The memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland announced on 1 January 2024 set off diplomatic rows in the Horn of Africa – and beyond. Details of the agreement are not publicly known, but both state leaders have touched on its content. Among the main elements:
Ethiopia gets a 50-year lease on a strip of land on Somaliland’s Red Sea coast for naval and commercial maritime use and access to the Berbera port.
Somaliland gets a share of Ethiopian Airlines. It also gets an undertaking that Ethiopia will investigate recognising Somaliland as a sovereign state. If it decides to do so, Ethiopia will be the first country to recognise Somaliland. The breakaway state has operated autonomously since it declared its independence from Somalia in May 1991, but lacks international recognition.
- It argues that the country’s historical status and its rapid economic growth entitle it to sovereign access to the sea.
- The diplomatic squabbles show re-configurations of political alliances in the Red Sea region and beyond.
- The memorandum of understanding has placed the question of Somaliland’s recognition into the centre of these political dynamics.
Opposition
- The president of the federal government of Somalia, Sheikh Hassan Mohamud, declared the memorandum a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
- It does not even exert full territorial control across Somalia – Al-Shabaab controls territory in south and central Somalia.
- So far the United Arab Emirates, a close partner of Somaliland and Ethiopia, has been silent.
- Not surprising is the opposition of Djibouti and China.
- Eritrea and Ethiopia fell out again after Ethiopia struck peace with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in November 2022.
The way forward
- The regional Intergovernmental Authority for Development, chaired by Djibouti, recently convened an extraordinary meeting to discuss tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia.
- It affirmed the territorial integrity of Somalia, but also called for de-escalation and dialogue.
- But Ethiopia’s president, who uses access to the sea to mobilise public support, has a lot to lose by offending these states.
This author is part of a research project on Port Infrastructure, International Politics, Everyday Life in the Horn of Africa (http://portinfrastructure.org) which received funding from Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed in this article are solely the responsibility of the author.
