fourth quarter of 2022.
    • The total provision for credit losses was a credit of $3.4 million for the fourth quarter of 2023 compared to a charge of $2.4 million for the previous quarter and $10.8 million for the fourth quarter of 2022.